U.S. v. Caceres

• Decision Date: 22 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-2384,84-2384
• Citation: 745 F.2d 935
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan CACERES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 935

745 F.2d 935

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan CACERES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 84-2384.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 22, 1984.

Windi Akins, Houston, Tex. (court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.

Daniel K. Hedges, U.S. Atty., James R. Gough, Asst. U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before GARZA, RANDALL and TATE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Juan Caceres seeks reversal of his drug conviction on the ground that his trial counsel also represented a codefendant, David Punch, with whom Caceres had a fundamental conflict of interest. Punch's conviction has already been reversed on the same ground. United States v. Punch, 722 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.1983). After the decision in Punch's case was announced, Caceres moved below, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, to vacate judgment. The district court denied the motion without assigning reasons, and Caceres brings this appeal.

I.

The facts of this case are set forth in our opinion affirming Caceres' conviction on direct appeal, United States v. Caballero, 712 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.1983), and our opinion reversing Punch's conviction, Punch, 722 F.2d at 146, and we need not repeat them here. We simply note that Punch, Caceres and several others were tried before the same jury for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Punch and Caceres retained the same attorney, Windi Akins, who, after discovering that her clients' defenses were antagonistic, attempted to withdraw as counsel for Punch. Her repeated and timely attempts to withdraw were denied by the district court. As a last ditch effort to protect her clients' sixth amendment rights, Akins obtained the district court's permission, on the first day of trial, for another attorney to appear on Punch's behalf. James Skelton appeared on the next day of trial to represent Punch, but Akins remained his attorney of record. Punch and Caceres were both convicted. Caceres appealed first, but did not raise the issue of his attorney's conflict of interest. Caballero, 712 F.2d at 126. Punch, however, raised the conflict of interest objection on direct appeal, and, applying the principles of Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), we reversed his conviction on that ground. Punch, 722 F.2d at 146. Caceres then made the instant section 2255 collateral attack on his conviction.

II.

Our decision in Punch, 722 F.2d at 152, clearly sets forth the principle governing this appeal: "Whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic." (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 488, 98 S.Ct. at 1180). Our decision there was not based on demonstrable prejudice to Punch resulting from an actual conflict manifesting itself before the jury at trial; it was based instead on the trial court's failure to deal with the possibility of a conflict once that possibility was brought to its attention in a timely manner. Caceres faced the same possibility of conflict as did Punch and made the same timely objections to the trial court. Therefore, it would serve no purpose here to engage in a lengthy reexamination of the assistance of counsel issue; we think what we said about Punch applies as well to Caceres.

The Government argues unconvincingly that Caceres deserves different treatment than Punch because (1) Akins sought to withdraw as Punch's attorney, not Caceres' and (2) since Skelton appeared at trial to represent Punch, Akins "represented Caceres exclusively" and provided him with effective assistance of counsel. This argument has no merit, as we would have thought our Punch decision makes clear, for two related reasons: (1) the association of Skelton on the second day of trial did not necessarily free Akins from the yoke of joint representation during the remaining days of trial ¹ and (2) at any rate, the right to conflict-free representation is not a temporal right that kicks in on the second day of trial; it exists at all critical stages of the prosecution, including "hearings on pretrial motions, the voir dire of the jury, the reading of the indictment, and the entering of pleas." 722 F.2d at 151.

The Government also argues that, because Caceres did not raise it on direct appeal, he has waived the conflict of interest issue. The Government, however, did not raise the waiver issue below and cannot rely on it for the first time here. ² Cf. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 670 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir.) (state cannot raise exhaustion for first time on appeal), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 2912, 73 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1982).

III.

Because we are convinced that Caceres is in the same position as Punch, we are, for the reasons set forth in Punch, ...