U.S. v. Dancy

• Decision Date: 02 January 1975
• Docket Number: Nos. 71--1856,72--1452,s. 71--1856
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Conrad S. DANCY, Appellant (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 779

510 F.2d 779

166 U.S.App.D.C. 399

UNITED STATES of America v. Conrad S. DANCY, Appellant (two cases).

Nos. 71--1856, 72--1452.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 11, 1973.

Decided Jan. 2, 1975.

Carol Garfiel Freeman, Washington, D.C. (appointed by this Court), for appellant.

Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Vincent R. Alto, Asst. U.S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge and LEVENTHAL and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

Appellant, Conrad Dancy, was convicted on September 23, 1971 of first degree felony murder ¹ and other lesser offenses, ² stemming from the shooting death of William Darden on July 6, 1970. ³ Since Dancy was under 22 years of age at the time of conviction, he was eligible to be considered for sentencing to a youth treatment facility under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). ⁴ To assist him in his sentencing decision, the trial judge elected, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e), to commit Dancy to a sixty day study and evaluation at the Lorton Youth Center. ⁵ The resulting report recommended that Dancy be denied FYCA sentencing and be given an adult sentence. Relying on that recommendation, the trial judge sentenced Dancy to an adult term of imprisonment of twenty years to life on the first degree murder count and to lesser concurrent terms on the other counts.

Dancy appealed both the conviction and the denial of FYCA sentencing. In a memorandum opinion issued on January 29, 1974, we disposed of all claims relating to his conviction. ⁶ At the same time we stayed consideration of the FYCA issues raised by the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Dorszynski v. United States. Dorszynski now having been decided, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974), we proceed to an examination of those issues, and, based on that examination, remand the case for resentencing.

I

Enacted in 1950, the Federal Youth Corrections Act was a Congressional response to the fact that persons between the ages of 18 and 22 were proportionately far over-represented in national crime statistics. ⁷ It was thought that psychological and physiological factors created a special propensity in persons in that age bracket to engage in criminal activity. ⁸ Congress thought it possible to steer many of these young offenders away from a continued life of crime, believing that 'young persons . . . convicted of crime have, as a general rule, a higher potential for being rehabilitated to become useful citizens than do older, more mature offenders.' ⁹ In order to realize that potential, the FYCA provides that eligible young offenders be committed to specially established rehabilitative facilities, there to receive 'essential varieties of treatment.' ¹⁰ Such facilities provide the added benefit--also contemplated by the Act--of insuring that young offenders are not intermixed in their institutionalization with hardened adult criminals. ¹¹

The sentencing alternatives available to a trial court under the FYCA are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 5010. If commitment is unnecessary, the trial judge may place the youth offender on probation. Otherwise, he may sentence the youth to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment under the Act. ¹² Finally, if the trial judge finds that 'the youth offender will not derive benefit from (Youth Corrections Act) treatment,' he may 'sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision (i.e. he may sentence him as an adult).' ¹³

In order to insure that the trial judge's sentencing decision be an informed one, Congress wisely provided in § 5010(e) of the Act that '(i)f the court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender will derive benefit from treatment (under the Act) . . . it may order that he be committed . . . for observation and study at an appropriate classification center or agency' and that '(w)ithin sixty days from the date of the order . . . the (Youth Services) Division shall report to the court its findings.'

The classification center ordinarily used for young offenders convicted in the District of Columbia is the Lorton Youth Center. There the conduct of the § 5010(e) study is the responsibility of a Youth Center Classification Committee. The Committee is composed of a clinical psychologist and a Classification and Parole Officer and is chaired by the Administrator of the Diagnostic Unit of the Youth Center. ¹⁴ The Classification and Parole Officer is responsible for compiling a classification study reviewing the circumstances of the offense in question, the offender's social and family background and the quality of his relationship with the staff while at the Center. He may conduct interviews not only with the offender but also with his family and community associates. The clinical psychologist compiles a personality profile of the offender, based on interviews with him and certain projective and intelligence tests. The three Classification Committee members prepare a joint evaluation and recommendation. This evaluation and recommendation, along with the individual reports of the Classification and Parole Officer and the clinical psychologist and a cover letter from the Superintendent or Assistant Director of the Youth Center are forwarded to the D.C. Board of Parole. Based on this material, the Board makes its own recommendation and submits the entire package of documents, the completed § 5010(e) study, to the court.

II

The implementation of the sentencing provisions of the FYCA has been the subject of much litigation in this and other Circuits. ¹⁵ Last Term, the Supreme Court addressed the area for the first time in Dorszynski v. United States. ¹⁶ In that case, a young man of 19 had been found guilty of possessing a controlled substance without a prescription. Although trial counsel requested that the defendant be 'placed on probation under the Youth Corrections Act', the trial judge sentenced the defendant to an adult term without ordering a § 5010(e) study and evaluation and, indeed, without making any reference at all to the FYCA. The Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing. It held--as this court had before ¹⁷--that before a trial judge may sentence a youth offender to an adult term he must make an explicit finding that the eligible youth will 'not benefit' from FYCA treatment. However, the Supreme Court also indicated that, in giving an adult sentence, the trial judge is not required to give a statement as to the reasons which underlay his finding of 'no benefit.' ¹⁸ The Court stated that the FYCA was intended 'to preserve unfettered the sentencing discretion of federal district judges', ¹⁹ and the only purpose of requiring a statement of reasons would be 'to facilitate appellate supervision of, and thus to limit, the trial court's sentencing discretion.' ²⁰

The Court was careful to point out in Dorszynski, however, that appellate courts do have a limited role to perform in the sentencing area. ²¹ In noting that the appellant made no contention that 'the District Court relied upon improper or inaccurate information', ²² the Court cited United States v. Tucker. ²³ In so doing, the Court reaffirmed the established doctrine that appellate courts have a duty to scrutinize sentencing decisions to insure that they are not based on information that is false or otherwise improper. ²⁴

The Court was also careful to distinguish between 'appellate modification of a statutorily-authorized sentence' ²⁵ and 'careful scrutiny of the judicial process by which the particular punishment was determined.' ²⁶ While the former is generally inappropriate, the latter is 'on the contrary, a necessary incident of what has always been appropriate appellate review of criminal cases.' ²⁷ Careful appellate review of the judicial sentencing process does not impinge upon the trial judge's discretion to impose sentence within statutory limits. Rather, it simply aims to guarantee that the trial judge's sentencing discretion is actually exercised ²⁸ and that the information relied upon by him is not unreliable, ²⁹ improper, ³⁰ or grossly insufficient. ³¹

Staying well within the bounds of the appellate role described in Dorszynski, we conclude for reasons detailed in III, infra, that Dancy's case must be remanded for restencing.

III

A

In sentencing Dancy to an adult term, the trial judge commented as follows: 'This court is of the opinion that in view of the fact that the Youth Center itself has indicated that sentencing him as a youth would not be the proper procedure and that they would not be able to supply the needs that he has; and although the Court recognizes that mere incarceration may not be rehabilitative, never theless, the Court has no alternative under the statute.' (Sent. Tr. 4--5). (emphasis added)

The trial judge evidently believed that the statute barred him from sentencing Dancy to a youth term against the recommendation of Youth Center officials. This apparent surrender of discretion and responsibility to the Youth Center authorities is fundamentally at odds with the demands of traditional sentencing doctrine that requires the trial judge to exercise his statutory discretion. ³² More importantly, the trial judge's claim that he had 'no alternative' is manifestly inconsistent with the provision of the FYCA which places the responsibility both for making a finding of 'no benefit' and for making the sentencing decision attendant thereto on the trial court alone: 'If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit . . . then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.' ³³

While a § 5010(e) report is a potentially useful pre-sentencing aid, it is designed only to provide 'additional information as to whether a youth...