U.S. v. Carter, CR. 03-30041-CBK.

Citation629 F.Supp.2d 934
Decision Date22 April 2009
Docket NumberNo. CR. 03-30041-CBK.,CR. 03-30041-CBK.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. William T. CARTER, Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. District of South Dakota

MARK A. MORENO, United States Magistrate Judge.

The above-captioned 28 U.S.C. § 2255 case was referred to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), for the purpose of conducting any necessary hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and submitting proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition thereof.1 Having carefully reviewed and considered all of the records on file and being fully advised in the premises, the Court does now make and propose the following findings, report and recommendations for resolution of the case.

I.

Defendant, William T. Carter (Carter), an Indian, was charged in a seven-count Indictment with abusive sexual contact, sexual abuse of a minor and incest of his stepdaughter, one of his granddaughters and the granddaughter's friend. United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 1017, 1020-21 (8th Cir.2005) (Carter I). He was convicted by a jury on all seven counts and sentenced to 360 months in prison. 410 F.3d at 1021, 1028: United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir.2007) (Carter II). On appeal, Carter argued that the trial court "erred in admitting certain evidence and limiting the cross-examination of a prosecution witness, in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on two counts, and in sentencing him." Carter I, 410 F.3d at 1020-21. He also maintained that the prosecutor's closing argument denied him a fair trial. Id. at 1021. The Eighth Circuit court of appeals affirmed Carter's convictions, but remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Id.; Carter II, 490 F.3d at 643.

After a hearing, the trial court sentenced Carter to 295 months imprisonment. Id. at 643. He again appealed, contending that the court erred in imposing certain sentencing enhancements. Id. The court of appeals, however, affirmed his sentence and judgment. Id. at 643, 646.

Carter then filed a motion under § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. The district court thereafter conducted an initial consideration of the motion, denied a motion to dismiss the same, granted Carter leave to amend his motion and directed Plaintiff, United States of America (Government), to file an answer or responsive pleading, along with a memorandum in support thereof, that complied with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings (§ 2255 Rules). The court, at the same time, referred the case to this Court to handle on a report and recommendation basis.

The Government complied with the district court's directives. In its response, the Government challenged the factual and legal basis for Carter's claims and requested that his § 2255 motion be denied in its entirety.

II.

The salient facts surrounding Carter's convictions are set forth in the appeals court's initial decision, see Carter I, 410 F.3d at 1021, and will not be repeated here. It will suffice to say that Carter sexually abused K.J.R., his stepdaughter, J.R.Y.H., his granddaughter, and B.A.S., a friend of his granddaughter, over approximately a one-year time period between December 18, 2000, and December 29, 2001, in Eagle Butte, South Dakota, on the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. In addition to the three alleged victims, three other female witnesses testified regarding sexual abuse that Carter committed beyond that for which he was tried. The evidence of Carter's guilt was overwhelming and the jury's deliberations lasted less than four hours.

III.

The district court, in its referral order, instructed this Court to determine whether an evidentiary hearing was required on Carter's § 2255 motion. Carter has requested such a hearing and the Court is duty bound, under Rules 4(b) and 8(a) of the § 2255 Rules, to determine whether a hearing is mandated or otherwise called for under the circumstances.

An evidentiary hearing is not required "where the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief." Kingsberry v. United States, 202 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 81, 148 L.Ed.2d 43 (2000): see also United States v. Ledezma-Rodriguez, 423 F.3d 830, 835-36 (8th Cir.2005). Such a hearing need not be held where the movant's claims are facially inadequate or affirmatively refuted by the record. Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Buster v. United States, 447 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir.2006); Sanders v. United States, 341 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1199, 124 S.Ct. 1460, 158 L.Ed.2d 116 (2004).

Carter's claims are ones that are capable of resolution from the record, as it now exists. Blankenship v. United States, 159 F.3d 336, 337 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090, 119 S.Ct. 844, 142 L.Ed.2d 699 (1999): Petersen v. United States, 352 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1019 (D.S.D.2005). After close scrutiny of the records on file, the Court is convinced that Carter cannot prevail on any of his claims. Saunders v. United States, 236 F.3d 950, 952-53 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 917, 121 S.Ct. 2524, 150 L.Ed.2d 696 (2001): see also United States v. Regenos, 405 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir.2005).

This being the case, Carter is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the Court shall proceed to dispose of his motion in a summary manner "as justice dictates." See Rules 4(b) and 8(a) of the § 2255 Rules.

IV.

Section 2255(a), which provides post-conviction relief for federal prisoners, states as follows:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

See also Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777, 781 (8th Cir.) ("To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the [movant] must demonstrate a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States."), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1094, 124 S.Ct. 970, 157 L.Ed.2d 803 (2003). A motion pursuant to § 2255 "is `intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.'" United States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974)).

Section 2255 relief though is not available to correct errors which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), or a showing that the alleged errors were fundamental defects resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice, see United States v. Smith, 843 F.2d 1148, 1149 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam); accord Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (in order to obtain collateral review of a procedurally defaulted claim, a movant must show either cause and prejudice or actual innocence).

The "cause and prejudice" necessary to resuscitate a procedurally defaulted claim may include ineffective assistance of counsel. Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1177, 126 S.Ct. 1346, 164 L.Ed.2d 59 (2006). Otherwise, "a claim that `is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel' may constitute cause for procedural default." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984)). "Prejudice" requires a showing that the error alleged "worked to [the movant's] actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584. In other words, the movant must demonstrate that there is a substantial likelihood that, absent the error, a jury would have acquitted him of the charged offenses. Johnson, 278 F.3d at 844. To establish "actual innocence" as an alternative means of overcoming a defaulted claim, the movant must show that, in light of all of the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604. This is a strict standard and one that generally the movant cannot satisfy where there is evidence sufficient to support his convictions. Johnson, 278 F.3d at 844; see also McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749-50 (8th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1148, 122 S.Ct. 1110, 151 L.Ed.2d 1005 (2002).

With these standards in mind, the Court now turns its attention to Carter's various claims for relief.

V.

Carter raises several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In doing so, he faces a heavy burden under the two-part Strickland test to establish that his trial counsel's assistance was ineffective. To prevail on his claims, Carter must show both (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A court must "indulge a strong presumption" that counsel's conduct was reasonable and that counsel "made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable, professional...

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