U.S. v. Clavis

• Citation: 977 F.2d 538
• Decision Date: 13 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 89-9011,89-9011
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oswald O'Brien CLAVIS, Ivan Frederick Edwards, Orin Terry Greene, Henry Louis Ismond, Winston Daniel Frazer, Ronald Reginald Phillips, Colin Andrew Grant, John Kirkland, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 538

977 F.2d 538

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oswald O'Brien CLAVIS, Ivan Frederick Edwards, Orin Terry Greene, Henry Louis Ismond, Winston Daniel Frazer Ronald Reginald Phillips, Colin Andrew Grant, John Kirkland Defendants-Appellants.

No. 89-9011.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 13, 1992.

Alan Baverman, Atlanta, Ga., for Clavis.

Thomas E. Spraley, Atlanta, Ga., for Edwards.

Jake Waldrop, Federal Defender Program, Atlanta, Ga., for Greene.

Robert L. Barr, Jr., U.S. Atty., H. Allen Moye, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for U.S.

Michael J. Trost, Atlanta, Ga., for Kirkland.

Thomas R. Moran, Atlanta, Ga. (Court-appointed), for Grant.

L. David Wolfe, Atlanta, Ga. (Court-appointed), for Phillips.

Frederick E. Link, Hartness and Link, Gainesville, Ga., for Ismond and Frazer.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION(S) OF REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion March 31, 1992, 11th Cir.1992, 956 F.2d 1079)

Before COX and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The court has considered the petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en banc filed by Clavis, Kirkland (John Doe # 2), Ronald Phillips, and Greene (John Doe # 1).

The petitioners are correct that we should not have analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy under Count One by applying the holding of U.S. v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir.1987), to the effect that once the existence of a conspiracy is established only slight evidence is necessary to connect a particular defendant to the conspiracy. The "slight evidence" standard set out in Orr was inconsistent with the earlier en banc decision, binding on this court, of the Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777, & 444 U.S. 846, 100 S.Ct. 91, 62 L.Ed.2d 59 (1979), and with several Eleventh Circuit decisions that we discuss below. The references in our opinion to Orr and its "slight evidence" standard are, therefore, withdrawn.

The Eleventh Circuit has not, however, been uniform in stating the governing standard post-Malatesta. In February 1982 in U.S. v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1377 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2305, 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982), we described the general standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence and referred to the Malatesta standard as an elaboration in the particular context of conspiracy convictions.

Our general standard of review concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine whether, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury necessarily must have entertained a reasonable doubt concerning the guilt of an appellant. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 826, 828 (11th Cir.1981). The former Fifth Circuit has elaborated on that standard in the particular context of conspiracy convictions, noting that we must find "substantial evidence" connecting an appellant to a conspiracy, United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Bertolotti, 440 U.S. 962, [99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777] & 444 U.S. 846 [100 S.Ct. 91, 62 L.Ed.2d 59] (1979).

Id. at 1377 (footnote omitted). Four months later, in U.S. v. Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 491; 74 L.Ed.2d 633 (1982), a conspiracy case, we referred to the "reasonably minded jury" test. In 1986, in U.S. v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987), an appeal from a conviction for extortion and conspiracy to extort, we used the "substantial evidence" articulation in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence of effect on interstate commerce. In 1990, in U.S. v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir.1990), a conspiracy case, the court quoted from Malatesta and used the "substantial evidence" test.

In this decision by a panel we need not try to synthesize these articulations or to determine whether they are different and which one, if any one, is preferable. Under both "substantial evidence" and "reasonably minded jury" standards the evidence is clearly sufficient with respect to Clavis, Kirkland and Ronald Phillips.

Greene's conspiracy conviction is a closer case, and we therefore directed the government to file a responsive brief with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence of his connection with the conspiracy. We have carefully reviewed the evidence set out in our opinion at 956 F.2d at 1085-86, and we hold that it meets both the "substantial evidence" and the "reasonably minded jury" statements of the applicable standard. In reaching this conclusion we have considered as a factor Greene's presence at the apartment, which the evidence showed was one of the sites for the conspiracy. We have also considered Greene's false...