U.S. v. Daniels
| Decision Date | 12 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1897,85-1897 |
| Citation | 772 F.2d 382 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roosevelt DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael H. King, Ross & Hardies, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant; Allan A. Ackerman, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Charles B. Sklarsky, Asst. U.S. Atty., Anton R. Valukas, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Daniels is in custody on a charge of distributing large quantities of controlled drugs (principally cocaine), in an operation that included bribing police officers to obtain protection. At Daniels's initial appearance before the magistrate, the government moved for an order of pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(f)(1)(C). The magistrate held a timely hearing, at which an agent of the FBI testified about the crime for which Daniels had been arrested. The magistrate found that there was probable cause to believe that Daniels had committed the drug offenses charged.
The prosecutor also placed Daniels's criminal record before the magistrate. In 1970 he was convicted of battery and unlawful use of a weapon, in 1971 of armed robbery. He served five years on these convictions. In 1976 he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping--abducting two people at gunpoint and stuffing them in the trunk of a car. People v. Daniels, 67 Ill.App.3d 663, 24 Ill.Dec. 65, 384 N.E.2d 932 (1978). This affair cannot have come long after his release. He also was convicted of a separate incident in 1976 of murder; he bludgeoned a person to death in a dispute about $60. (This conviction was reversed, People v. Daniels, 75 Ill.App.3d 35, 30 Ill.Dec. 631, 393 N.E.2d 667 (1979), but Daniels then entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder.) Perhaps aggravated kidnapping and murder are not viewed as serious crimes these days, for by 1982 Daniels was at liberty once more, this time facing charges of unlawful use of a weapon. He was returned to jail. By 1984 he was out again. When arrested on drug charges in September 1984 he was wearing a holster for one of six guns thrown out the window of a front for selling drugs. This led to the revocation of his parole in November 1984. But even that did not last. He was out again when arrested on April 15, 1985, and charged with running a drug operation.
The magistrate understandably concluded that Daniels would pose a danger to the community if allowed to remain at large pending trial. As he put it, Daniels--who introduced no evidence at the hearing--did not rebut the statutory presumption of dangerousness that flows from the finding of probable cause to believe that he had committed a serious drug offense. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e). On appeal to the district court Daniels once again introduced no evidence. He argued instead that he was not likely to flee. The district court agreed with the magistrate and concluded that Daniels should be held pending trial.
Daniels repeats on appeal the argument that he is unlikely to flee. And indeed the evidence shows that he is a lifelong resident of Chicago, where all his family lives. He apparently returns to Chicago over and over again to commit crimes, and the police seem to have no trouble picking him up. He says that he has never jumped bond on an offense. This is disputed; the prosecutor says that bond forfeiture proceedings have been filed against him but that the record does not reflect the disposition of these. We need not resolve the dispute. We may assume that Daniels, like a bad penny, will return even if ordered not to do so. This is irrelevant. He is being held on a conclusion that he is likely to commit more crimes on release, not on a charge that he is likely to flee. These are distinct statutory sources of authority to detain. That the evidence supports only one is no reason to let Daniels out; one is quite enough. See generally United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887 (8th Cir.1985) (en banc); S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), U.S.Code Cong....
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