U.S. v. Crowley

• Citation: 504 F.2d 992
• Decision Date: 30 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1437,73-1437
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert E. CROWLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 992

504 F.2d 992

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert E. CROWLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 73-1437.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 5, 1973.

Decided Sept. 30, 1974.

Michael J. Guinan, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

James R. Thompson, U.S. Atty., Gary L. Starkman and Michael D. Monico, Asst. U.S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge, SPRECHER, Circuit Judge, and POOS, ^* Senior District Judge.

POOS, Senior District Judge.

Defendant, Robert E. Crowley, was indicted in a one count indictment for violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951. ¹ Following a trial by jury, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to two years imprisonment. This appeal follows that conviction.

Jack David and Jerome Morris, hereinafter referred to as David and Morris, were the proprietors of the Bryn Mawr Bowling Lanes located in Chicago's south side. In recent years their business, which was located in a racially changing area, had experienced numerous thefts and violent disturbances. The proprietors soon discovered that without sufficient police protection they were unable to properly and profitably continue their business enterprise. It is within this factual milieu that defendant, a police officer for the Chicago Police Department, enters.

In the fall of 1971, David and Morris were separately introduced to defendant Crowley by another unidentified policeman who had been receiving pay-offs from the two men. Crowley was introduced to each of the alleged victims as the man who would continue to collect the monthly pay-offs. Subsequently, the proprietors paid one hundred dollars ($100) per month from November, 1971 to April, 1972, on approximately the four-teenth (14th) of each month. The manner of payment involved either of the two men writing a check for the designated amount, cashing it, and then giving the sum of money to defendant when he entered the premises.

Defendant admitted to having received the money but contended that it was voluntary remuneration for services rendered to the alleged victims, i.e., providing security for the premises while on and off duty. The record further discloses, however, that defendant never performed, nor was asked to perform any services for David or Morris. Officer Crowley never personally arrested or caused anyone to be arrested on the bowling establishment premises. Oft times the alleged victims complained that they were not receiving adequate police assistance when needed. Crowley reassured David and Morris and indicated that their complaint would be remedied. The proprietors testified, however, that the only time they ever observed defendant during the period in question was when he collected the payments.

Finally, on April 14, 1972, the aforementioned relationship between the proprietors and defendant ended. On that morning Agent Noble of the Federal Bureau of Investigation handed David five twenty dollar bills, which he had previously photostated. Subsequent thereto, defendant entered the bowling alley and encountered David. David complained that despite the payments adequate police protection was not being afforded; defendant assured David that the service would improve. It was during this conversation that David gave the five twenty dollar bills to defendant, who placed them on his person. As defendant Crowley exited the premises he was apprehended by Agent Noble, who in comparing the bills in Crowley's possession found them to correspond to those previously given David. Defendant's trial and conviction stemmed from this arrest.

Defendant's first contention on appeal is that the government's evidence of extortion was insufficient to sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C., Sec. 1951. ¹ In support thereof, defendant argues that while the evidence may support a charge of bribery, it wholly fails to prove a crime of extortion in that there was no indication that Crowley's actions engendered a reasonable fear of harm in the minds of the alleged victims. In essence, defendant alleges that it was necessary for the government to prove not only that defendant obtained the property of another, with his consent, while acting 'under color of official right' but also within the 'wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear.' ²

In setting forth such an exposition, defendant clearly misreads 18 U.S.C., Sec. 1951 and the case law pertinent thereto. Even a cursory reading of the statute reveals that it is phrased in the disjunctive. ³ Furthermore, United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1972), supports this interpretation,

(While) private persons may violate the statute only by use of fear and public officials may violate the act by use of fear, persons holding public office may also violate the statute by a wrongful taking under color of official right . . .. The 'under color of official right' language plainly is disjunctive. That part of the definition repeats the common law definition of extortion, a crime which could only be committed by a public official and which did not require proof of threat, fear, or duress. 462 F.2d at 1229.

This holding comports with the Supreme Court's concept of common law extortion. In United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289, 89 S.Ct. 534, 536, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969), the Court discussed the meaning of extortion in the Hobbs Act's companion statute, 18 U.S.C., Sec. 1952. It stated:

At common law a public official who under color of office obtained the property of another not due either to the office or the official was guilty of extortion. In many States, however, the crime of extortion has been statutorily expanded to include acts of private individuals under which property is obtained by means of force, fear, or threats. ⁴

With reference to the foregoing analysis it appears that the jury in the instant case was warranted in finding that defendant committed extortion 'under color of official right.' The jury was properly instructed on this facet of the extortion statute. ⁵ Furthermore, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the government, ⁶ established that Crowley obtained money to which he was not entitled while in uniform and in the performance of his official duties. Defendant was introduced to the proprietors as the man who would collect the pay-offs. Crowley performed no services for David and Morris, and they expected non of him. The evidence was therefore sufficient for the jury to conclude that it was defendant's uniform-- his office-- that induced David and Morris to make the payments.

Defendant has cited numerous cases which stand for the proposition that fear or duress is a necessary element for the crime of extortion. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 736, 30 L.Ed.2d 745, is the authority predominantly relied upon for this proposition. Hyde, however, did not esplicitly deal with the 'under color of official right' aspect of the Hobbs Act and therefore is clearly distinguishable,

There was evidence in this case to support a finding that the defendants coerced companies into paying fees in order to avoid harmful legal action. In some cases explicit threats were made. 448 F.2d at 833.

It is apparent that the Court in Hyde was not concerned and did not decide the issue relevant to the resolution of the instant case.

As to the remaining authorities cited by defendant, suffice it to say that they concerned private, not public participants in the crime of extortion and therefore are inapposite. ⁷

This Court need not solely rest upon the above rationale to support the jury's finding in the instant case. The evidence contained in the record, both direct and circumstantial, proved that the proprietors of the Bryn Mawr Bowling Lanes paid defendant because they feared if adequate police protection was not provided, their business would be plagued by financial loss. It is readily conceded that the business establishment was the target of frequent incidents of vandalism and violence. David and Morris, like other businessmen in the racially changing neighborhood, were often forced to summon the police, and found, not infrequently, that assistance was slow in arriving. Hence, David and Morris were highly susceptible targets for such extortionate practices as set forth in the indictment.

The testimony reveals that another policeman, who had been collecting from the proprietors, represented that defendant would continue to collect the payments. Defendant represented to the victims that he would arrange for improved police service. David and Morris obviously recognized that if adequate police service was not forthcoming the spectre of financial ruin would become an immediate reality. It is important to note that it is unnecessary for the government to prove that defendant actually created the fear in the minds of his victims. Rather, as the Court in Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 174-176 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764, held, the exploitation of the victim's reasonable fear constitutes extortion regardless of whether or not the defendant was responsible for creating that fear and despite the absence of any direct threats. Accordingly, Crowley was charged with extorting money through the use of economic harm, ⁸ the issue on which the jury heard evidence, was instructed, and reasonably could have concluded the defendant's guilt.

Defendant asserts a two-pronged attack on this aspect of the jury's adverse conclusion. Initially, defendant cites various contradictions that were revealed in the witnesses' testimony during examination at trial and relies on the issue of credibility to subvert the jury's finding. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 77-80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), properly repudiates defendant's proposition:

The short answer to this is that the credibility of a...