U.S. v. Carbone, s. 88-1668
Decision Date | 01 March 1989 |
Docket Number | 88-1756,Nos. 88-1668,s. 88-1668 |
Citation | 880 F.2d 1500 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Luis CARBONE, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Carlos V. Garcia Gutierrez, San Juan, P.R., for appellant.
Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco, Asst. U.S. Atty., Crim. Div., San Juan, P.R., with whom Jose A. Quiles, Acting U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., was on brief for the U.S.
Before BREYER and SELYA, Circuit Judges, and CAFFREY, ** Senior District Judge.
Defendant Luis Carbone appeals from the district court's denial of his motions for post-conviction relief under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. Carbone was convicted by a jury of conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, aiding and abetting in the possession of half a kilogram of cocaine with intent to distribute it, and aiding and abetting in the distribution of half a kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. The conviction was affirmed by this Court in United States v. Carbone, 798 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.1986).
In addition to arguing that the district court erred in denying his request for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and an alleged "unauthorized evidentiary finding" by this Court, defendant argues that the court should at least have held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motions. Given that we are not persuaded by defendant's arguments, we affirm.
First, defendant argues that a new trial is in order because newly discovered evidence establishes that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant contends that his attorney did not pursue viable defenses available to Carbone because of a conflict of loyalties in his representation. He claims that his attorney abandoned an in-depth cross-examination of Jose Rios, a government informant, due to an earlier agreement the attorney had entered into with the government involving Rios' role in another drug prosecution case. There is no indication in the record, however, that the alleged conflict of interest adversely affected defense counsel's performance in cross-examining Rios, nor was the alleged conflict an active conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979) ( ). Defendant is therefore required to show that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that but for this ineffective assistance the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-68, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ( ).
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Carbone has been unable to show that his attorney's performance in cross-examining Rios fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The transcript indicates that such cross-examination was vigorous and was well within the range of competence required of defense counsel in criminal cases. Furthermore, defendant is unable to establish by a long shot that there is a reasonable probability that but for the alleged ineffective assistance the outcome of the trial would have been different. As this Court explained in the earlier affirmance, "[t]he evidence against defendant was overwhelming; he was convicted by the words out of his own mouth." 798 F.2d at 29. Rios' testimony was only a part of a strong case against defendant. Defendant's challenge on this basis fails to satisfy both of the requirements set forth in Strickland. The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this challenge.
Second, defendant also argues that a new trial should be granted based on newly discovered evidence uncovering the alleged perjury of Burgos Colon, one of the government's key witnesses at trial. Carbone alleges that there is substantial evidence that Burgos lied when he testified that he sold half a kilogram of cocaine to Carbone. According to defendant, Burgos told a fellow inmate at the Commonwealth Penitentiary at Rio Piedras that he had never entered into a drug transaction with defendant. Defendant has also provided this Court with a supplemental offer of proof regarding the alleged perjury of Burgos at trial on the subject of his plea agreement which provided for his testifying against Carbone. For purposes of this appeal, we allow the defendant's related motion to supplement the record. We conclude, however, that the district court's denial of defendant's request for a new trial should not be disturbed.
Given that defendant has alleged that Burgos' testimony implicating defendant in the drug transaction was perjured, the applicable analysis is arguably the test described in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir.1928). See United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1020 (1st Cir.1980) (). Under Larrison, the threshold for granting a new trial is that "the trial judge be satisfied that the testimony was perjured." Id. at 1020. It is well established that recantations are generally viewed with considerable skepticism. Pelegrina v. United States, 601 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 961 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834, 99 S.Ct. 115, 58 L.Ed.2d 129 (1978). In the present case, there is substantial cause to disbelieve Burgos' alleged recantation. Burgos' testimony at trial was consistent in all material respects with the recorded conversations admitted into evidence and testimony provided by other government witnesses. As this Court explained earlier, 798 F.2d at 29 (footnote omitted). We see no reason to disturb the...
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