U.S. v. Clay

• Decision Date: 09 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-1079,80-1079
• Citation: 640 F.2d 157
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Donald Edward CLAY, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 157

640 F.2d 157

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Donald Edward CLAY, Appellant.

No. 80-1079.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 19, 1980.

Decided Feb. 9, 1981.

Benjamin D. Entine, Asst. Fed. Pub. Defender, W. D. Mo., Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.

Kenneth Josephson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.

Before HENLEY and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, and ROY, ^* District Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Donald Clay appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1). The district court imposed an eighteen-month suspended sentence and four years of probation. For reversal appellant argues that the district court erred in failing to sustain his motion to suppress physical evidence obtained as a result of an alleged illegal search and seizure in violation of his fourth amendment rights. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

Pursuant to a state search warrant issued on March 23, 1979, police entered the residence of Donald Love, located at 6213 Walrond, Kansas City, Missouri, in search of drugs, contraband and firearms. The search warrant was executed by uniformed and undercover agents during the early evening hours. Shortly after the search began, appellant, who was neither a suspect in the investigation nor an anticipated subject of the search, approached the house, knocked on the storm door and was confronted by Sergeant Tom Moss, an undercover police agent who was dressed in blue jeans and a T-shirt. Sgt. Moss opened the door, displayed his badge and identification, and ordered appellant into the house. Appellant immediately stepped backwards but did not attempt to run away. Sgt. Moss pulled out his revolver and again ordered appellant into the house. Appellant entered the house whereupon Sgt. Moss requested his investigator to conduct a pat down search. ¹ A small quantity of marijuana and a gun were discovered.

Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized. Appellant argued that the search was unconstitutional because it was done without a warrant, without probable cause, without consent, and not incident to a valid arrest. Appellant stressed that the stop and frisk was not based upon objective facts from which a police officer could reasonably conclude that appellant was involved in criminal activity. The government sought to justify the frisk under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A full evidentiary hearing was held on November 26, 1979. Pursuant to the hearing, the district court denied appellant's motion to suppress. The only issue raised by appellant is whether the firearm was lawfully seized and properly submitted into evidence over appellant's objection.

II. Discussion of Stop and Frisk

Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 45, 50, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286, 1288 (8th Cir. 1979). A seizure may be accomplished either by physical restraint or by sufficient show of authority. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. Thus, when Sgt. Moss ordered appellant into the house at gunpoint, he restricted appellant's motion and performed a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment.

We must determine initially whether Sgt. Moss' action was justified at its inception and, if so, whether the subsequent "pat down" was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Id. at 19, 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878, 1879.

In determining whether Sgt. Moss had a basis for initiating a frisk, there are two inquiries to be made: whether the officer was rightfully in the presence of the party frisked so as to be endangered if that person was armed, and whether the officer had a sufficient degree of suspicion that the party to be frisked was armed and dangerous. Brown v. Texas, supra, 443 U.S. at 50-53, 99 S.Ct. at 2640-2642.

Only specific articulable facts taken together with rational inferences warrant the intrusion of an investigatory search. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. In making an assessment whether the seizure of appellant was justified, we judge the facts using an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate to protect his life or the life of innocent bystanders? Id. at 21, 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 1880.

First, we consider whether Sgt. Moss possessed specific, objective facts sufficient to establish that the initial seizure of appellant was justified. In his testimony, Sgt. Moss said that the search of Donald Love's house had taken place during the evening hours; that marijuana, firearms and ammunition had been discovered in the house previous to appellant's arrival; and that he knew Love was known to be armed and dangerous. In addition, Sgt. Moss testified appellant's "hesitation" in complying with the order to enter the house and the danger associated with a white officer in a predominantly black neighborhood placed him in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. The district court held that these "many specific facts quite naturally led (Sgt. Moss) to a reasonable suspicion that any person that came to the door was potentially armed and dangerous." United States v. Clay, No. 79-00117-01-CR-W-4 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 6, 1979) (order denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress). We disagree.

An experienced police officer should not be apprehensive about executing a search warrant during the early evening hours in a predominantly black neighborhood that is not a high crime district. There is nothing inherently suspicious about a black man walking up to a private home on a street in a black neighborhood at 7:30 p. m. See United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 1979). Police cannot have grounds for suspicion based solely on the race of the suspect. United States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1975). Although color of skin is an identifying factor, United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836, 97 S.Ct. 104, 50 L.Ed.2d 102 (1976), this court has consistently rejected the use of race in combination with other factors to justify investigative searches and seizures. United States v Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971). ² In the case at bar, like Nicholas, "we think that, at best, the police were acting upon a generalized suspicion that any black person ... might be engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 625.

Appellant's conduct alone was not suspicious under the circumstances; he merely hesitated and took a step or two backwards (but did not turn around) when confronted at the door by an armed man in plain clothes from inside his cousin's house. The government's emphasis that appellant's "hesitancy" created individualized suspicion falls far short of those cases dealing with flight, ³ furtive gestures, ⁴ or otherwise inexplicable sudden movements toward a pocket or other place where a weapon could be concealed. ⁵ Thus, appellant's action in stepping backwards did not justify the search.

The question remains whether the evidence of criminal activity within the house being searched justified the police in searching anyone who approached the premises. The warrant is of no help to the government in its attempt to justify the search. The warrant only gave the police authority to be on the premises, not to search anyone that came to the door during the time of the search.

Because Sgt. Moss' actions towards appellant were taken without an arrest warrant, the information to be considered is that available to the officer at the time of the stop and frisk. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Sgt. Moss had no factual data about appellant that would have given rise to a probability of illegal activity. "(A) person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person." Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (warrant to search bar and bartender cannot normally be construed to authorize a search of each individual at the club). An investigatory search will be found constitutionally permissible only when supported by reasonable suspicion directed to the person to be searched, and "(this) requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be." Id. at 89-91, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42. ⁶

Beyond dispute, the police may take appropriate action to ensure their own protection when officers are carrying out their duty in executing a search warrant. The scope of that protection, however, is balanced against the fourth amendment rights of others. See note 9 infra.

The government relies in part upon the fact that firearms, marijuana, cocaine and heroin were found in the apartment prior to appellant's arrival. Nothing in the record, however, establishes a nexus between the contraband discovered inside the house and appellant at the time he was stopped and frisked. Under the circumstances, it was plainly unreasonable to infer that no one other than a user of narcotics would be allowed on the premises. See United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 1974).

The government also urges the court to put great weight on the fact that Love, the target of the search, was known to be armed and dangerous. This argument is diminished largely because at the suppression hearing Sgt. Moss testified that he did not mistake appellant for the owner of the...