U.S. v. Cooper, No. 98-2123

Decision Date14 February 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-2123
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric Allen COOPER & Albert Urbina, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. (No. 97-42-Cr-ORL-18), G. Kendall Sharp, Judge.

Before DUBINA, Circuit Judge, KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and NESBITT*, Senior District Judge.

KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge:

The principal issue in this appeal is whether criminal defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room for which they neither paid nor registered. We hold that under the circumstances as alleged by the defendants in their motion to suppress, they did not and thus lacked standing to move to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 26, 1997, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Robert Garcia checked into a Sheraton Hotel (the "Sheraton" or the "hotel") in Orlando, Florida, and was assigned to Room 616. He was accompanied by an unidentified male and a minor female later identified as JoAnn Grande, neither of whom actually registered with the hotel. At approximately 5:45 the same morning, Allen Gonzalez checked into the hotel and was assigned to Room 624, the room directly opposite Garcia's. He was also accompanied by an unidentified male who did not register with the hotel. Because both Garcia and Gonzalez proffered the occupancy fees in cash, hotel policy mandated that each present some form of photographic identification; each presented a Florida driver's license, which the hotel desk clerk photocopied. Later that same day, Garcia departed the hotel and allegedly turned the key to Room 616 over to Gonzalez.

Beginning on the evening of January 26, James O'Brien, a security officer employed by a private firm under contract with the Sheraton, witnessed numerous individuals, including Defendants Eric Allen Cooper and Albert Urbina (collectively, "Defendants"), coming and going from the sixth floor of the hotel, particularly during the early morning hours of January 27. On one occasion, O'Brien assisted Defendant Urbina in entering Room 616, as the key Urbina had was not working properly.

Shortly after midnight on January 28, O'Brien received a call from the occupant of Room 618, the room adjoining Room 616. The guest complained that a ringing alarm clock in Room 616 was disturbing his sleep. O'Brien proceeded to Room 616 and knocked on the door several times, receiving no response. O'Brien, using his pass key, entered Room 616 to switch off the alarm. While inside the room, O'Brien noticed in plain view what he assumed to be marijuana. Following what he described as hotel policy, O'Brien immediately exited the room and "pin locked" it to prevent anyone other than himself from accessing the room. He then notified the Orange County Sheriff's Office.

After two sheriff's deputies arrived, O'Brien escorted them to Room 616 and granted them entrance. The deputies inspected the room and, concluding several varieties of narcotics were in fact on the premises, requested assistance from a narcotics unit. The narcotics officers conducted on-site tests that confirmed the presence of controlled substances.

O'Brien allowed the officers to lie in wait for the occupants of Room 616 in the adjoining room, Room 618 (its occupant was relocated to another room). Shortly thereafter, Defendants, accompanied by Grande, returned to the hotel. As arranged, O'Brien notified the officers that some of the people he had observed going in and out of Room 616 were en route to the sixth floor. Defendants and Grande entered Room 616, at which time the awaiting officers also entered through the adjoining room and arrested all three individuals. The officers searched each suspect: from Defendant Urbina, they recovered the driver's license of Allen Gonzalez and approximately $6500 of United States currency in varying denominations bundled together with rubber bands; from Defendant Cooper, they recovered approximately $1500 of United States currency similarly bundled and a plastic bag containing what were later identified as four broken tablets of flunitrazepam, or Rohypnol, a controlled substance. A complete inventory of Room 616 revealed: approximately 3100 grams of marijuana; approximately 225 grams of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), also known by its street name "ecstasy"; approximately 58 grams of Rohypnol; approximately 8 grams of lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD"); a Colt .38 revolver; $1043 of United States currency; two packages of plastic bags; a pipe used for smoking marijuana; assorted narcotics paraphernalia; and an address book. The street value of the narcotics seized exceeded $33,000.

Defendants were indicted on five narcotics-related counts: one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 (Count I); and one count of possession with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2, for each of the four controlled substances found on the premises (Counts II-V). At trial, Defendants moved to suppress all evidence found in the hotel room, asserting the police searched the hotel room and seized the evidence without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances or consent, all in violation of their Fourth Amendment1 rights. The district court denied the motion, holding Defendants had not alleged sufficient facts to establish they had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the hotel room and therefore did not have standing to challenge the search and seizure. Defendants requested an evidentiary hearing on the standing issue, but the district court declined to hold one. Cooper and Urbina each were convicted on all five counts of the indictment and sentenced to prison terms of ninety-seven and fifty-one months, respectively.

II. ANALYSIS
A.Search of the Motel Room
1.The Motion to Suppress

The Supreme Court long has recognized that the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from warrantless searches and seizures is not premised on arcane concepts of property and possessory interests; instead, the Fourth Amendment protects an individual in those places where she can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy against government intrusion. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Such a place can include a hotel room. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964). Fourth Amendment rights, however, are personal, and only individuals who actually enjoy the reasonable expectation of privacy have standing to challenge the validity of a government search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Our initial inquiry, therefore, focuses on whether Defendants established in their motion to suppress that they possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 616. See id. at 131 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. at 424 n. 1; United States v. Sneed, 732 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam). We review this mixed question of law and fact de novo. See United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir.1998).

To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room, courts have looked to such indicia as whether the individual paid and/or registered for the room or whether the individual's personal belongings were found inside the room. See United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir.1988). Here, Defendants' motion to suppress did not allege such details; instead, Defendants contend their motion's numerous references to the hotel room as "theirs" established their privacy interests. We disagree. "A motion to suppress must in every critical respect be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented.... A court need not act upon general or conclusory assertions...." United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir.1985) (internal citations omitted). Defendants' offhanded references fall far short of meeting this standard, especially considering that Defendants' claim to standing is founded only on their own ultimate conclusion that the hotel room was "theirs," rather than on facts demonstrating that conclusion to be true. Even after the Government raised the issue of standing in its opposition to Defendants' motion to suppress, Defendants failed to amend their motion to provide the specific facts essential to demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room. See Sneed, 732 F.2d at 888 (acknowledging that Defendant Sneed failed to amend his motion once his standing was questioned). Moreover, the undisputed trial testimony of O'Brien, the hotel security officer, revealed that Robert Garcia was the individual who actually paid and registered for Room 616, which he later transferred to Allen Gonzalez; this evidence undermines any credible argument that Defendants were the individuals who paid or registered for the room.2

In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1688, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), the Supreme Court held that overnight guests in the homes of third-persons can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those premises. On appeal, Defendants argue they were the overnight guests of Gonzalez, thus entitling them to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room. Whether the privacy interest recognized in Olson extends to the overnight guests of hotel registrants, especially those guests not disclosed to the hotel, is an open question in this circuit. Because Defendants did not allege in their motion to suppress that they were Gonzalez's guests, however, we...

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