U.S. v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 21 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-10672,00-10672
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RANDLE CURTIS DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 411

252 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RANDLE CURTIS DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-10672

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

May 21, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Randle Daniels appeals his conviction for bank theft and money laundering. Daniels's main argument is that he believed in good faith that he was entitled to the money he took from Colonial Savings Bank; that as a matter of law he lacked the required mens rea. We disagree, and affirm.

I

Colonial Savings held the mortgage on Daniels's home. A hail storm damaged its roof. His insurance company sent him a check for $46,000 to cover the cost of repairs.

Aware of the mortgage, the insurance company made the check payable to Randle Daniels and Colonial Savings jointly. Daniels took the check to Colonial Savings and asked them to endorse it to him. The bank refused, preferring to hold the money in a trust account, disbursing it as actual repairs were made. Daniels and the bank resolved their differences, agreeing that the bank would pay Daniels $16,000 immediately, and place the remaining $30,000 into a trust account, to be disbursed as Daniels presented receipts for repairs.

While the $16,000 check was being prepared, Daniels stole a blank, signed bank check from the desk of a bank employee. He made that check out for $29,800, and directed his girlfriend, Marsha Veach, to deposit it in her account. She did so and later wrote him a check for $29,500.

The check was traced to Daniels, and he was charged with bank theft and money laundering. His defense at trial was that a bank representative gave him the blank check. A jury convicted him of both charges and he now appeals.

II

Daniels argues that, as a matter of law, he lacked specific intent to steal as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2113. Since Daniels believed the proceeds from the insurance check to be his, his argument goes, he cannot have had the required scienter.

The relevant portion of section 2113 provides that a defendant who "takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank" shall be punished.¹ In Carter v. United States,² albeit in dictum, the Supreme Court stated that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) required a specific intent to steal or purloin because without such an intent requirement, the "statute would run the risk of punishing seemingly innocent conduct in the case of a defendant who peaceably takes money believing it to be his."³

Daniels's argument is essentially an insufficiency of the evidence contention. As such, it is unpersuasive. A rational jury could have concluded that Daniels did not believe he was entitled to take the money. The check was payable to both Daniels and Colonial Savings. With Daniels's debt to Colonial Savings secured by his home, Daniels had to be aware of the bank's interest in the insurance proceeds. At least a rational juror could have so found. Daniels acknowledged as much in his agreement with the bank. His awareness of the bank's interest and his intent to unlawfully defeat it is further evidenced by his covert conduct - waiting until the bank representative had left his presence before taking the bank check from a desk drawer.

III

Daniels contends that the jury charge on money laundering constructively amended the indictment. The indictment charged Daniels with causing the withdrawal of $29,500 from Veach's bank account. The trial judge instructed the jury that it must find that Daniels "knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of value greater than $10,000." At trial, there was evidence that Daniels ordered both the deposit of the check and also the withdrawal of the money. Veach initially testified as a government witness that Daniels directed her to make the deposit and withdrawal. On cross examination, she stated that it was her idea to make the withdrawal. The argument is that the jury instruction permitted the jury to convict Daniels for causing the deposit of the illicit funds under an indictment charging only their withdrawal.

A criminal defendant has a Fifth Amendment right to be "tried only on charges presented in a grand jury indictment,"⁴ and therefore only the grand jury may amend an indictment once it has been issued.⁵ A jury charge constructively amends an indictment, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, if it permits the jury "to convict the defendant upon a factual basis that effectively modifies an essential element of the crime charged."⁶ That is, constructive amendment occurs if the jury is permitted to convict on "an alternative basis permitted by the statute but not charged in the indictment."⁷

Daniels did not object at trial to the jury instructions. We therefore review only for plain error.⁸ A jury charge is plain error if: (1) it was erroneous; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the plain error affected the substantial rights of the defendant.⁹ If those conditions are met, we have discretion to correct the error; discretion we will exercise if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."¹⁰

Assuming without deciding that the first three requirements are met, in this case we decline to exercise our discretion to correct any error. The unindicted act of causing the deposit of illicit funds could have properly been charged in the indictment and is prohibited by statute.¹¹ The two acts - deposit and withdrawal - are so closely linked here that we are convinced that the "fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings" is not implicated. There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor. It was obvious that evidence of the deposit and other transactions would be relevant to prove that Daniels controlled the funds and to impeach any testimony that the withdrawal was Veach's own idea. The jury may have credited her testimony and convicted Daniels for the unindicted act of depositing illicit funds; but it is equally possible that the jury disbelieved her testimony and properly convicted Daniels for the indicted act of withdrawing illicit funds. After all, under Daniels's claim of entitlement, a withdrawal at his direction would have been inevitable - unless he intended to make the funds a gift to Veach. This claimed constructive amendment did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.

IV

The remainder of Daniels's arguments are equally meritless. Daniels argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because "Colonial Savings Mortgage," the entity from which he claims to have taken the check, is not a bank. When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we view the evidence and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict.¹² At trial, Judy Monroe testified that she worked for Colonial Savings Bank, that it was a banking institution insured by the FDIC, and that the stolen check bore her signature. While her testimony, and the testimony of others, sometimes distinguished between Capital Savings Mortgage and Capital Savings Bank, nothing in the record establishes that Capital Savings Mortgage was a legal entity distinct from Capital Savings Bank. While identifying the source of the check, she...