U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, Cal.

• Decision Date: 22 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-55453.,No. 01-55182.,01-55182.,01-55453.
• Citation: 288 F.3d 391
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; Board Of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles; City of Los Angeles Police Department, Defendants-Appellees, Los Angeles Police Protective League, Proposed Intervener-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Michael Garcia; Ernesto Luevano; Duc Pham; Jesus Nieto; Salvador Salas; Robert Hernandez; Carlos Gonzalez; David Askew; Timothy Campbell; Alberto Lovato; Tonye Allen; Reverend James M. Lawson, Jr.; Southern Christian Leadership Conference Of Los Angeles; Acluof Southern California; Homeboy Industries; Asian Pacific American Legal Center; Radio Sin Fronteras, Proposed Interveners-Appellants, v. City of Los Angeles, California; Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles; City of Los Angeles Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

288 F.3d 391

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; Board Of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles; City of Los Angeles Police Department, Defendants-Appellees, Los Angeles Police Protective League, Proposed Intervener-Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Michael Garcia; Ernesto Luevano; Duc Pham; Jesus Nieto; Salvador Salas; Robert Hernandez; Carlos Gonzalez; David Askew; Timothy Campbell; Alberto Lovato; Tonye Allen; Reverend James M. Lawson, Jr.; Southern Christian Leadership Conference Of Los Angeles; Acluof Southern California; Homeboy Industries; Asian Pacific American Legal Center; Radio Sin Fronteras, Proposed Interveners-Appellants, v. City of Los Angeles, California; Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles; City of Los Angeles Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-55182.

No. 01-55453.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 6, 2002.

Filed April 22, 2002.

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Gregory G. Petersen and Andrea F. Weiss, Petersen Law Firm, a Law Corporation, Costa Mesa, CA; Mark D. Rosenbaum and Catherine E. Lhamon, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA; Erwin Chemerinsky, University of Southern California Law School, Los Angeles, CA, for the proposed-interveners-appellants.

Sarah E. Harrington, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the plaintiff-appellee and Patricia L. Glaser and R. Paul Katrinak, Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-11769-GAF.

Before BROWNING, THOMAS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, various third parties contend that the district court erred by denying their motions for intervention. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

In the underlying action, the United States alleged that the City of Los Angeles ("the City"), the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") (collectively, the "City defendants") engaged in a pattern or practice of depriving individuals of constitutional rights through the use of excessive force, false arrests and improper searches and seizures in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141.¹ The suit was an outgrowth of a lengthy investigation of the LAPD's Rampart Division and, in particular, its anti-gang unit known as Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums ("CRASH"). The inquiry was based on allegations made by former LAPD officer Rafael Perez who, pursuant to a criminal plea agreement, offered testimony of misconduct and corruption within the CRASH unit.

Before filing this suit, the United States discussed the issues with the City defendants. The parties agreed to enter into a consent decree that would resolve the suit. They negotiated a draft consent decree that was approved by the Los Angeles City Council. Accordingly, on the same day that the United States filed the complaint in this action, the parties filed a "Joint Application to Enter Consent Decree" and lodged a proposed consent decree with the district court.

The Los Angeles Police Protective League (the "Police League") responded by (1) filing an action seeking to enjoin implementation of the consent decree and a declaration that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 is unconstitutional,² and (2) filing a motion for leave to intervene in the instant action. The Police League is the designated bargaining unit for the "rank and file" LAPD officers — the approximately 8,600 officers who do not hold ranks higher than lieutenant. The Police League and the City presently operate pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") which governs the terms and conditions under which members of the Police League are employed by the City. The Police League claims that the consent decree proposed to the district court is incompatible with the MOU. The district court denied the Police League's motion to intervene as a matter of right and its motion for permissive intervention.

A number of community groups³ and individuals⁴ ("the Community Interveners") also requested leave to intervene in the underlying action, both as of right and permissively. The individuals are people of color, many of whom live in areas of Los Angeles that have high crime rates, who have submitted uncontroverted declarations stating that they have suffered from, and are likely to continue to suffer from, the unconstitutional police misconduct that forms the basis of the United States' suit against the City defendants. The organizations are various community action groups that have worked with such individuals and the LAPD for many years, seeking police reform. The Community Interveners desire to intervene to help ensure that the reform sought is successful and to be able to participate in that reform process. Along with their motion to intervene, the Community Interveners filed a complaint in intervention, asserting claims as plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City defendants.

The district court denied all the requests for intervention. The Police League and the Community Interveners have timely appealed that decision. "A district court's denial of a motion for intervention as of right is an appealable `final decision.'" Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir.1998). If the district court has abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention, then appellate jurisdiction also exists to review the district court's decision to deny permissive intervention. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1307-08 (9th Cir.1997).

II

Intervention as of right is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), which provides in part:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

Thus, one who seeks to intervene as of right in a pending lawsuit must satisfy four requirements. The applicant must show that:

(1) it has a significant protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; (3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest.

Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 409 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating whether these requirements are met, courts "are guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations." Id. Further, courts generally "construe[] [the Rule] broadly in favor of proposed intervenors." United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir.1992). "`A liberal policy in favor of intervention serves both efficient resolution of issues and broadened access to the courts. By allowing parties with a practical interest in the outcome of a particular case to intervene, we often prevent or simplify future litigation involving related issues; at the same time, we allow an additional interested party to express its views before the court.'" Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 n. 8 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir.1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).

The district court found the Police League's motion to intervene to be timely, a conclusion not challenged on appeal. The district court did not specifically rule on the timeliness of the Community Interveners' motion, but none of the other parties challenged its timeliness below or on appeal. Further, the motion was filed only approximately one and half months after the suit was filed. Thus, only the remaining three factors need to be addressed in this appeal.

"An applicant has a `significant protectable interest' in an action if (1) it asserts an interest that is protected under some law, and (2) there is a `relationship' between its legally protected interest and the plaintiff's claims." Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 409. The relationship requirement is met "if the resolution of the plaintiff's claims actually will affect the applicant." Id. at 410. The "interest" test is not a clear-cut or bright-line rule, because "[n]o specific legal or equitable interest need be established." Greene, 996 F.2d at 976. Instead, the "interest" test directs courts to make a "practical, threshold inquiry," id., and "is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process," County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir.1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To determine whether the existing parties adequately represent an applicant's interest, we consider:

(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the would-be intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect. The prospective intervenor bears the burden of demonstrating that existing parties do not adequately represent its interests.

Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The requirement of inadequate representation "is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his...