U.S. v. Colon Berrios

• Citation: 791 F.2d 211
• Decision Date: 23 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1493,85-1493
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William COLON BERRIOS, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Page 211

791 F.2d 211

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William COLON BERRIOS, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 85-1493.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

April 23, 1986.

David W. Roman, First Asst., Federal Defender, Chief, Appellate Div., Old San Juan, P.R., for defendant, appellant.

Daniel F. Lopez Romo, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., for appellee.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA, ^* Circuit Judge, and PETTINE, ^** Senior District Judge.

ORDER OF COURT

In view of the substantial sentence received by appellant, and the pendency of serious charges against him in the courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, we are not disposed to disagree with the district court that appellant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee. The renewed motion for conditional release pending appeal is denied.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

This matter is before us on appellant William Colon-Berrios' renewal of motion for conditional release pending appeal.

Appellant was found guilty after a jury trial of (1) conspiracy to obstruct justice by committing perjury in a federal civil deposition in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371; and (2) committing perjury in a federal civil deposition in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621. Upon sentencing, the district court committed appellant to the custody of the Attorney General thereby revoking a conditional release it had previously granted Colon-Berrios pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3143(a). Subsequently, Colon-Berrios filed a motion for conditional release pending appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3145(c) and Fed.R.App.P. 9(b). A divided panel of this Court denied said motion on November 15, 1985 noting that appellant had failed to sustain the statutory burden under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3143(b). Particularly, the Court observed that appellant had not met his burden of showing that he was not likely to flee (18 U.S.C. Sec. 3143(b)(1)) in light of the substantial sentence he received (three consecutive four-year terms of imprisonment) and the pendency of state murder charges against him. At the time, I noticed my dissent. Today, a panel of this Court refuses to grant appellant's renewed request. I dissent because I believe compliance with Sec. 3143(b) has been established.

Section 3143(b) provides in part:

(b) Release or Detention Pending Appeal by the Defendant. The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds ...

(1) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released; and

(2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.

The record shows that appellant (1) has complied with Sec. 3143(b); and (2) is, therefore, entitled to bail pending the prosecution of this appeal.

First, the record shows that appellant does not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community. The presentence report indicates that appellant has no significant prior antisocial or criminal history. He grew up in a stable, problem free environment. Positive accounts of appellant were received from his present wife, former wife, and neighbors. No incidents of disruption or violence by appellant occurred while on bail during trial or after conviction prior to sentencing. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence of threats or witness intimidation by appellant. This is particularly significant as the legislative history of the 1984 Bail Act repeatedly emphasizes that defendants who have threatened witnesses pose a significant danger to the community. See S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 7, 12, 15, 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News at 10, 15, 18, 24, 25 (Supp. 9A). Accord, United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1400 (3d Cir.1985) (bail denied in part because of evidence of intimidation of witnesses by defendant). Thus, both the probation report and trial history show appellant's compliance with Sec. 3143(b)(1).

Second, Colon-Berrios does not appear to present a risk of flight justifying denial of bail. Among the factors relevant to the issue of possible flight are: (1) the defendant's family ties, character and mental condition; (2) the length of his residence in the community; (3) his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution; (4) the nature and circumstances of the offense; and (5) his prior criminal record. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(g); see also United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 583 (D.C.Cir.1972). Accord, United States v. Bishop, 537 F.2d 1184, 1185 (4th Cir.1976), United States v. Miranda, 442 F.Supp. 789 (S.D.Fla.1977). ¹ Application of these factors justifies granting bail.

A

The record shows that Colon-Berrios has family ties to Puerto Rico and no apparent ties elsewhere. Before incarceration he was living with his third wife and three year old son. Appellant has lived in Puerto Rico all his life. (Colon-Berrios is 41 years old). Since both family ties and a defendant's length of residence in the community support the inference that a defendant will appear as required, United States v. Birges, 523 F.Supp. 472, 475-76 (D.Nev.1981), those factors allow the conclusion here that appellant will stay in Puerto Rico if released.

B

A defendant's mental condition is a valid indicator of whether he will flee. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(g). Thus, it has been noted that a defendant's mental stability allows an inference that he will stay. 523 F.Supp. at 476.

As noted above, the presentence report shows that appellant grew up in a stable environment. Good accounts were received from his present wife, former wife and neighbors. The report notes the absence of history of mental and/or emotional disorders regarding appellant. It also describes Colon-Berrios as emotionally stable. Accordingly, the record reflects mental stability supporting the inference that appellant will not flee. Cf. DeVeau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1317-18 (D.C.App.1982) (bail denied in part because defendant had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, and unstable mental condition created risk of flight).

C

An individual's lack of compliance with conditions on bail pending sentencing is strong evidence of a defendant's potential to flee. United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 235 (7th Cir.1982). Colon-Berrios was given bail during trial and after conviction pending sentencing. He fully complied with conditions set forth by the district court in granting bail. This compliance serves as evidence that he (1) will further comply with court's orders, and (2) does not intend to flee.

D

The nature and circumstances of the offense shed light on, inter alia, the possible term of imprisonment faced by a defendant. United States v. Birges, supra at 475. Substantial terms of imprisonment faced by defendants support an inference of flight justifying denial of bail. Id. As Colon-Berrios faces a 12 year term of imprisonment, it may be argued that he poses a risk of flight worth denying bail.

Appellant, however, faces a shorter term of imprisonment than that faced by defendant in Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 99 S.Ct. 16, 58 L.Ed.2d 33 (1978), a case in which Justice Brennan, acting as Circuit Justice, granted bail pending appeal. Moreover, as Truong Dinh Hung makes clear, risk of flight must be assessed on the basis of the several factors stated therein. Id. at 1329, 99 S.Ct. at 18. As noted above, this view was expressed by the Senate Report on the 1984 Bail Act. S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., ante at 212 n. 1. Thus, even though Colon-Berrios faces a 12 year term of imprisonment, such term does not constitute an unsurmountable obstacle to bail due to the totality of circumstances present in this case. ²

E

It has been stated that the possibility of conviction in state prosecutions coupled with conviction in federal court gives appellants an incentive to flee. United States v. Oliver, supra at 235. It is reasoned that a defendant should not be granted bail in these circumstances because he may flee to avoid state prosecution. Id. As appellant faces a 12 year federal term of imprisonment and two murder charges in state court, it might be arguable that Oliver serves to justify denying bail.

The problem with this reasoning, however, is that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, where murder charges are pending, granted appellant bail pending trial. When murder charges were filed, appellant had already been indicted for conspiracy and perjury at the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's bail statute directs Commonwealth judges to consider a variety of factors similar to those considered by federal judges under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(g). See P.R.Rule of Crim.P. 218. ³ Moreover, as stated in Rule 218, "in fixing the amount of bail there shall be considered the circumstances connected with the adequate guarantee of appearance of the accused ..." Ibid. Yet Puerto Rico's Superior Court where the murder charges are actually pending, thought so little of the risk of appellant fleeing, that it only required a $2,500.00 bond in granting bail to Colon-Berrios. Obviously, the judicial officer of the court at which charges are pending thought that Colon-Berrios was not a risk worth requiring a substantial bond; $2,500.00 was enough to guarantee appellant's appearance at trial. Thus, I do not believe we should read in pending state charges a greater risk than that perceived by the Puerto Rican courts where appellant is in fact charged.

In sum, the aforementioned factors are designed to enable a court to predict from objective manifestations...