U.S. v. Charleston County
| Decision Date | 06 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:01-562-23.,No. 2:01-0155-23.,2:01-0155-23.,2:01-562-23. |
| Citation | 316 F.Supp.2d 268 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | THE UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. CHARLESTON COUNTY, South Carolina Charleston County Council; John O. Conlon, Toi Ahrens Estes, Cindy M. Floyd, Curtis E. Bostic, A.D. Jordan, Barrett S. Lawrimore, Timothy E. Scott, Leon E. Stavrinakis, Charles Wallace, members of Charleston County Council; Charleston County Election Commission, Defendants. Lee H. Moultrie, George Freeman Maggie McGill, and Sandra Flower, Plaintiffs, v. Charleston County Council and Charleston County Election Commission, Defendants. |
Laughlin McDonald, Atlanta, GA, Armand Georges Derfner, Charleston, SC, Cheryl Whipper Hamilton, Whipper Law Firm, North Charlsteon, SC, for Lee H. Moultree, George Freeman, Maggie McGill, Sandra Fowler.
A. Arthur Rosenblum, Rosenblum and Goldberg, Charleston, SC, Bernard Eugene Ferrara, Jr., Joseph Dawson, III, Charleston County Legal Department, N Charleston, SC, Samuel W Howell, IV, Howell and Linkous, Mt Pleasant, SC, Benjamin E Griffith, Cleveland, MS, for Charleston County, South Carolina, Charleston County Council.
Bernard Eugene Ferrara, Jr., Joseph Dawson, III, Charleston County Legal Department, N Charleston, SC, Samuel W Howell, IV, Howell and Linkous, Mt Pleasant, SC, for John O Conlon, Toi Ahrens Estes, Cindy M Floyd, Ruth C Glover, A D Jordan, Timothy Scott, Curtis E. Bostic.
Lucas C. Padgett, Jr., Bernard Eugene Ferrara, Jr., Joseph Dawson, III, Charleston County Legal Department, N Charleston, SC, Samuel W Howell, IV, Howell and Linkous, Mt Pleasant, SC, for Barrett S. Lawrimore, Leon E. Stavrinakis, Charles Wallace.
Mikell Ross Scarborough, Charleston, Bernard Eugene Ferrara, Jr., Joseph Dawson, III, Charleston County Legal Department, N Charleston, SC, Samuel W Howell, IV, Howell and Linkous, Mt Pleasant, SC, for Charleston County Election Commission.
This matter was tried without a jury beginning on July 15, 2002. The United States has alleged that the at-large method of electing the nine-member Charleston County Council violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 ("Section 2"), because it results in the unlawful dilution of minority voting strength. The Court-having heard the arguments, read the submissions of counsel, and considered the evidence including court-room testimony, deposition testimony, and exhibits-enters judgment for the United States of America and partial judgment for Plaintiffs Moultrie, Freeman, McGill, and Flower based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
As an initial matter it is important to clarify what this Order rigorously says about the at-large electoral system of Charleston County and what it unequivocally does not say about her citizens. The Court recognizes that its decision does not merely operate mechanically against a political subdivision of the State of South Carolina but in fact against individual citizens whose lives in various measure are today changed. While the Court is otherwise disinclined to editorialize, those individuals, whether white or black,1 who have had no voice in this debate but whose liberties are invariably altered by its resolution, deserve as clear and direct an explanation of this action as can be reasonably provided. There is a fundamental gravity to any decision of a federal court which calls into question actions taken by the people through the legislative process of their local and state communities. Federalism and separation of powers demand vigilant consideration.
With that said, this Order is radically not a condemnation of the citizenry of Charleston County but rather a recognition that the specific bulwark of an at-large system, in twisted concert with the particular geographic and historical realities of this County, unlawfully and institutionally inhibit a community of voters in Charleston County from equal access to the electoral process. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the "essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect preferred representatives." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). In other words, a violation of Section 2 may arise from the structure of the electoral process itself plus the effects of past discrimination without regard to any present discriminatory intent. This case is one such instance.
Undoubtedly there are bigots among us, and while their stories uncomfortably texture the four corners of the Court's decision, this Order is little about them. If the trial on the merits demonstrated anything, it is that Charleston County can celebrate a rich legacy of individuals selflessly working towards a true community among its many races. Notwithstanding, the current at-large system, as it exists in a county of this size, unlawfully exacerbates the disadvantaged political posture inherited by generations of African-Americans through centuries of institutional discrimination.
The United States brought this action on January 17, 2001.2 The United States did not allege a violation of Section 2's intent standard.3 Private plaintiffs, who are four citizens registered to vote in Charleston County elections, filed their suit on February 28, 2001, alleging that Charleston County's at-large method of election violates the results and intent standards of Section 2. The Court consolidated the two cases on April 6, 2001.
On March 5, 2002, the United States moved for partial summary judgment as to the three preconditions set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25(1986). On March 29, 2002, the United States also moved to enjoin the County from holding elections for open seats on the Charleston County Council until a proper remedy could be implemented under Section 2. On April 1, 2002, the private Plaintiffs also filed motions for a partial summary judgment on the Gingles preconditions and for a preliminary injunction. On April 2, 2002, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the third Gingles precondition and on the totality of circumstances.
Magistrate Judge Robert S. Carr heard oral argument on those motions on April 17, 2002. In a written Report and Recommendation dated April 26, 2002, Magistrate Judge Carr recommended that (1) the United States' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Gingles preconditions be granted, (2) the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the totality of the circumstances be denied, and (3) the United States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied.
Defendants objected only to Magistrate Judge Carr's recommendation that partial summary judgment be granted the United States as to the third Gingles precondition. They did not object to the other recommendations, including those related to the first two Gingles preconditions or that an untimely affidavit filed by one of Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Ronald Weber, be stricken from these proceedings. The United States objected only to that portion of Magistrate Judge Carr's Report and Recommendation that concluded that the United States did not meet its burden of demonstrating that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest.
On May 24, 2002, the Court denied the United States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In an Order dated July 10, 2002, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Carr's Report and Recommendation in toto granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the three Gingles preconditions. Both the Court's Order, dated July 10, 2002, granting Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and the Magistrate Judge's Report are incorporated herein by specific reference.
The trial in this case commenced on July 15, 2002, and concluded on August 16, 2002. On September 18, 2002 the Court denied the United States' renewed motion for preliminary injunction against the November 5, 2002 general election for positions on the Charleston County Council.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973j, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345. The voting rights claims advanced by the United States in this action are premised solely upon Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d), "[w]henever any person has engaged ... in any act or practice prohibited by [Section 2] ... the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, an action for preventive relief, including an application for a temporary or permanent injunction ... or other order." Thus, the United States has standing to challenge Charleston County's at-large method of election for its County Council to protect the voting rights of the County's African-American citizens.4
Private Plaintiffs also have standing to pursue their claims. See Wilson v. Minor, 220 F.3d 1297, 1303 n. 11 (11th Cir.2000) ().
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