U.S. v. de Cruz
| Decision Date | 01 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-50095,95-50095 |
| Citation | 82 F.3d 856 |
| Parties | 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3030, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5042 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maria Leticia Ruiz DE CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Stephen M. Romero, El Monte, California, for defendant-appellant.
Brent A. Whittlesey, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Lourdes G. Baird, District Judge, Presiding. No. CR-94-00638-LGB.
Before: WALLACE, FERGUSON, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
OVERVIEW
The defendant, Maria Leticia Ruiz de Cruz, appeals her jury conviction of knowingly accepting and receiving counterfeit immigration documents as evidence of employment authorization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Defendant was employed by a group of medical clinics in Southern California known as "Clinica Medica Familiar" ("CMF") from 1989 until 1993. She began working for CMF as an assistant clinic manager and was eventually promoted to the position of general administrator of the clinics. There were a total of seven clinics that defendant was responsible for supervising.
On May 8, 1991, defendant hired Dr. Aida Bernal, an anesthesiologist, to work at CMF as a medical assistant. Dr. Bernal is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States on a tourist visa which did not authorize her to have employment in the United States. On March 31, 1993, after working for CMF for almost two years, Dr. Bernal's employment was terminated because she was unable to present CMF with adequate documentation for work authorization. In April 1993, Dr. Bernal was rehired by defendant after she presented defendant with a valid social security card in the name of Lourdes Cardenas. Approximately one month later, Dr. Bernal was again terminated after the personnel department at CMF found out that she was working under a false name.
Dr. Victor Campos, a medical doctor who is a resident of Mexico, began working for CMF in June 1991. Dr. Campos entered the United States on a tourist visa and did not have work authorization papers. About fifteen days after he was hired, Dr. Campos met with the defendant. Defendant told him to go to the personnel department and hand in the appropriate documentation for work authorization.
On August 4, 1994, defendant was indicted for knowingly accepting or receiving counterfeit immigration documents as evidence of employment authorization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (), knowingly encouraging an alien to remain in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(D) () and causing a false social security number to be presented with the intent to deceive in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) ().
On September 19, 1994, the district court set a trial date of November 8, 1994. On October 14, 1994, defendant filed a series of motions, seeking, among other things: (1) a continuance of trial; (2) dismissal of the indictment for prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of process; (3) dismissal of counts fourteen and fifteen of the indictment; and (4) discovery.
On November 1, 1994, the district court denied the requested continuance, granted the motion to dismiss counts fourteen and fifteen, and took the discovery issues under consideration. On November 3, 1994, the district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of process, and granted defendant's motion for discovery, ordering the Government to produce certain files of the United States Department of Labor requested by defendant.
The trial began as scheduled on November 8, 1994. At trial, the Government called a number of current and former clinic employees as witnesses, including Dr. Bernal and Dr. Campos. 1
Following trial, only three counts of the original indictment were left before the jury. 2 The jury convicted defendant of two counts of knowingly accepting or receiving counterfeit immigration documents as evidence of employment authorization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, as charged in counts six and thirteen of the indictment. The jury acquitted defendant of the charge of causing a false social security number to be presented with the intent to deceive in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) as charged in count sixteen.
On November 28, 1994, defendant made a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion.
On February 13, 1995, the district court held a sentencing hearing. The district court sentenced defendant to a term of probation for three years on each of counts six and thirteen, to be served concurrently, as well as a fine of $1,500 and a special assessment of $100.
Defendant timely appeals her conviction and the district court's denial of her motion for a new trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Denial of a motion to continue a trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1383 (9th Cir.1991). An abuse of discretion will be found only where "denial of the continuance was arbitrary or unreasonable." Id. "To demonstrate reversible error, the defendant must show that the denial resulted in actual prejudice to [her] defense." United States v. Mitchell, 744 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir.1984).
Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to continue the trial until after election day because a continuance was necessary to prevent the jury from being unfairly swayed by highly inflammatory and negative propaganda against illegal immigrants. 3 We reject this argument.
First, the district court's denial of defendant's motion was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The district court stated that it understood that the trial was scheduled to start on election day. However, the district court pointed out that the immigration issue was going to be around for a "long, long time" and that the case had to be tried sometime. The district court believed that voir dire would be more than enough to take care of any danger of potential bias. Thus, the court It is clear that the district court considered the possible impact of Proposition 187 on the jurors, considered the alternatives that were available, and determined that the best alternative was to proceed with the trial and grant defense counsel the opportunity to conduct voir dire to determine whether any prejudice existed. This action by the district court was not unreasonable or arbitrary. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance.
granted counsel the opportunity to conduct voir dire to determine whether any potential trial jurors could not be fair and impartial in deciding the case.
Second, even if we assume that the district court did err in denying defendant's motion to continue the trial, defendant has failed to show that any actual prejudice resulted from this denial. Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate reversible error. See Mitchell, 744 F.2d at 704.
Defendant has not pointed to any evidence that the jury in this case judged her on anything but the evidence presented. There has been no showing that the jury was influenced in any way by the political debate over Proposition 187, or any other issue. The fact that the jury acquitted defendant of one of the three charges that was presented to them for decision further indicates a lack of prejudice toward defendant. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1446 (9th Cir.1994) (), cert. granted in part, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 39, 132 L.Ed.2d 920 (1995).
Defendant claims that she was denied her right to a fair trial when the district court denied her motion for a continuance in order to evaluate the Department of Labor documents. She argues that had she been given an opportunity to further investigate the documents, the Government's case would have been weakened by defense counsel's use of the documents to impeach prosecution witnesses. We are not persuaded.
Defendant points to no actual prejudice that resulted from the denial of a continuance. She does not claim that she has, upon further investigation, found evidence that would have assisted her at trial. Instead, defendant makes a general claim that she was prejudiced because she was not given the opportunity to thoroughly analyze these documents. This general claim is insufficient to show the actual prejudice required to reverse a conviction. See Mitchell, 744 F.2d at 704. We therefore hold that the defendant was not denied her right to a fair trial when the district court denied her motion for a continuance.
"Prosecutorial comments to which defendant objects are reviewed for 'harmless error', while the standard of review for comments which defendant failed to interpose an objection is 'plain error'." United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 513 (9th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13 n. 10, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1045 n. 10, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)).
Defendant claims that two portions of the prosecution's rebuttal argument prejudiced her and denied her right to a fair trial. We will address each portion of the argument separately.
Defendant claims that she was...
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