U.S. v. Chanthasouxat

• Decision Date: 22 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-17158.,No. 01-17163.,01-17158.,01-17163.
• Citation: 342 F.3d 1271
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chittakone Chanthasouxat, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keopaseuth Xayasane, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

342 F.3d 1271

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chittakone Chanthasouxat, Defendant-Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keopaseuth Xayasane, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-17158.

No. 01-17163.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

August 22, 2003.

Roderick Graham (Court-Appointed), Birmingham, AL, for Chanthasouxat.

John H. England and Alice H. Martin, Birmingham, AL, for U.S.

J. William Cole (Court-Appointed), Luker, Cole & Assoc., LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Xayasane.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before DUBINA, MARCUS and GOODWIN^*, Circuit Judges.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

Chittakone Chanthasouxat ("Chanthasouxat") and Keopaseuth Xayasane ("Xayasane") (collectively, "Defendants") appeal their convictions for drug-related offenses. Specifically, Chanthasouxat and Xayasane argue that the district court erred in denying their motions to suppress drug evidence and statements obtained pursuant to a stop for an alleged traffic violation and a subsequent detention. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

Chanthasouxat was driving a van in which Xayasane was a passenger, traveling from Texas to North Carolina. Officer Phillip T. Carter ("Officer Carter") of the Birmingham, Alabama Police Department, testified that he stopped the van in Alabama for failure to have an inside rearview mirror. Officer Carter asked Chanthasouxat to step out of the van and stand behind it. He then questioned Chanthasouxat, who stated that he and Xayasane were driving back to North Carolina after having attended a party in Texas. Chanthasouxat told Officer Carter that a friend had loaned Defendants the van. Apparently, Chanthasouxat could not remember the friend's full name, so Officer Carter recorded the friend's name only as "Honroe." Officer Carter then questioned Xayasane, who stated that he and Chanthasouxat had been at an engagement party for Chanthasouxat's sister. Officer Carter observed that Xayasane appeared to be nervous and that one of his eyes was twitching.

Officer Carter placed Chanthasouxat in the patrol car and informed him that he would receive a citation for failure to have an inside rear-view mirror. Officer Carter then asked Chanthasouxat if he was carrying drugs and if the police could search the van. The patrol car was equipped with a video recorder, and the tape demonstrates that Officer Carter did not display his weapon or use any force or threats when he asked Chanthasouxat if he could search the van. Chanthasouxat agreed to the search. Officer Carter then asked Xayasane to join Chanthasouxat in the patrol car and called for back-up. After additional officers arrived, the police searched the van and found approximately fifteen kilograms of cocaine. While Chanthasouxat and Xayasane were in the patrol car, the patrol car video camera recorded their discussion of how they would reconcile their stories. Their conversation also demonstrated that they knew they were carrying cocaine.

The government charged Chanthasouxat and Xayasane with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence seized at the traffic stop and all of their statements on the grounds that Officer Carter did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the van or search its interior. Chanthasouxat also contended that his consent to the search was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Xayasane argued that the traffic citation was a pretext and that the Defendants were stopped because they were foreigners driving a van with Texas license plates. Xayasane also claimed that there was no Alabama or Birmingham law requiring a vehicle to have an inside rear-view mirror. He argued that, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion as grounds for the traffic stop, any evidence obtained from the stop was "fruit of the poisonous tree," and therefore should be suppressed. In addition, Xayasane contended that Officer Carter should have informed Defendants of their right to refuse consent to the search of the van,¹ and that, given the fact that English is not Defendants' native language, Officer Carter should have made it clear that Defendants' consent to the search was optional.

Chanthasouxat reiterated Xayasane's arguments and asserted that the detention after the traffic stop was invalid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). He also argued that the questioning was improper because, while a detention and any subsequent questioning must be reasonably related to the reason for the traffic stop, Officer Carter's questions were not. Chanthasouxat disputed the government's claim that Officer Carter had probable cause for the traffic stop under the totality of the circumstances. Moreover, he asserted that any consent to a search was tainted. Thus, any evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible under the exclusionary rule requiring courts to exclude evidence gathered by violating a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-13, 88 S.Ct. at 1875.

In response to Defendants' motions to suppress, the government argued that the Alabama Code required inside rear-view mirrors. Thus, because Chanthasouxat's vehicle had no inside rear-view mirror, Officer Carter had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. Pointing to Rule 20 of the Birmingham City Magistrate's fine schedule, the government also contended that the twenty dollar fine for "improper or no rear-view mirror" supported its position that the Defendants did, in fact, violate Birmingham's traffic code. In addition, the government argued that once Officer Carter properly stopped the van, Officer Carter's questioning of the Defendants was also proper. From the Defendants' answers to his questions, Officer Carter formed an articulable suspicion of other illegal activity. The government noted that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a consent to search a vehicle. The government also asserted that there were no coercive police procedures and that, viewing the totality of the circumstances, Chanthasouxat's consent to the search was voluntary. Finally, the government contended that the police are not required to inform Defendants that they have the right to refuse consent to a search.

At an evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress, Officer Carter was the only witness for the government. He testified, among other things, that his duties involved highway patrol and narcotics investigations and that he often stopped vehicles for violations of traffic laws on the interstate and then interviewed the individuals he stopped. On cross-examination, Officer Carter testified that he wrote the citation at issue under section 10-11-5 of the Birmingham City Code. That section states as follows:

No person shall drive on any street of the city a motor vehicle which is so constructed or loaded as to prevent the driver from obtaining a view of the street to the rear by looking backward from the driver's position unless that vehicle is equipped with a mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the streets for a distance of at least 200 feet of the rear of the vehicle.

Birmingham City Code § 10-11-5. Officer Carter acknowledged that this section did not specify that vehicles must have inside rear-view mirrors. He further acknowledged that there were no state statutes that specifically required that vehicles have inside rear-view mirrors. The Code of Alabama provides only that "[e]very motor vehicle, operated singly or when towing any other vehicle, shall be equipped with a mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway for a distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of such motor vehicle." Ala.Code § 32-5-214 (2002).

However, Officer Carter stated that a city magistrate had told him that the failure to have an inside rear-view mirror is a violation under section 10-11-5. More specifically, Officer Carter testified that he considered the lack of an inside rear-view mirror a violation based on his training, the magistrate's interpretation of the statute, and the fact that he had written over 100 tickets for the same violation.

After hearing all of the evidence, the district court denied the Defendants' motions to suppress. Specifically, the district court determined that, based on Officer Carter's training, his instructions from a magistrate concerning the interpretation of section 10-11-5, and his history of having written more than 100 traffic citations for the same violation, Officer Carter had probable cause to stop the Defendants' vehicle. Both Chanthasouxat and Xayasane subsequently entered conditional pleas of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denials of their motions to suppress. The district court sentenced each defendant to concurrent terms of sixty months imprisonment. Chanthasouxat and Xayasane then perfected their appeals.

II. ISSUES

A. Whether the district court erred in finding that Officer Carter had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the Defendants' vehicle.

B. Whether Chanthasouxat's consent to search the Defendants' vehicle was voluntary.

C. Whether Chanthasouxat had an expectation of privacy in his conversation with Xayasane as they waited in the back of the police car.

D. Whether the district court erred in determining that Officer Carter did not exceed the scope of a permissible traffic stop.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court's findings of fact for clear error, United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir.1999), viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court. United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 668 (11th Cir.2000). This court reviews the district...