U.S. v. Chandler

• Decision Date: 16 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 98-40044-01.,No. 00-3382-RDR.,98-40044-01.,00-3382-RDR.
• Citation: 291 F.Supp.2d 1204
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Cecil W. CHANDLER III, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

291 F.Supp.2d 1204

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Cecil W. CHANDLER III, Defendant.

No. 98-40044-01.

No. 00-3382-RDR.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

September 16, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Norman Wesley Quarles, Pro se, Forrest City, AR, James G. Chappas, Jr., Ronald E. Wurtz, Office of Federal Public Defender, Topeka, KS, for Defendant.

Thomas G. Luedke, Office of United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROGERS, District Judge.

This matter is presently before the court upon the defendant's pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Having carefully reviewed the arguments contained in the defendant's motion, the court is now prepared to rule.

The defendant was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of conspiracy to distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 360 months imprisonment on each count. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. United States v. Chandler, 5 Fed.Appx. 839, 2001 WL 201977 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 852, 122 S.Ct. 120, 151 L.Ed.2d 76 (2001). The defendant was convicted of involvement in two conspiracies: (1) one with David Seabury from approximately January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1997 to distribute crack cocaine (the "Seabury conspiracy"); and (2) one with Ronnie Jones from approximately November 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997 to distribute crack cocaine (the "Jones conspiracy"). The facts underlying these convictions were set forth in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in this case as follows:

A. The Seabury Conspiracy

Defendant sold crack for a living. Seabury and Defendant began buying crack together in 1997. Their first joint purchase occurred in January, 1997. Defendant arranged to meet the seller, a person unknown to Seabury, in a grocery story parking lot in Topeka, Kansas. Seabury and Defendant then drove to Topeka, Kansas, where Defendant paged the seller. When the seller approached their car, Seabury gave Defendant $500 which Defendant put together with his own $500 and handed to the seller in exchange for one ounce of crack. After purchasing crack in Topeka, Defendant and Seabury divided it equally and then sold it separately. Defendant had others sell his crack for him. Specifically, Seabury saw Jermaine Archibald, a/k/a Bastard, sell drugs for Defendant.

Defendant and Seabury made two additional joint purchases from the Topeka seller in the same manner. The second joint purchase of crack occurred in May 1997, and differed from the first only in that two ounces were purchased for $2000. The third and final joint purchase made by Seabury and Defendant took place in July 1997. That time, four ounces of crack were purchased for $4000. Seabury and Defendant had Seabury's mother rent cars for them, generally for one month at a time, which they used to drive to Topeka to buy crack and for other purposes. Defendant and Seabury each paid half of the rental charge and they shared the use of the rental cars equally.

During the period of time in which Defendant and Seabury were buying crack in Topeka, they spent a significant amount of time together and even jointly rented a home in Ogden, Kansas. At trial, the government introduced a photograph of Defendant and Seabury in which Defendant is displaying a large amount of cash for the camera. Seabury confirmed that the money Defendant is holding in that photograph came from selling crack.

B. The Jones Conspiracy

In November 1996 Defendant approached Ronnie Jones about buying drugs. Jones bought two ounces of crack from Defendant that month, and one ounce a month thereafter until May 1997. In these purchases Jones acted as a middleman, purchasing the crack from Defendant for a person named "Beedy-bump." Beedy-bump gave Jones the money he used to make the purchases and paid him approximately $200 for completing each transaction.

C. Other Evidence of the Charged Conspiracies

Jurlene Lucas a/k/a Jurlene Jackson, the mother of one of Defendant's girlfriends, heard Defendant discuss his sale of drugs numerous times during the nine years that she has known him. In 1997, Defendant told Lucas that he was buying his crack cocaine in Topeka and also bragged that he had fifteen people working for him in his drug operation. Lucas identified Keisha Green, Tamika Moore, a woman named "Lum," and Archibald as some of the people that worked in Defendant's drug ring. She often saw Defendant with Seabury, and heard both Seabury and Archibald brag about selling drugs.

Sometime during the summer of 1997, Defendant asked Lucas to keep $4000 for him. In September of 1997, after he had retrieved the original $4000, Defendant asked Lucas to hold an additional $8,500 for him. Later, he asked her to hold another $3000. Police eventually seized $10,960 of that money and found that most of it was in $20 bills.

At the time of the alleged conspiracies, crack was commonly sold in one-hit $20 pieces. Those one-hit pieces of crack are commonly packaged by dropping them in the corner of a sandwich baggie, tying a knot, and cutting the corner off above the knot. Brandon Grubs, a police officer, found small empty plastic bags and $230 in cash in Defendant's shoes when he searched Defendant following his arrest in December of 1996. When Grubs asked him what the baggies were for, Defendant replied that sometimes his stuff is not packaged and he has to do it himself.

In June 1998, police executed a search warrant at the home of Natasha Moore, Seabury's sister and another girlfriend of Defendant. Over $3000 worth of rental car agreements in Seabury's mother's name, from the first six months of 1997, were found. One of the agreements listed Defendant as a driver and Defendant had been stopped by police in the rental car covered by that particular agreement. Several letters from Defendant to Moore were also recovered. One of the letters contained a photograph of Defendant taken while he was incarcerated. The photograph shows Defendant in the center surrounded by approximately six other men. The handwritten caption on the photo reads: "I keep a Firm no matter where I'm at, baby." Ron Espy, a police officer, stated that the handwritten caption appeared to match the handwriting of the other letters from Defendant to Moore which were recovered during the search. Seabury, Lucas and Espy all testified that Defendant referred to his drug distribution organization as "The Firm."

In March or April of 1997, Defendant and Jones were both confined at the federal pretrial detention facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. Jones and Defendant had a conversation there in which Defendant told Jones that Archibald was running his drug business while he was incarcerated. After Jones had stopped purchasing crack from Defendant, Jones saw Defendant packaging crack in August 1997 at his Ogden, Kansas home.

Jones and Seabury both claimed to be very familiar with the appearance of crack, Seabury claiming to have seen it over 500 times and Jones, over 100 times. Both Seabury and Jones testified that the substance purchased from and with Defendant was crack. Finally, in June 1997, during the period of the alleged Seabury Conspiracy, Defendant was arrested for possession of crack. Defendant pled to possession of crack and a journal entry of his conviction was entered into evidence.

Seabury, Lucas and Jones all entered into agreements to testify with the federal prosecutor hoping to avoid indictment or to obtain lenient sentences.

Chandler, 5 Fed.Appx. at 843-45 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In the instant motion, the defendant raises the following grounds for relief: (1) his counsel was ineffective both prior to trial and during trial; (2) the instructions given by the court effectively amended the indictment; (3) the issue of the drug quantity was not submitted to the jury; (4) the government failed to notify him that it had filed an enhancement information under 21 U.S.C. § 851; (5) the government engaged in misconduct by relying upon a misleading witness to indict; (6) there was insufficient evidence to convict him; (7) the court erred in denying a James hearing prior to trial; and (8) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges against him.

In order to obtain relief under § 2255 on the basis of constitutional error, the petitioner must establish an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). In order to obtain relief on the basis of nonconstitutional error, the petitioner must show a fundamental defect in the proceedings resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice or an error so egregious that it amounted to a violation of due process. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353-354, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 129 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994).

An evidentiary hearing must be held on a § 2255 motion "unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 n. 1 (10th Cir.1995). To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the defendant must allege facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1471 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1235, 116 S.Ct. 1881, 135 L.Ed.2d 176 (1996). "[T]he allegations must be specific and particularized, not general or conclusory." Id. The court finds that a hearing on the defendant's motion is not necessary for two reasons. First, the court finds that the materials already in the record conclusively show that the defendant is not entitled to relief on most of his claims. Second, the court finds that the defendant has not provided a sufficient factual basis to require a hearing on the remaining claims.

...