U.S. v. Carter, 04-2578.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-2578.,04-2578. |
| Citation | 408 F.3d 852 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael CARTER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jonathan H. Koenig (argued), Michelle L. Jacobs, Office of the United States Attorney, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ann Auberry (argued), Rebholz & Auberry, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before KANNE, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
Michael Carter pled guilty in federal district court to the fraudulent use of a social security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(g). Carter admitted in the plea agreement to using a false social security number to obtain financing on a 2002 Mazda 626 automobile. That was one in a series of such purchases, in which Carter obtained eight automobiles from eight Milwaukee area dealerships using false financial information and false social security numbers. Carter never made payments toward any of those vehicles. Carter was sentenced to a six-month term of imprisonment and three years of supervised release for that offense. In addition, the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $52,285.87, or at least $100 per month during supervised release.
After his release from prison and while on supervised release, Carter engaged in several violations of the terms of that release, the most serious of which resulted in a conviction for credit card theft. Other violations included the failure to pay child support, failure to maintain employment, and receipt of traffic citations. After conducting a revocation hearing, the district court revoked Carter's supervised release and ordered him to serve 8 months' imprisonment followed by 2 years of supervised release. In addition to the standard conditions of supervised release, the district court further ordered Carter: to participate in a cognitive intervention program; to reimburse the clerk of court for the cost of appointed counsel at the rate of no less than $50 per month; to refrain from holding employment or self-employment having fiduciary duties without first notifying his employer and/or his supervising probation officer; not to open any new lines of credit or use existing credit without the prior approval of his supervising probation officer; to submit all tax returns in a timely manner; to pay child support and arrearage; and to participate in a mental health treatment program.
Carter was released from his second term of supervised release in May 2003. In March 2004, he was indicted in the district court for misuse of a social security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). The indictment alleged that Carter used the name of his father, Stanley Carter, and a false social security number to purchase an automobile from a dealership in February 2004. Following that indictment, Carter's probation officer petitioned the court for an order to show cause why Carter's supervised release should not be revoked. The petition noted the criminal charge and also detailed that Carter had failed: to make any payment toward his court-appointed counsel since his release from prison; to tender monthly child support payments for almost a year; to submit monthly restitution payments; and to file, or to obtain an extension for, a 2003 tax return. The court conducted a hearing in June 2004 on that petition. Consistent with his plea agreement in the new federal criminal case, Carter did not contest the revocation of his supervised release, and the court proceeded to consideration of the appropriate sentence. The government recommended that the court sentence Carter at the high end of the 6-to 12-month sentencing guideline range. The court instead sentenced Carter to 24 months' imprisonment—the maximum term of imprisonment permitted by statute—with no additional supervised release. Carter now appeals that sentence.
Carter acknowledges that the guidelines for sentence revocation are advisory, and that the court has discretion to impose the sentence that it feels appropriate within the statutory limits. He nevertheless contends that the court abused that discretion in imposing the sentence of 24 months, double the amount recommended by the guidelines.
We will not reverse the district...
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