U.S. v. Davila, 77-1601
Decision Date | 14 April 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 77-1601,77-1601 |
Citation | 573 F.2d 986 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lupe DAVILA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
William J. Stevens, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Richard C. Leng, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before SWYGERT and BAUER, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. *
Lupe Davila was convicted of heroin distribution in September 1975 and placed on three years probation. The conditions of probation initially required Davila's participation in an institutional drug abuse program, but the lower court later amended the conditions to provide for additional drug abuse treatment under the supervision of the probation department. Thus, when Davila allegedly failed to keep several appointments with his probation officer, the Government filed a motion for a rule to show cause why probation should not be revoked.
On the basis of the Government's representations, the district court granted the motion and issued a bench warrant for Davila's arrest. On May 19, 1977, Davila was brought before the court, and, at that time, the Government informed him of the grounds on which it sought revocation of his probation. After a revocation hearing held on June 1, 1977, the district court revoked Davila's probation and sentenced him to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of three years.
On appeal, Davila argues that the Government's failure to provide any written notice of the alleged violations of probation denied him due process of law. We agree.
It is clear from the Supreme Court's decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1972) that the "minimum requirements of due process" which govern the revocation of probation are precisely the same as those established in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), for parole revocation proceedings. More precisely, in Gagnon, the Court held that the probationer, no less than the parolee, is entitled to both a preliminary and final hearing which satisfy the following due process criteria:
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