U.S. v. Comstock, s. 07-7671
| Decision Date | 06 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 07-7671,Nos. 07-7675,Nos. 07-7672,Nos. 07-7674,Nos. 07-7673,s. 07-7671,s. 07-7672,s. 07-7673,s. 07-7674,s. 07-7675 |
| Citation | 627 F.3d 513 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Graydon Earl COMSTOCK, Jr., Respondent-Appellee. United States of America, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Shane Catron, Respondent-Appellee. United States of America, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Thomas Matherly, Respondent-Appellee. United States of America, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Marvin Vigil, Respondent-Appellee. United States of America, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Markis Revland, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Mark B. Stern, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan F. Cohn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Samantha L. Chaifetz, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, R.A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Jane E. Pearce, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Lauren Brennan, Research and Writing Attorney, Eric Brignac, Research and Writing Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judge AGEE joined.
In these consolidated cases, we resolve identical constitutional challenges to the civil commitment provision of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the "Act")-18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
Invoking the Act, the United States initiated these cases by asking the district court to order the civil commitment of five individuals-Graydon Comstock, Shane Catron, Thomas Matherly, Marvin Vigil, and Markis Revland. The district court refused to do so, finding the Act unconstitutional because (1) it was "not a proper exercise of any power that Congress might constitutionally exercise" and (2) "commitment pursuant to § 4248" would violate the Due Process Clause. United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522, 559-60 (E.D.N.C.2007). We affirmed on the first ground alone. See United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the Constitution ... authorizes Congress to enact the statute" and remanding the cases to us. United States v. Comstock, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1965, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010). Accordingly, we must now address the due process challenge.
The Act authorizes civil commitment only if a court finds by "clear and convincing evidence" that a person "has engaged or attempted to engage in sexual violence or child molestation" and is "sexually dangerous to others." §§ 4248(d), 4247(a)(5). The district court held that the Due Process Clause requires the Government to establish the first of these findings by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rendering unconstitutional the less rigorous "clear and convincing evidence" standard set forth in the Act. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d at 559-60. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
We begin by outlining the relevant statutory provisions of § 4248 and then set forth the procedural history of these consolidated cases.
The statute challenged here permits the Attorney General, his designee, or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to certify a person as "sexually dangerous" and ask a federal district court to order that person's civil commitment. 18 U.S.C. § 4248. Commitment may be sought only "in relation to a person (1) in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons," or (2) committed to the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (), or (3) against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely because of a mental condition. § 4248(a). Filing a certificate alleging that a person is "sexually dangerous" automatically stays the person's release from federal custody and triggers a hearing in which the district court determines whether the certified person is in fact "sexually dangerous." Id.
Prior to the hearing, the court may order an expert psychiatric or psychological examination of the certified person, with the resulting report filed with the court. § 4248(b). At the required hearing, the Act mandates that an attorney represent the certified person and provides for court-appointed counsel for any indigent person. §§ 4248(c), 4247(d). Furthermore, the Act affords a certified person an opportunity to present evidence, testify, subpoena witnesses, and confront and cross-examine witnesses. §§ 4248(c), 4247(d). The court can civilly commit a person only if, after considering all the evidence, the court finds that the person is "sexually dangerous" by clear and convincing evidence. § 4248(d).
For the court to make such a finding, the Government must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the certified person "has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation" and is "sexually dangerous to others." §§ 4248(d), 4247(a)(5). To establish the latter finding, the Government must prove that a person "suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder" and "as a result ... would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." § 4247(a)(5)-(6). Thus, in total, the Act requires the Government to establish three facts by clear and convincing evidence before obtaining a commitment order: that the person (1) has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation, (2) suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality,or disorder, and (3) as a result, would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.
In the event the court orders civil commitment, the Attorney General must "make all reasonable efforts" to arrange for a State to assume responsibility for the person's "custody, care, and treatment." § 4248(d). If the Attorney General effects the transfer, federal custody ceases; but if no State will assume responsibility, then § 4248 authorizes the Attorney General to hold the person "for treatment in a suitable facility" until discharge. Id. Before placing a person in a facility, the Attorney General must consider the "suitability of the facility's rehabilitation programs in meeting the needs of the person." § 4247(i)(C).
As long as the Attorney General holds the person pursuant to a § 4248 commitment order, the Act requires the director of the facility to which the person is committed to prepare annual reports on the mental condition of the person and whether the need for the person's continued commitment persists. § 4247(e)(1)(B). These reports must be submitted to the district court that ordered the person's commitment. Id. The director of the facility also must notify the person of any available rehabilitation programs. § 4247(e)(2).
The Act offers a person committed to a federal facility pursuant to § 4248 several avenues to discharge. When the director of the facility determines that the "person's condition is such that he is no longer sexually dangerous to others, or will not be sexually dangerous to others if released under a prescribed regimen" of care or treatment for his condition, the director "shall promptly file a certificate to that effect" with the district court. § 4248(e). The court then "shall order the discharge" or, on the Government's motion or the court's own initiative, hold a hearing to determine whether discharge is appropriate. Id. Alternatively, counsel for the committed person or a legal guardian may move for discharge and, if denied, renew that motion repeatedly every 180 days after a denial. § 4247(h).
At a discharge hearing, the committed person must be afforded the same rights to counsel, to present evidence, and to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses as afforded him at the commitment hearing. If the court finds by a "preponderance of the evidence" that a committed person is no longer sexually dangerous to others if released unconditionally or if released under a prescribed regimen of treatment, then the court must order the appropriate discharge. § 4248(e). The Act also preserves a committed person's right to habeas relief. § 4247(g).
In the consolidated cases before us, the BOP certified Comstock, Vigil, Matherly, Revland, and Catron (collectively the "respondents") as "sexually dangerous" persons subject to civil commitment under § 4248. At the time of certification, all five were confined at the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North Carolina.
Comstock, who pled guilty to one count of receiving material involving sexual exploitation of minors by computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), had been sentenced to 37-months imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. At the time the Government certified him as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to § 4248, Comstock was serving the last few days of his term of imprisonment, which expired on November 8, 2006.
The cases of Vigil, Matherly, and Revland followed a similar course. Vigil hadpled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) and § 2246 and received a sentence of 96-months imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. The Government certified him as a "sexually dangerous" person on November 22, 2006, the very day his federal term of imprisonment expired.
Matherly had pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B) and § 2252(b)(2)...
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