U.S. v. Cray

Citation47 F.3d 1203,310 U.S. App. D.C. 329
Decision Date24 February 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-3222,93-3222
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Lyman CRAY, a/k/a Lynn Ward Carey, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 93cr0008-01).

Mary E. Davis, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was Thomas Abbenante, appointed by the court, Washington, DC.

G. Michael Lennon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Atty., John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black and Cherry Marie Destura, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, DC.

Before SILBERMAN, GINSBURG, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:

Lyman Cray pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, and possession of a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c). Prior to sentencing, Cray moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his codefendant had coerced him into accepting the plea bargain. After an evidentiary hearing, the learned district court denied Cray's motion and sentenced him to 10 years' incarceration to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Cray now appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Primarily because Cray has not shown that his plea was entered in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, we affirm.

I. Background

Lyman Cray, John Whitaker, and Steven Bridgeforth were originally charged with various drug and firearm offenses in an 11-count indictment. Before their scheduled trial Whitaker pled guilty to two of the counts and agreed to testify against his codefendants. Bridgeforth and Cray then agreed to plead guilty on the same terms. When Bridgeforth and Cray appeared before the court to enter their guilty pleas, however, Cray's attorney told the judge that Cray had just changed his mind and decided to go to trial. The Government was then granted a short recess in order to prepare its case against Cray, which would now include Bridgeforth's testimony.

At some point during the recess, Bridgeforth and Cray were left together in a holding cell. After the recess, Cray's attorney informed the court that Cray had again reconsidered his position and would plead guilty after all. When Cray had entered his plea, the court advised him as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c), inquired into the voluntariness of his plea, pursuant to Rule 11(d), accepted the plea, and adjudged the defendant guilty of the two offenses charged in the superseding information.

During the Rule 11 colloquy, Cray admitted to each element of the crimes charged, fully agreed with the Government's proffer of evidence, and was advised of his possible sentence. When the court specifically said: "You're not going to be able to take [your plea] back after today. Do you understand that?" Cray answered: "Yes, I do understand that." When asked: "Has anyone forced, threatened, or coerced you in any way into making a guilty plea here this afternoon?" Cray responded: "No, sir." To the question: "Are you entering your pleas of guilty to each of these crimes knowingly, freely, and voluntarily, of your own free will, because you are in fact guilty, and for no other reason?" Cray said: "Yes, I am."

Nevertheless, some two-and-a-half months later but still prior to his sentencing, Cray came before the district court asking to withdraw his plea of guilty. This time Cray said that in pleading guilty "I just went along with my codefendant without really thinking about the consequences for myself." His attorney explained further: "Basically, as I understand it, he's saying that when the attorneys were not present, it was the pressure that was being placed upon him by his codefendant in this case that led him to go along with this."

The district court held a two-day hearing on Cray's motion to withdraw his plea. Cray testified that Bridgeforth tried to convince him to accept the plea bargain so that Bridgeforth would not have to testify against him, and therefore be labeled a "snitch" in prison. Cray admitted that Bridgeforth had neither threatened nor physically intimidated him, but he maintained that he had pled only because Bridgeforth had pressured him to do so. ("I've never turned my back on you, so you've got to help me and not turn your back on me.") For his part, Bridgeforth denied having threatened, intimidated, or coerced Cray in any way. He testified that Cray told him he had decided to go to trial, and that Bridgeforth had simply replied: "Well, that's your right. You fight. I'm trying to take a cop." Cray also testified that he had told his probation officer that he was guilty of only "some" of the offense behavior charged, though in response to questions from the court he acknowledged that he had made that statement with regard to the original 11-count indictment rather than the two-count information to which he ultimately pled guilty.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Cray's motion. The court found that Cray had not made an adequate assertion of his innocence of the charges against him. In addition, specifically crediting Bridgeforth's testimony and finding Cray's statements false, the court found that Cray's claim that Bridgeforth had intimidated or coerced him into pleading guilty was false, and therefore concluded that Cray's guilty plea was knowing, free, and voluntary, and was taken in full compliance with Rule 11. Finally, the court found that the delay between Cray's guilty plea and the filing of his motion would substantially prejudice the Government's ability to prosecute the case.

On appeal, Cray argues against the district court's conclusion that his plea was knowing and voluntary, essentially asking us to find that the district court abused its discretion in crediting Bridgeforth's testimony over his own. He also argues that the statement he made to his probation officer to the effect that he was guilty of only "some" of the offense behavior alleged in the original indictment shows that he maintained his innocence before the district court. Finally, he contends that the Government would not have been unduly prejudiced by a belated trial. As set out below, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cray's motion.

II. Analysis

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), the district court may in its discretion grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentence is imposed "upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927) ("on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence"). At the same time, however, "a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act ... accepted only with care and discernment," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); the district court is therefore required to set it aside only for good cause shown. Indeed, we have long held that a district court's ruling in this situation should be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 13 F.2d 298, 299 (D.C.Cir.1926); Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 654 (D.C.Cir.1937). Not surprisingly, therefore, reversal is "uncommon." United States v. McKoy, 645 F.2d 1037, 1038 (D.C.Cir.1981).

Although the standard has long been the same, the particular inquiry we undertake in order to determine whether a district court has abused its discretion to deny withdrawal of a guilty plea has not been consistent over the years. Prior to 1975, this court generally upheld the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as long as the defendant had made the plea knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 984 (D.C.Cir.1964). Judge Wright undertook a more thorough analysis, however, in United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 211 (1975) (en banc) (affirming convictions of "foot soldiers of the Watergate Break-in"). The defendants in Barker sought to withdraw their guilty pleas on the ground that they had entered the pleas under the erroneous belief that they were engaged in a "secret, confidential, and sensitive national security operation," which they had felt constrained not to disclose. Id. at 216.

In Barker the court required that a Rule 32 movant make out a credible claim of legal innocence as a threshold matter: "If the movant's factual contentions, when accepted as true, make out no legally cognizable defense to the charges, he has not effectively denied his culpability, and his withdrawal motion need not be granted." Id. at 220. As the court noted, however, "were mere assertion of legal innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively be an automatic right," id. at 221, which would eviscerate the rule. Therefore, in addition to requiring that a defendant who would withdraw his plea make out a legally cognizable defense, the court required him to give a good reason "why the defenses now presented were not put forward at the time of original pleading." Barker, 514 F.2d at 221. The key to this inquiry is whether the plea was entered in accordance with Rule 11. If the plea is defective under Rule 11, then withdrawal "should almost always be permitted"; but if the plea was properly accepted, then "withdrawal is not an automatic right and more substantial reasons for delay must generally be asserted." Id. Finally, the court considered the prejudice that the Government would suffer were it belatedly forced to try the case: "The movant's reasons must meet exceptionally...

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