U.S. v. Crandon
| Decision Date | 18 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-5161,98-5161 |
| Citation | 173 F.3d 122 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Richard C. CRANDON, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
David E. Schafer (argued), Office of Federal Public Defender, Trenton, NJ, for Appellant.
George S. Leone, Gail H. Nichols (argued), Office of United States Attorney, Newark, NJ, for Appellee.
Before: STAPLETON, LEWIS, and MAGILL, * Circuit Judges.
Richard C. Crandon appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to one count of receiving child pornography. Crandon seeks to vacate his sentence on three grounds. He argues that the District Court erred when it: (1) ordered him to pay restitution for psychiatric medical expenses of his victim; (2) attached a special condition to his supervised release that limits his computer use; and (3) applied the cross-reference set forth in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1) when determining his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. We will affirm the order of restitution and special condition of supervised release, but vacate and remand for reconsideration the application of the cross-reference.
In early 1997, Crandon, then a 39-year-old New Jersey resident, met a 14-year-old girl from Minnesota on the Internet. After communicating through electronic mail for several months, Crandon traveled to Minnesota, in July 1997, where he met the girl and engaged in sexual relations with her. During this three-day visit, Crandon took approximately 48 photographs of the girl. Two of the photos were sexually explicit, including one depicting Crandon and the girl engaging in oral sex. After returning to New Jersey, Crandon mailed the undeveloped film to Seattle FilmWorks, a mail-order film processor located in Seattle, Washington, for developing. He later received the developed photos in New Jersey.
Following the July visit, Crandon and the girl spoke on the telephone regularly and discussed Crandon returning to Minnesota to bring her back to New Jersey with him. In August 1997, Crandon returned to Minnesota, picked up the girl and began to drive back to New Jersey. After traveling as far as Pennsylvania, Crandon and the girl learned that the police were searching for them. Crandon then placed the girl on a bus back to Minnesota. Upon his return to New Jersey, Crandon was arrested and the sexually explicit pictures from the July visit were seized.
Some three weeks later, the girl was admitted to a hospital psychiatric ward for suicidal ideation. She remained in the hospital for 50 days before being transferred to a long-term, in-patient psychiatric facility where she remained until the date of the sentencing. The hospital expenses incurred by the girl's mother totaled $57,050.96 (including medical and miscellaneous expenses). Prior to this incident, the girl had never sought or received mental health treatment.
Crandon pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). At sentencing, the District Court noted that section 2G2.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a base offense level of 17 for a conviction of receiving child pornography. However, the District Court applied section 2G2.2's cross-reference, thereby invoking section 2G2.1, which raised the base offense level to 25. 1
The District Court imposed a 78-month sentence and a three-year term of supervised release. The term of supervised release included a special condition directing that Crandon not "possess, procure, purchase or otherwise obtain access to any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers unless specifically approved by the United States Probation Office." The court also ordered Crandon to pay restitution in the amount of $57,050.96.
Crandon now appeals. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We address first the claim that the sentencing court inappropriately imposed an order of restitution which covered the costs of the girl's 50-day hospitalization and related miscellaneous expenses. While we exercise plenary review over whether an award of restitution is permitted under law, we review specific awards of restitution for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir.1995).
The mandatory restitution provision of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act requires awarding the full amount of the victim's losses suffered as a proximate result of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3). Crandon argues that (1) his conduct was not the proximate cause of the victim's losses; (2) even if it was, it was only part of the cause; therefore, the sentencing court should have ordered restitution for only a portion of the losses; and (3) his economic circumstances do not allow for payment now or in the foreseeable future; as such, only "nominal periodic payments" should have been ordered.
We disagree. Congress mandated broad restitution for a minor victim following an offender's conviction of federal child sexual exploitation and abuse offenses. The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that full restitution was warranted under these circumstances.
The District Court concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Crandon's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's losses. See Graham, 72 F.3d at 356 (). In reaching its conclusion, the District Court relied upon the expert opinion of Jodi Pritchard, a licensed social worker and treatment coordinator at the long-term psychiatric facility where the girl was treated. In a letter to the court, Ms. Pritchard stated that Crandon's contacts with the victim were "a significant contributing factor in [the girl's] worsening depression and suicide ideation." Supp.App. at 8. The government also presented a report of the psychiatrist who treated the girl and concluded that Crandon's conduct "exacerbated" her depression and led to her hospitalization. See Supp.App. at 16. This evidence was unrebutted.
Crandon challenges the court's consideration of Ms. Pritchard's opinion (though not the psychiatrist's opinion) on the ground that she is not a medical doctor. This type of challenge has been repeatedly rejected. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir.1998) (); Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir.1982) ( ; see also Fed.R.Evid. 702. We also note the facts that the victim had never been treated for a mental health problem before the incident, sought medical treatment and required hospitalization shortly after the incident, and had been placed in a long-term psychiatric treatment center. The District Court properly considered these factors in addition to the opinions of Ms. Pritchard and the psychiatrist.
Crandon also contends that his actions cannot be considered the proximate cause of the girl's losses because the government's mental health experts conceded that she may have suffered from pre-existing, untreated psychological problems prior to their relationship. Despite that reality, it was entirely reasonable for the District Court to conclude that the additional strain or trauma stemming from Crandon's actions was a substantial factor in causing the ultimate loss. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Crandon's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's hospitalization. 2
Crandon also argues that neither his current economic circumstances nor those in the foreseeable future allow for payment in full; therefore, the District Court should have imposed "nominal periodic payments." The District Court, however, was required to impose mandatory restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259. The court was not permitted to consider Crandon's economic circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(B) (). After ordering full restitution, the court must set a payment schedule and may only order nominal periodic payments if the defendant proves indigency. 3 In this case, the court noted that Crandon "is a man with a college education with some master's points ... [his] financial future is not bereft of hope." App. at 92. These findings, which are not disputed, suggest that Crandon's potential earning capacity precludes a determination of indigency. Accordingly, we do not find the imposition of full restitution costs to be an abuse of discretion.
We next address Crandon's challenge to the District Court's decision to limit his Internet access during his term of supervised release. We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to the District Court's imposition of a special condition of supervised release. See United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir.1997); United States v. Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 1118 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Chinske, 978 F.2d 557, 559-60 (9th Cir.1992).
As a part of Crandon's sentence, the District Court imposed the following condition of supervised release:
The defendant shall not possess, procure, purchase or otherwise obtain access to any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers unless specifically approved by the U.S. Probation Office.
App. at 11. Crandon contends that the condition unnecessarily infringes upon his liberty interests and bears no logical relation to his...
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