U.S. v. Cameron

• Decision Date: 01 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. CR-09-24-B-W.,CR-09-24-B-W.
• Citation: 652 F.Supp.2d 74
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. James M. CAMERON.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

652 F.Supp.2d 74

UNITED STATES of America, v. James M. CAMERON.

No. CR-09-24-B-W.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

September 1, 2009.

Gail Fisk Malone, Office of the U.S. Attorney, District of Maine, Bangor, ME, for United States of America.

Peter E. Rodway, Rodway & Horodyski, Portland, ME, for James M. Cameron.

ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., Chief Judge.

James M. Cameron seeks an order suppressing the results of a search of computers the Government seized pursuant to a search warrant. He claims that the state of Maine Superior Court Justice was not authorized under Maine law to issue a search warrant, that the actual search exceeded the terms of the warrant, that the search was conducted after the expiration of the warrant, and that the information in the affidavits failed to support a finding of probable cause. The Court denies the motion.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 11, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted James M. Cameron, alleging a variety of violations of federal criminal prohibitions against the possession and transportation of child pornography. Indictment (Docket # 3). On May 18, 2009, Mr. Cameron moved to suppress evidence the Government obtained as a consequence of a December 21, 2007 search of his house. Mot. to Suppress Evid. (Docket # 27) (Mot). The bases of the motion include: (1) that John Nivison, as a Superior Court Justice for the state of Maine, is not authorized to issue a search warrant; (2) that a state of Maine Superior Court Justice is not a "neutral and detached magistrate"; (3) that recent changes in Maine law do not authorize Justice Nivison to issue a search warrant; (4) that the exercise of issuance power by a Superior Court Justice violates the rules of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court; (5) that a search warrant signed by an unauthorized judge is void ab initio and cannot be saved by the "good faith exception"; (6) that the search of data files on the computers exceeded the scope of the warrant and was overbroad; (7) that the search of the computer equipment was conducted after the expiration of the warrant; and, (8) that the information contained in the four corners of the affidavits was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Unauthorized Issuance of Search Warrant, "Neutral and Detached Magistrate," Ineffective Authorization of Search Warrant Authority, and the Good Faith Exception

On December 21, 2007, affidavits in support of a search warrant and a draft search warrant for Mr. Cameron's residence were taken to state of Maine Superior Court Justice John Nivison for review. The same day, Justice Nivison signed the warrant, crossing out the title "Justice of the Peace," leaving the title District Court Judge intact, and writing below "District Court Judge," his title "Superior Court Justice."¹

The basic premise of Mr. Cameron's multi-pronged attack against the legality of the search warrant is that Justices of the Superior Court in Maine are not authorized under Maine law to issue search warrants. Mr. Cameron points to the language of the search warrant authorizing statute, which limits the authority to issue search warrants to District Judges and Justices of the Peace.

A judge of the District Court or a justice of the peace shall issue search warrants for any place in the State for such purposes as the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Maine permit ...

15 M.R.S.A. § 55. He also notes that Rule 41 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, which addresses search warrants, refers only to District Court Judges. Mot. at 3; Me. R.Crim. P. 41(a) (stating that "[a] search warrant may be issued by a judge of the District Court or justice of the peace as authorized by law"). Mr. Cameron argues that the statutory restriction to District Judges is policy-based, since Superior Court Justices are more likely to hear motions to suppress and since the inclusion of Superior Court Justices would diminish District Judge involvement in the search warrant review process. Mot. at 4. He contends that the failure of the state of Maine to expressly designate Superior Court Justices to issue search warrants deprived him of his constitutional right to a "neutral and detached magistrate." Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)). Finally, acknowledging that the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued an administrative order allowing Justices of the Superior Court to sit as Judges of the District Court, Mr. Cameron says that the authorization did not extend to the issuance of search warrants. Mot. at 5-7.

The Court does not agree that a Superior Court Justice in Maine lacks the authority to issue a search warrant. In 2007, the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, acting pursuant to statutory authority, expressly authorized the Justices of the Superior Court to sit as Judges of the District Court. Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Admin. Order JB-07-3 (eff. Nov. 1, 2007).² The administrative order relies on authority granted by 4 M.R.S.A. § 121, which authorizes the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to assign a Justice of the Superior Court to sit in the District Court and "when so directed the justice has authority and jurisdiction in the District Court as if the justice were a regular judge of that court" and to "hear all matters and issue all orders, notices, decrees and judgments that any Judge of the District Court is authorized to hear and issue." 4 M.R.S.A. § 121.

In view of Administrative Order JB-07-3, the Court agrees with the Government that when Justice Nivison signed the search warrant as a Superior Court Justice, he was acting as a District Judge under 15 M.R.S.A. § 55. He was expressly authorized to do so by the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice herself was acting under express statutory authority. Mr. Cameron's literal interpretation notwithstanding, when a Superior Court Justice issues a search warrant in Maine, he or she is acting as a District Court Judge under 15 M.R.S.A. § 55 and Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, and is thus authorized to issue a search warrant. Since Justice Nivison was acting according to authority under Maine law, he was a "neutral and detached magistrate" under Johnson.³ Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, 68 S.Ct. 367; Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972).

Mr. Cameron's final contention is that search warrants are not "orders, notices, decrees and judgments" under 4 M.R.S.A. § 121, and therefore, even though a Superior Court Justice might be authorized to issue some District Court orders, he or she would not be authorized to issue a search warrant. This argument ignores the first sentence of the authorizing section, which provides that "the justice has the authority and jurisdiction of the District Court as if the justice were a regular judge of that court." 4 M.R.S.A. § 121. Further, in issuing a search warrant, a judge would seem to be issuing an order, notice, or decree within the meaning of 4 M.R.S.A. section 121, and if not, the authority to issue a search warrant is authorized under the general grant of authority in the first sentence of § 121.

B. The Search of Data Files on the Computers Exceeded the Scope of the Warrant and the Warrant Itself Was Overbroad

Distinguishing between the authority to seize and the authority to search, Mr. Cameron says that the law enforcement search of the seized Cameron data files exceeded the authorized scope of the warrant. Mot. at 11-17. He says the warrant contained two parts, "Property/Evidence to be Seized," and a seizure section, which expressly referenced the computers, computer records or data, and visual images in any form that would be illegal under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 281(4).⁴ Id. at 12. He says that the search warrant "did not authorize the search of the computers for any particular items" and that the warrant "did not authorize the search of the computers themselves, just the seizure of them and any other `computer records or data.'" Id. He contends that the failure of the search portion of the warrant to specify what the officers were authorized to look for within the computers makes the warrant a "general warrant" prohibited by the Fourth Amendment as overly broad. Id. at 13. Noting that computers contain vast amounts of private information, he maintains that to be upheld, a search warrant must specify what the officers are authorized to seek when they examine a computer. Id. In support, he cites United States v. Grimmett, a Tenth Circuit case, for the proposition that "courts are willing to allow very broad computer searches, but officers must ask the court for such permission." Mot. at 13 (citing 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir.2006)).

The first part of Mr. Cameron's objection is not well taken. The search warrant states in part:

It is further authorized that in the event that computers or electronic data storage devices are in fact seized, they may be examined by a trained forensic examiner from the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit (or another law enforcement agency qualified to perform computer forensic examinations) either at the place of seizure or upon removal of the equipment to the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit's forensic lab, or both. This warrant further authorizes the making of a duplicate "image" of any computer or electronic data storage device that is seized pursuant to this warrant for subsequent forensic examination. It is further authorized that civilian employees of the Maine Department of Public Safety assigned to the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit may assist in the execution of this search warrant and any subsequent forensic examination of seized evidence.

Search Warrant Attach. 1 (Docket # 63). By its express terms, the warrant authorizes not merely the seizure, but also the search of the seized computers....