U.S. v. Coon, 89-1489
| Citation | 928 F.2d 405 |
| Decision Date | 19 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1489,89-1489 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shelia D. COON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, No. 88-80398; De Mascio, J.
Before BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR. and MILBURN, Circuit Judges, and WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant Shelia Coon appeals her conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it, a violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1). Defendant Coon contends that the officers who searched her luggage at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport stopped her without reasonable suspicion and searched her luggage without probable cause, thus violating the Fourth Amendment. She also claims that evidence of her prior robbery convictions should not have been introduced against her for impeachment purposes. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Some unusual events first aroused the suspicions of narcotics officers at the Los Angeles International Airport in the late evening hours of June 1, 1988. Defendant Shelia Coon, who had aroused their suspicions, left the airport on Flight 336, traveling on a one-way ticket paid for in cash to Detroit, Michigan. Before Flight 336 arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the narcotics officers in Los Angeles had relayed their suspicions to officers Raymond Denton and Michael Ondejko, both of whom were assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force at the Detroit airport. Based upon the information they received from Los Angeles, the officers decided to interview defendant Coon upon her arrival in Detroit. After allowing her to claim her luggage, they approached her, identified themselves, and asked permission to speak to her. Both officers were in plain clothes and no weapons were visible, if indeed either was actually armed.
The encounter took place as defendant Coon, carrying her luggage, passed through one set of automatic doors into a vestibule and prepared to pass through another set of automatic doors about ten feet away in order to leave the baggage claim area. Defendant Coon stopped between these two sets of automatic doors in the public area of the terminal and agreed to talk to the officers. During the conversation and at the officers' request, Ms. Coon permitted the examination of her ticket and her purse. The ticket bore the name "Kim Johnson," but the California driver's license found in her purse identified her as Shelia Coon, a circumstance that led the two officers to identify themselves further as narcotics officers and to request permission to search the luggage she had just reclaimed.
According to the unrebutted testimony of both officers, Coon gave her consent to the search of the luggage at her feet, although in the same breath she mentioned that she was uncertain about whether one of the pieces, a foldable garment bag, was actually hers. Officer Ondejko's search of that bag produced two "bricks" of cocaine.
Defendant Coon moved to suppress the cocaine but did not testify at the suppression hearing. At the hearing it was argued that she had been seized without probable cause or stopped without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that her consent was therefore involuntary. It was also argued that she had never actually consented to the search. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that officers Denton and Ondejko had a reasonable, articulable suspicion which would justify a limited "stop" of the defendant as soon as she arrived in Detroit. App. at 21. The court went on to find, however, that the encounter between the police officers and defendant Coon was not a seizure. It found that when the officers approached defendant and obtained her permission to speak with her, App. at 23. The court further found that there was no evidence of coercion, trickery, or intimidation on the part of the agents when they initially secured the defendant's permission to talk with her, and it found that defendant was not restrained in any way from leaving the public area in which she was originally approached. Under all those circumstances, the court concluded that "[a] reasonable person would have believed that she was free to leave...." App. at 24. That being the case, the court held that Coon had freely and voluntarily consented to the search of her luggage, and it therefore overruled her motion to suppress evidence.
Defendant Coon also argues that the district court abused its discretion at the trial in admitting evidence of her prior felony convictions under Rule 609(a)(1), Federal Rules of Evidence. In particular, she objected in limine to the government's proposed use of two relatively recent robbery convictions, claiming that their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The court found that the defendant's credibility would be a central issue in the case because, if she testified at all, she would likely disclaim any knowledge of the fact that narcotics were being transported in her luggage. After defendant Coon testified that she had no knowledge of the narcotics, the court permitted cross-examination as to her prior convictions, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction and a sentence of twelve years were entered on April 20, 1989. This timely appeal followed.
Defendant raises two issues. First, she contends that the cocaine seized by narcotics officers should have been suppressed because the officers (a) lacked probable cause to seize her or search her luggage, (b) lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop her, and (c) did not obtain a valid consent to open her luggage. Second, Ms. Coon insists that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the introduction into evidence of her two prior convictions for robbery which, she argues, have little probative value on the question of credibility but great prejudicial effect.
A district court's factual findings made in consideration of a motion to suppress evidence are upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir.1989). More specifically, questions concerning the voluntariness of a consent search are questions of fact and are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir.1988) (per curiam). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if "the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," see Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985), and where the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in the light of the whole record, its findings should be affirmed because "it is the function of the District Court rather than the Court of Appeals to determine the facts ..." in a suppression hearing. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 543 (1988).
A trial court's decision to admit or suppress evidence of prior convictions under Rule 609, Federal Rules of Evidence, is reviewed only to determine whether the court abused its discretion. See United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Williams, 587 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.1978) (per curiam order).
Defendant Coon argues that the cocaine seized from the luggage in her possession should have been suppressed because the seizing officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights. She further argues that the police seizure of the cocaine was unreasonable because no search warrant had been obtained and because the officers at the initial point of encounter with her lacked probable cause to seize her or search the luggage in her possession.
The facts of the case show that the officers who approached the defendant in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport did so by simply walking up to her, properly identifying themselves, and politely asking her permission to engage in conversation. App. at 98, 103. Ms. Coon concedes that she agreed to speak to the officers, that she voluntarily allowed them to inspect her flight ticket, and that she agreed to the search of her purse that revealed her driver's license and true name. Brief of Appellant at 7.
The police officers both testified without contradiction in the suppression hearing that Ms. Coon freely and unequivocally consented to the search of both pieces of luggage in her possession. App. at 96, 105. According to the officers, she expressed some doubt as to whether or not the suit bag in which the cocaine was found was hers. We believe that her "afterthought" could not affect the validity of the search: either the bag was hers (in ownership or possession) and she consented to its search, or it was not hers and her consent to search it was unnecessary. 1 At the trial, Ms. Coon admitted that she consented to the search of the luggage by the officers.
The district court found that defendant Coon had neither been seized nor detained prior to giving her consent to search.
Defendant remained in a public area, had possession of her ticket, driver's license, purse and luggage. She could have exited the last set of doors if she chose to do so. There is no evidence that defendant was coerced, tricked, or intimidated into stopping and speaking with the agents. Moreover, there is no evidence that defendant was compelled to remain or was restrained from leaving the interview area. Under...
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