U.S. v. Corona, 76-3540
Decision Date | 16 May 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 76-3540,76-3540 |
Citation | 551 F.2d 1386 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Erasmo CORONA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Robert R. Harris, El Paso, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
John E. Clark, U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Frank B. Walker, Asst. U. S. Atty., El Paso, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before GOLDBERG and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, and WYATT, * District Judge.
The appellant, Corona, was indicted on the charges of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance, possession of marijuana and two counts of using a communication facility to commit those crimes. 1 He pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. Although three of his co-conspirators were also indicted, he went to trial alone since they all pled guilty. At trial the case against Corona was primarily constructed by one of his partners in crime, Ortega, who took the stand and testified adversely to Corona. It was disclosed at that time that Ortega had a long criminal record and had pled guilty to a misdemeanor in connection with the events of the present case. Another co-defendant, Uribe, was mentioned in testimony but did not appear as a witness. The jury found Corona guilty of all counts and he was sentenced to a total of ten years imprisonment with a special parole term to follow.
On this appeal, Corona asserts that the prosecutor's closing argument was so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. Even a cursory examination of the transcript discloses that Corona's complaint is well taken. The prosecutor, apparently in a superabundance of zeal to attain a conviction, lost sight of his responsibility to insure that the defendant be afforded a fair hearing based only on the evidence properly presented to the jury at trial. We reverse.
The test to be applied in cases such as these is well settled: Does the prosecutor's argument, taken as a whole in the context of the entire case, prejudicially affect substantial rights of the defendant? See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); United States v. Rodriguez, 503 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rhoden, 453 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1972). A review of the closing argument of the Government convinces us that substantial rights of the defendant were grossly prejudiced. Several misstatements by the prosecutor deserve special note.
(1) During the course of his argument, the prosecutor mentioned co-conspirator Uribe, "who is a co-Defendant, pled guilty, and has been sentenced." 2 Uribe, however, did not appear as a witness in the trial and no evidence was properly admitted as to the fact that she had pled guilty. It should be noted, though, that the prosecutor in his opening statement at the commencement of the trial stated that "(Mr. Corona)'s charged alone now, because the other two people that were involved at this point have already pled guilty and have been disposed of." Record at 6.
Needless to say, the prejudicial effect of such statements is great indeed. We have elaborated on this point recently in United States v. Hansen,544 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1977). There, as here, the appellant was tried separately after his co-defendants had pled guilty. In Hansen it was the trial judge who then gratuitously informed the jury that the co-defendants had confessed their guilt. We reversed. As explained by Chief Judge Brown,
(Appellant's) co-defendant pleaded guilty before the trial commenced. . . . Nowhere in the record was there any evidence that the co-defendant had pleaded guilty. Indeed, (the co-defendant) never testified during (appellant's) trial. We think this is a bad practice which ought not, and must not, be followed. . . . (T)here is no need to advise the jury or its prospective members that some one not in court, not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded guilty. The prejudice to the remaining parties who are charged with complicity in the acts of the self-confessed guilty participant is obvious. Id. at 780.
In our view, the prejudice is not lessened to any significant degree by the fact that the prosecutor, rather than the trial judge, disclosed the damaging information.
(2) The prosecuting attorney also made remarks during oral argument which were intended to bolster the testimony of the Government witnesses. Several undercover agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency testified at trial, and as to them the prosecutor remarked that they
did the best they could under the circumstances. . . . (T)hose agents are human beings, and they're doing a dirty, nasty job, and they're associating daily with dirty, nasty people, because I, for one, consider dope dealers and dope traffickers as dirty, nasty people. And I think you should consider them the same way. Record at 269.
As to the remaining Government witness, co-defendant Ortega, the prosecutor offered the following assessments:
The (agents are) handling garbage, ladies and gentlemen, and there's an old saying, "When you handle garbage, your hands are going to stink." And we have to use people like Ortega. I'm not proud of him.
I'm kind of proud of him. He finally had the guts to tell the truth and try and help us to get at the sources of supply in this case. But his activities, I don't condone. His record I don't condone. Id. at 275.
It should be abundantly clear by now that "(i)t is impermissible for the prosecutor to assert his own credibility as a basis for conviction." United States v. Herrera, 531 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Serrano, 496 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974) (plain error). In United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971), the court reversed a conviction because the prosecutor remarked in closing argument that he thought an agent/witness did "a real good job" and "was doing his duty to his country." The court spoke in strong words which, unfortunately, we must repeat here:
As we have stated above the government concedes that it was error for counsel to vouch for this government witness. However, it is contended by the United States that this was harmless error and it should be overlooked. This court has passed too many times on this kind of comment by prosecutors to permit it to continue by allowing it to be brushed under the rug under the harmless error doctrine. See Gradsky v. United States, 5 Cir., 373 F.2d 706; Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 231; McMillian v. United States, 363 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1966); Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1962) and Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1955). Id. at 1236.
(3) The prosecutor made other improper comments concerning intermittent conferences between Corona and his lawyer during the cross-examination of Ortega but out of the hearing of the jury. The relevant passage is as follows:
Thus, over objection, the prosecutor was allowed to urge guilt by association. He encouraged the jury to find that various persons mentioned during the course of Ortega's cross-examination were drug traffickers and acquaintances of the defendant. These inferences were wholly unsupported by the record. It is true that on three separate occasions during the rather lengthy cross-examination of the Government's chief witness, Corona's counsel asked permission of the court to consult with his client. These consultations all occurred after counsel had asked Ortega if he knew a certain individual, however, not before. After the brief conferences, which of course were not transcribed, counsel began questioning the witness about a different subject altogether. These individuals were never identified as drug traffickers. In sum, the prosecutor misled the jury as to the conclusions it could properly draw from the evidence.
In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), the Supreme Court struck down a conviction when the prosecuting attorney's argument to the jury "was undignified and intemperate, containing improper insinuations and assertions calculated to mislead the jury." Id. at 85, 55 S.Ct. at 633. The Court warned that "improper suggestions, insinuations and especially assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none." Id. at 88, 55 S.Ct. at 633.
It is apparent to us that the remarks of the prosecutor in this case were even more prejudicial than those decried in Berger. In Berger the example selected for reproach was when the prosecutor added to the evidence by claiming that a particular witness knew the defendant. Here the prosecutor was allowed to claim that the defendant was giving out names of drug traffickers to his attorney during the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. Kopituk
...States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir. 1977). Employing this standard, we find neither of Field's claims to be The first prong of Field's argument focuses upon the p......
-
U.S. v. Leslie
...opinion set out this quotation and then went on to quote from several other cases of this Court. For example, in United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1391 (5th Cir.1977), we said that a prosecutor must "conduct criminal trials with an acute sense of fairness and justice." Then in United ......
-
U.S. v. Rodriguez
...United States v. Morris, 5 Cir. 1978, 568 F.2d 396, 400-02; United States v. Pariente, 5 Cir. 1977, 558 F.2d 1186; United States v. Corona, 5 Cir. 1977, 551 F.2d 1386; United States v. Warren, 5 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d 219, 229; Code of Prof. Resp., DR 7-106(C)(1), (3), (4), and (7); ABA Standa......
-
U.S. v. Butera
...comments that are presented for review. See United States v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971). In a proper case reversal will certainly be mandated. E.g., Corona, supra.......