U.S. v. Chambers

• Citation: 944 F.2d 1253
• Decision Date: 10 September 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 89-1357,s. 89-1357
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billy Joe CHAMBERS (89-1381), Larry M. Chambers (89-1380/1950), Willie L. Chambers (89-1877/1879), Otis B. Chambers (89-1357/1949), Belinda Lumpkin (89-1382), Jerry L. Gant (89-1358), Marshall Glenn (89-1396), Eric L. Wilkins (89-1359), and Elayne C. Lucas (89-1360), Defendants-Appellants. to 89-1360, 89-1380 to 89-1382, 89-1396, 89-1877, 89-1879, 89-1949 and 89-1950.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 1253

944 F.2d 1253

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billy Joe CHAMBERS (89-1381), Larry M. Chambers (89-1380/1950), Willie L. Chambers (89-1877/1879), Otis B Chambers (89-1357/1949), Belinda Lumpkin (89-1382), Jerry L Gant (89-1358), Marshall Glenn (89-1396), Eric L. Wilkins (89-1359), and Elayne C. Lucas (89-1360), Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 89-1357 to 89-1360, 89-1380 to 89-1382, 89-1396,

89-1877, 89-1879, 89-1949 and 89-1950.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Aug. 13, 1990.

Decided Sept. 10, 1991.

Larry Bunting, Asst. U.S. Atty., John R. Roth, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued and briefed), Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee.

Thomas V. Wilhelm (argued and briefed), Frederick K. Hoops & Assoc., Birmingham, Mich., for Otis Bernard Chambers.

Curtis R. Williams (argued and briefed), Detroit, Mich., for Jerry Lee Gant.

Timothy P. Murphy (briefed), Detroit, Mich., for Eric Lamar Wilkins.

Ronald R. Gold (argued and briefed), Southfield, Mich., for Elayne Coleman Lucas.

Elayne Coleman Lucas, Detroit, Mich., pro se.

Rita C. Martin (argued and briefed), Federal Public Defenders Office, Anthony T. Chambers (argued), Detroit, Mich., Larry Marlowe Chambers.

Douglas R. Mullkoff (argued and briefed), Kessler & Geer, Ann Arbor, Mich., for Billy Joe Chambers.

Rudolph A. Wartella, III (argued and briefed), East Detroit, Mich., for Belinda Lumpkin.

David I. Goldstein (briefed), Ann Arbor, Mich., for Marshall Glenn.

John R. Minock (argued and briefed), Kelley & Cramer, Ann Arbor, Mich., for Willie Lee Chambers.

Willie Lee Chambers, pro se.

Before RYAN and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and WILHOIT, District Judge. ^*

RYAN, Circuit Judge.

Defendants are nine members of a drug trafficking conspiracy known as the Chambers Brothers Organization. They appeal their convictions for conspiracy and related crimes.

I.

On February 29, 1988, twenty-two persons were named in a fifteen-count indictment charging conspiracy with the intent to possess and distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; possession with the intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201; and continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.

The drug conspiracy involved an extensive crack cocaine distribution network in the City of Detroit, organized and directed by brothers Billy Joe and Larry Chambers, and known as the Chambers Brothers Organization. The conspiracy allegedly began in 1983 and continued through February 1988. There was testimony that the widespread and carefully structured operations generated narcotics sales of as much as $200,000 a day. The operation was conducted out of various locations in the City of Detroit and was policed by a cadre of conspirator/enforcers known as "the wrecking crew." All twenty-two persons indicted were members of the organization.

At the time of trial, four of the indictees were fugitives, and four others had pled guilty. The remaining fourteen indictees are the defendants in this case and were tried jointly. They were tried by a jury except Willie Lee Chambers, who was tried by a judge. During the trial, the government dismissed charges against four of the original defendants and the jury acquitted one. The remaining nine defendants were convicted, and now appeal.

The nine defendants raise a host of issues, of which the following are most significant:

1. Application of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, 18 U.S.C. § 5031, et seq.

2. Denial of a change of venue due to pretrial publicity.

3. Denial of a mistrial following recantation of testimony.

4. Sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy.

5. Double jeopardy.

6. Sentence guidelines issues.

We conclude that:

The convictions of Lumpkin and Wilkins must be vacated and their cases remanded for a hearing and ultimate disposition consistent with what we have said in part II-A; The convictions of Billy Joe and Larry Chambers for conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and one of the two convictions and its corresponding sentence must be vacated in each case; and that

All other convictions must be affirmed.

II.

A. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act

The jury found Belinda Lumpkin and Eric Wilkins guilty of conspiracy to distribute, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, "crack" cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Lumpkin and Wilkins were under eighteen years of age during the greater part of the conspiracy and performed their overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy while they were between fifteen and eighteen years of age. Thus they were eligible for special procedural protections afforded certain juveniles under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ("FJDA" or "the Act") of 1938, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq. Nevertheless, the government proceeded against Lumpkin and Wilkins as adults, and they failed to invoke the Act's protection until the close of the government's case-in-chief. They then filed motions for mistrial or acquittal on the ground that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to the government's failure to file a certification required by the Act. The government responded by tendering the statutorily required certification, along with a motion to proceed against the juvenile defendants as adults.

The district court denied Lumpkin's and Wilkins' motions, and they appeal. The district court concluded that the certification requirement pertained to personal, rather than subject-matter, jurisdiction and that Lumpkin and Wilkins waived the issue of personal jurisdiction by failing to timely object. Alternatively, the district court concluded that the government's tender of certification at the close of its case-in-chief was timely. We agree with the district court's latter conclusion but nevertheless find it necessary to remand Lumpkin's and Wilkins' cases to the district court for further proceedings.

1.

Congress enacted the FJDA in order to remove juveniles from the ordinary federal criminal justice system and to provide them with protections not available to adults accused of committing crimes. See United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 405, 66 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980). The Act defines "juvenile" and "juvenile delinquency" as follows:

[A] "juvenile" is a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, ... and "juvenile delinquency" is the violation of a law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult.

18 U.S.C. § 5031. Persons who have not attained age twenty one but who have committed acts of juvenile delinquency are also "juveniles." Id. The statute further provides:

A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency, ... shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that ... (3) the offense charged is ... an offense described in section 841 ... of title 21, and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

If the Attorney General does not so certify, such juvenile shall be surrendered to the appropriate legal authorities of such State.

18 U.S.C. § 5032 (emphasis added). A successful prosecution under the Act does not result in a criminal conviction but rather in an adjudication that the defendant has entered into a state of juvenile delinquency.

2.

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 701, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2103, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982), and, for purposes of jurisdiction, there exists no general federal common law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Consequently, the district court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to Lumpkin's and Wilkins' cases only if there exists some specific constitutional or statutory provision expressly or impliedly conferring such jurisdiction.

In cases where the federal government accuses adults of committing federal crimes such as possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, federal statutes confer jurisdiction upon the district courts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3231; 21 U.S.C. § 841. As the district court noted, prior to the enactment of the FJDA, the government successfully relied upon such statutes as the jurisdictional basis for prosecuting juveniles in the district courts. Cf. United States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir.1978).

The enactment of the FJDA, however, reflects a legislative perception that accused juvenile offenders generally belong in the hands of state authorities, absent unusual circumstances and/or special procedural protections. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have discussed the legislative policy underlying the FJDA as follows:

The certification procedure in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act encompasses a recognition of the general policy of federal abstention. The official summary and analysis of the 1974 amendments to the Act stated:

The federal courts and federal correctional system have never been properly equipped to handle large numbers of juveniles with the result that federal juvenile delinquents are frequently transferred away from their home communities for treatment. By deferring jurisdiction to state courts, the harmful effects of this dislocation would be reduced.

120 Cong.Rec. 25162 (1974). The certification procedure was designed to ensure that only where jurisdiction existed nowhere but in the ...