U.S. v. Coffee

Decision Date20 January 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-1758.,04-1758.
Citation434 F.3d 887
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Joseph COFFEE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ON BRIEF: Stuart W. Harris, Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Elizabeth A. Stafford, United States Attorney, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: SILER and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; KATZ, District Judge.*

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant John Joseph Coffee, Jr., was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. Defendant now appeals, alleging that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the search warrant for the premises was issued without probable cause, (2) the evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) he is entitled to resentencing under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm defendant's convictions, but vacate defendant's sentences and remand for resentencing in light of Booker.

I.

Defendant's convictions arose out of the January 30, 2003, search of a home which defendant rented at 26868 Penn, Inkster, Michigan. On that date, law enforcement officers from the Metro Street Enforcement Team ("MSET") executed a search warrant for the above address. Following the search, defendant fled to Illinois, where he stayed until his arrest in June 2003.

The circumstances leading to the search of the above address were described at trial by the MSET officers. On January 29, 2003, the MSET organized and executed a controlled purchase of cocaine base from 26868 Penn with the assistance of a confidential informant ("CI"). The officers had received information from the CI that a male known as "J" sold narcotics out of that house. Prior to the purchase, MSET Officer Shawn Adams searched the CI to make sure that he did not have any narcotics or currency on his person and then gave the CI $20 in U.S. currency. The MSET officers then watched as the CI approached 26868 Penn and entered the house. The CI was wearing a transmitter; thus, the officers were able to hear the CI's conversation with the seller and the voices of children in the background. Officer Adams and another MSET officer testified that defendant's voice matched that of the person who sold the cocaine to the CI. When the CI exited the house, he was accompanied by defendant, who then entered a vehicle and left the area. The officers followed the CI to a prearranged location, where the informant handed over .3 grams of a substance which field-tested positive for cocaine base.

On the next day, January 30, 2003, Officer Adams secured a search warrant for 26868 Penn and the search was carried out that same day. Officer Adams, accompanied by five other officers and a drug detection dog, knocked on the door and announced their presence, but found no one in the house. The dog indicated the presence of narcotics in a Crown Royal bag on a television stand in the northwest bedroom of the house. The bag contained twenty-eight packages of marijuana, totaling thirty-two grams. A further search of the closet in the northwest bedroom revealed an electronic scale, a .22 caliber rifle and a box of .22 caliber bullets, and two loaded revolvers located in the pockets of work shirts in the closet. One of the shirts was embroidered with the name "John," and the other was labeled "Coffee." In addition, officers found numerous documents, including bills and court documents, bearing defendant's name and address, in a file cabinet in the closet. A collage of photographs displaying pictures of defendant, his children, and other close family members was also noted in the northwest bedroom.

The dog indicated the presence of narcotics in some blinds in the northeast bathroom, and eight individual bags of cocaine base, totaling 7.6 grams, were found in the top bracket of the window blind.

At trial, defendant presented several witnesses in his defense. Defendant did not dispute that he rented the residence at 26868 Penn in Inkster; however, through the testimony of his witnesses, he attempted to show that he was not in Michigan in January 2003, but in fact had moved to Freeport, Illinois, well before the January 30th search, and that several other individuals resided or were present at 26868 Penn on the dates in question.

On January 23, 2004, the jury convicted defendant of the charged offenses. On May 17, 2004, the district court sentenced defendant to ninety-seven months' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. Defendant now timely appeals.

II.

Defendant first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence. He asserts that Officer Adams' affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant is deficient in several material respects; specifically, it purportedly fails to adequately establish the veracity or reliability of the unnamed CI and does not sufficiently corroborate the CI's allegations of illegal activity so as to provide the requisite probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.

When reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we will reverse findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 628 (6th Cir.2003). "[L]egal conclusions as to the existence of probable cause are reviewed de novo." United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). "When the district court has denied the motion to suppress, we review all evidence in a light most favorable to the Government." Galloway, 316 F.3d at 628 (citation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation ...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Probable cause arises if there are "reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion," United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir.1990) (citation omitted), and "[i]n order for a judicial officer to issue a warrant, law enforcement officials must present evidence from which the magistrate judge can conclude from the totality of the circumstances, `including the "veracity" and "basis" of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Search warrant affidavits must be judged based on the totality of the circumstances, rather than line-by-line scrutiny. United States v. Woosley, 361 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 479 (6th Cir.2001). In this regard, affidavits for search warrants:

Must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).

Review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting probable cause is limited to the information presented in the four corners of the affidavit. United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir.2005). A magistrate judge's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by a reviewing court. United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir.2000) (en banc). Thus, "an issuing magistrate's discretion should only be reversed if it was arbitrarily exercised." Id.

Where, as here, the bulk of the information in the affidavit comes from a confidential source, a court must consider the veracity, reliability, and the basis of knowledge for that information as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis. Frazier, 423 F.3d at 532. "While independent corroboration of a confidential informant's story is not a sine qua non to a finding of probable cause, ... in the absence of any indicia of the informant[s'] reliability, courts insist that the affidavit contain substantial independent police corroboration." Id. (citations omitted). "As long as the issuing judge can conclude independently that the informant is reliable, an affidavit based on the informant's tip will support a finding of probable cause." United States v. McCraven, 401 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir.2005). An affidavit is sufficient "where a known person, named to the magistrate, to whose reliability an officer attests with some detail, states that he has seen a particular crime and particular evidence, in the recent past, [such that] a neutral and detached magistrate may believe that evidence of a crime will be found." Allen, 211 F.3d at 976. As we recently explained in McCraven,

Under Allen, while an affidavit must state facts supporting an independent judicial determination that the informant is reliable, those facts need not take any particular form. See [Allen, 211 F.3d] at 975-76. The affidavit could state that police corroborated significant parts of the informant's story. Or the affiant could attest "with some detail" that the informant provided reliable information in the past. Id. at 976....

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