U.S. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts

• Decision Date: 24 July 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-10112-JLT.
• Citation: 440 F.Supp.2d 24
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, American Waterways Operators International Association of Independent Tank Owners, Bimco, and Chamber of Shipping of America, Intervenor-Plaintiffs, v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHSETTS, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, Governor Mitt Romney, in his capacity as Governor of Massachusetts, Robert W. Golledge, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, Defendants, Coalition for Buzzards Bay, Intervenor-Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

440 F.Supp.2d 24

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, American Waterways Operators International Association of Independent Tank Owners, Bimco, and Chamber of Shipping of America, Intervenor-Plaintiffs, v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHSETTS, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, Governor Mitt Romney, in his capacity as Governor of Massachusetts, Robert W. Golledge, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, Defendants, Coalition for Buzzards Bay, Intervenor-Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-10112-JLT.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

July 24, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrew J. Hachey, George J. Skelly, Nixon Peabody LLP, Boston, MA, C. Jonathan Benner, Sean T. Connaughton, Troutman Sanders LLP, Washington, DC, for Intervenor-Plaintiffs.

Steven Y. Bressler, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Pierce O. Cray, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

Jonathan M. Ettinger, Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, MA, for Intervenor-Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

TAURO, District Judge.

On April 27, 2003, the Bouchard Barge-120¹ collided with an outcropping of rocks, spilling thousand of gallons of oil into the waters of Buzzards Bay.² In response to the Bouchard oil spill, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law entitled "An Act Relative to Oil Spill Prevention and Response in Buzzards Bay and Other Harbors and Bays of the Commonwealth" ("Oil Spill Prevention Act" or "OSPA").³ The United States Government and the Intervenor-Plaintiffs⁴ (collectively "Plaintiffs") challenge several provisions of the OSPA, alleging that the challenged provisions are preempted by federal law and are therefore unconstitutional. Plaintiffs, accordingly, seek a judgment declaring the challenged provisions of the OSPA invalid and a permanent injunction enjoining the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("the Commonwealth" or "Massachusetts") from enforcing those provisions. The United States Government and the Intervenor-Plaintiffs have both moved for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, both the United States Government's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the Intervenor-Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings are ALLOWED.

Background

"The maritime oil transport industry presents ever-present, all too real dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills which could be catastrophes for the marine environment."⁵ The Commonwealth of Massachusetts faces these dangers each day as numerous vessels transport oil through the Commonwealth's waterways. The Commonwealth's fears became a reality in 2003, when the abovementioned Bouchard Barge spilled about ninety-eight gallons of oil into Buzzards Bay.⁶ The Bouchard oil spill soiled approximately ninety miles of Buzzards Bay beaches and coastline, killed hundreds of birds and marine life, contaminated thousands of acres of shellfish beds, and seriously harmed the overall marine environment of the Bay.⁷

In August 2004, the Massachusetts legislature responded to the threat of future oil spills by passing the OSPA,⁸ provisions of which are now in issue. The OSPA created a vast scheme of rules and regulations governing vessels transporting oil in Massachusetts waters. The Act, in relevant part, (1) prohibits vessels with certain design characteristics from docking, loading, or unloading in Massachusetts waters,⁹ (2) sets forth manning and navigation watch requirements for towing vessels and tank barges,¹⁰ (3) requires vessels carrying oil in certain Massachusetts waters to "take on and employ" a Massachusetts licensed pilot,¹¹ (4) requires tank vessel owners and operators to implement alcohol and drug testing policies and procedures, and to equip their vessels to carry out such testing,¹² mandates tugboat escorts for tank vessels traveling in certain waters of the Commonwealth,¹³ (6) requires tank vessels to follow mandatory vessel routes through Massachusetts waters,¹⁴ and (7) requires any vessel carrying oil in Massachusetts waters to present a certificate of financial assurance to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.¹⁵

Plaintiffs challenge the above provisions of the OSPA on the grounds that each of them is preempted by federal law and/or federal regulations pertaining to maritime oil transportation. Plaintiffs point particularly to the preemptive effect of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978,¹⁶ and the relevant regulations promulgated thereunder. The Commonwealth wealth of Massachusetts and the Coalition for Buzzards Bay (collectively "Defendants") oppose Plaintiffs' motion and defend the Commonwealth's power to enact and enforce the challenged provisions.

The issue at the heart of this matter is whether Congress, Or the United States Coast Guard acting under its congressionally delegated authority, has either explicitly or implicitly prohibited the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from regulating the various aspects of tank vessel transportation with which the OSPA is concerned.¹⁷ The merits of the policies behind the relevant federal and state regulations are not at issue here. In any case, such matters of policy are not for this court to decide.¹⁸

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiffs bring the instant motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "The standard for evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss]."¹⁹ The court "`must accept all of the nonmovant's well-pleaded factual averments as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.'"²⁰ The court, in doing so, will award judgment on the pleadings only when it appears beyond doubt that the movants are entitled to prevail as a matter of law.²¹

B. General Federal Preemption Analysis

The United States Constitution creates a dual structure of government in which power is distributed to both the federal government and the various state governments. This delicate and often controversial balance of power is commonly known as "federalism."²² One axiom of federalism is that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof[,] ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."²³ In other words, "[a] fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law."²⁴

Under the Supremacy Clause, federal action may preempt the enforcement of state laws in three general circumstances.²⁵ First, Congress may expressly preempt state action by the explicit language of a federal enactment.²⁶ Second, Congressional action may preempt state laws by implication when the federal legislative scheme is so comprehensive and pervasive that it manifests Congress' intention to occupy the entire field of regulation.²⁷ In such a case, the Supremacy Clause forecloses any state action in that field.²⁸ This type of preemption is referred to as "field preemption."²⁹ The third area of preemption is known as "conflict preemption."³⁰ Conflict preemption occurs when a state law conflicts with a federal determination on the same subject.³¹ A conflict exists "when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible," or "when the state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"³² What constitutes a sufficient obstacle is a matter for judicial review of the substance of the federal statute, its purposes, and its intended effects.³³

A federal agency, acting within the authority delegated to it by Congress, may similarly preempt state and local action.³⁴ A federal regulation, therefore, wields the preemptive strength of a federal statute and, thus, may expressly or implicitly preempt state action.³⁵

C. Federal Preemption Under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act

The preemptive effect of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, ("PWSA") is well developed. The United States Supreme Court has established a specific analytical structure for courts to utilize when evaluating state maritime laws challenged under the preemptive force of the PWSA.³⁶

1. The Structure of the PWSA

The PWSA consists of two titles, each of which regulate different, although somewhat overlapping, aspects of maritime oil tanker transportation.³⁷ Title I deals generally with vessel traffic "in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States."³⁸ Title I, more specifically, gives the United States Coast Guard³⁹ the authority to enact regulations "for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment....⁴⁰ Title I, however, does not require the Coast Guard to enact vessel traffic regulations.⁴¹ Rather, Title I gives the Coast Guard the discretionary authority to pass and enforce such regulations if it deems them necessary.⁴²

Title II, on the other hand, expressly requires the Coast Guard to issue regulations regarding "the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of [tank] vessels...."⁴³ Title II goes on to illustrate more specific areas in which the Coast Guard must act.⁴⁴ These include "hulls,"⁴⁵ "equipment and appliances for life saving, fire protection, and prevention and mitigation of damage to the marine environment,"⁴⁶ and "the manning of vessels and the duties, qualifications, and training of the officers and crew."⁴⁷

2. Preemption Analysis Under the PWSA

The two titles of the PWSA preclude the enforcement of state laws under two different modes of analysis.⁴⁸ Under Title II of the PWSA, the appropriate preemption analysis is one of field preemption⁴⁹ Title II dictates that "only the Federal...