U.S. v. Cusmano

• Decision Date: 17 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-5364,79-5364
• Citation: 659 F.2d 714
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph D. CUSMANO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 714

659 F.2d 714

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph D. CUSMANO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 79-5364.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 17, 1981.

Decided and Filed Sept. 17, 1981.

Neil H. Fink, Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellant.

James K. Robinson, U. S. Atty., John Newcomer, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LIVELY, KENNEDY, and BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judges.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Joseph Cusmano was convicted in the Eastern District of Michigan of both conspiracy to violate and a substantive violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. ¹

Cusmano was the founder and half owner, along with codefendant James Russo, of the J & J Cartage Company, a trucking firm engaged in the transportation of steel. The other codefendants were Vincent Meli, an employee of the company, and Roby Smith, the business agent for Teamsters Local 299. The indictment charged that Cusmano, Russo, Meli, and Smith conspired to and did in fact obstruct, delay, and affect interstate commerce through extortion. ² The codefendants allegedly coerced the drivers to pay the company's contributions to the Teamster Health and Welfare and Pension Funds by causing them to sign a so-called "11% agreement." The agreement authorized the company to deduct 11% from gross earnings, prior to computing the drivers' wages, and to use the deducted amount to pay the employer contributions to the funds.

Cusmano makes several arguments on appeal. We only address one of those arguments, because our decision on the issue it raises requires us to reverse his conviction.

Cusmano contends that certain evidence admitted at trial, together with the trial court's instructions to the jury, constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment, depriving him of his Fifth Amendment right not to be prosecuted except on charges set forth in a grand jury indictment. We agree.

Count One of the indictment stated as follows:

(The codefendants) did knowingly and willfully conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, and with each other, and with persons unknown to the Grand Jury, to obstruct, delay and affect interstate commerce, as that term is defined in Section 1951 of Title 18, United States Code, and the movement of articles and commodities, that is, steel and steel products, in such commerce, and did attempt to do so by extortion, to-wit: by threats of economic loss, that is to say, the defendants did force the drivers who were employees, agents, and owner-operators of the Company to pay the Company employer contributions to the Funds with their consent induced by the wrongful use of force and fear, in that the defendants did threaten certain drivers of the Company with unprofitable truck loads, the loss of their jobs, and the loss of equity in their equipment unless they agreed to the deduction from their weekly gross earnings. ³

It is clear that the indictment alleges only one means of extortion: threats of economic loss. The "wrongful use of force and fear" constituting the extortion element of the offense is particularized the drivers were threatened with unprofitable loads, the loss of their jobs, and the loss of equity in their equipment. There is no allegation that the employees' consent to the 11% agreement was induced by the wrongful use of actual or threatened physical violence. Such conduct is not a necessary element of a Hobbs Act conviction; it is well settled that fear of economic loss is sufficient to support a conviction under the Act. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973); United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123, 97 S.Ct. 1160, 51 L.Ed.2d 573 (1977); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S.Ct. 949, 30 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972).

As the government points out in its brief, however, fear of economic loss was not the only kind of fear that the witnesses were permitted to describe. Evidence was admitted at trial of the employees' fear of physical violence as well. John Gemelli, one of the truck drivers, testified that he had heard that codefendant Meli was involved in the Mafia and was not one to "fool around" with. Gemelli also stated that he was concerned for his family, and that his mother-in-law had received a threatening phone call. Cusmano moved during Gemelli's testimony for a mistrial, and in a supporting memorandum contended that the evidence as to Meli's character was inadmissible, highly prejudicial, and irrelevant to prove the fear of economic harm alleged in the indictment. In its opinion denying the motion, the trial court first stated that it would give a cautionary instruction. Addressing Cusmano's claim that the evidence was irrelevant, the court stated:

First, a reference to Meli as an affiliate of the "Mafia" does not necessarily connote solely a "physical" threat it may well convey the ability to enforce an economic threat, perhaps through physical means, perhaps through commercial means. The court deems the information probative since it may assist the jury in their determination of whether there existed in the witness' mind a reasonable fear of economic loss. The fear in the mind of the alleged victim may be a product of potential economic loss, potential physical harm, or a hybrid of the two. Second, the court does not find that the proofs are fatally variant from the charges of the indictment. See, United States v. Mills, 366 F.2d 512, 514 (6th Cir. 1966). The defendant in this case has been afforded substantial discovery, thereby minimizing the potential for surprise or for being misled. In the leading case on fatal variance, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), the prosecution relied on facts at trial that were much different from those enumerated in the indictment. Such is not the case here. It is conceivable here that the existence of fear in the alleged victim's mind was related to economic loss as well as physical harm under certain circumstances it is apparent that the two forms of coercion may be inextricably tied. That is not to say that the government will be allowed to prove a case of extortion by physical threats, which was not charged in the indictment. It is difficult for the court, at this time, to foresee what proofs are forthcoming. Hopefully, the aforementioned rationale will assist the government in recognizing their limitations. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for a mistrial is hereby denied.

(Emphasis added).

It is clear that at this point in the trial the court intended to limit the government's proof to the charges set forth in the indictment. The trial judge obviously believed that the evidence of Meli's Mafia connection connoted a threat of physical violence. He cautioned the jury to consider that evidence only as it bore on Gemelli's state of mind. The court reasoned that the evidence would assist the jury in determining whether there existed in Gemelli's mind a reasonable fear of economic loss. ⁴

In contradiction to its earlier statement that the government would not be allowed to prove a case of extortion by physical threats, the court gave the following instructions to the jury:

Now, as to the second element of the Hobbs Act violation, that is, the use of extortion, I instruct you that the law as it relates to this case defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another with his consent, where that consent was induced by the wrongful use of threatened force, violence, or fear. The mere taking of property not induced by these fears would not constitute extortion.

The term "fear" as used in these instructions has the commonly accepted meaning. It is a state of anxious concern, alarm, or apprehension of anticipated harm. The term "fear" as used in these instructions not only encompasses fear of economic loss or damage to certain employee drivers of J & J Cartage Company but also fear of physical violence.

Thus, if the defendants deliberately and intentionally played upon an individual's reasonable fear of force, violence, or economic loss to obtain money from that person or persons the defendants have committed extortion.

In connection with what I have just said about extortion through the use of fear, I instruct you that if you, ladies and gentlemen, find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant deliberately and intentionally utilized another person's reasonable fear of actual or threatened force or violence, or of economic loss, to obtain property from that person, extortion has been committed.

Keep in mind in deciding the issues it is the burden of the Government to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to prove the defendant's guilt the Government must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to obtain the property by threats of force or violence or fear of economic harm. ⁵, 6

Except as to matters of form or surplusage, there is a per se rule prohibiting judicial amendments to the terms of an indictment. Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fruehauf, 577 F.2d 1038, 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978); United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1978). The rule began as a prohibition of formal alterations of the wording of an indictment. See Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887). In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), the Supreme Court held that events at trial can effectively amend an indictment, requiring reversal of a conviction even in the absence of a formal amendment. The Stirone indictment alleged a Hobbs Act violation which affected the movement of sand in interstate commerce. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court allowed the government to present evidence of an effect on interstate...