U.S. v. DeLaurentis

• Decision Date: 30 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00-5121,00-5121
• Citation: 230 F.3d 659
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA APPELLANT, V. JAMES V. DELAURENTIS Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 659

230 F.3d 659 (3rd Cir. 2000)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA APPELLANT,

V.

JAMES V. DELAURENTIS

No. 00-5121

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued: June 30, 2000

Filed October 24, 2000

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, Criminal No. 99-431, District Court Judge: Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky

Counsel for the Appellant: George S. Leone, Esq. Chief, Appeals Division U.S. Attorney's Office 970 Broad Street Newark, NJ 07102-2535

Counsel for the Appellee: Louis M. Barbone, Esq. (Argued) Jacobs & Barbone, P.A. 1125 Pacific Avenue Atlantic City, NJ 08401

Before: Alito and McKEE, Circuit Judges, and Fullam Senior District Judge.^*

OPINION OF THE COURT

Fullam, District Judge

The government appeals from the district court's pretrial dismissal of two counts of an indictment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S3731, and the scope of review is plenary.

The two dismissed counts charged the defendant James V. DeLaurentis, the Supervisor of Detectives for the Hammonton Police Department, in Hammonton, New Jersey, with violations of 18 U.S.C. S666 (theft or bribery involving programs receiving federal funds). The dismissal was based upon the district court's conclusion that the government's evidence did not suffice to show a nexus between the alleged bribes and any federal interest or program, under the standards set forth in this court's recent decision in United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 1999). We conclude that the order appealed from must be reversed, for both procedural and substantive reasons.

We address first the procedural issue. Unless there is a stipulated record, or unless immunity issues are implicated, a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment is not a permissible vehicle for addressing the sufficiency of the government's evidence. See United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 83 n.7 (1969), United States v. Gallagher, 602 F.2d 1139, 1142 (3d Cir. 1979) cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 1040, and cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. King, 581 F.2d 800, 802 (10th Cir. 1978). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes dismissal of an indictment if its allegations do not suffice to charge an offense, but such dismissals may not be predicated upon the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the indictment's charges. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1962).

In civil cases, of course, the summary judgment procedures contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 may be utilized to test, pretrial, the sufficiency of the evidence to establish triable issues of fact; but there is no corollary in criminal cases. The government is entitled to marshal and present its evidence at trial, and have its sufficiency tested by a motion for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

We recognize that the district court may have adopted the novel procedure followed here in order to preserve the government's right of appeal, but that result could readily have been achieved by a post-verdict ruling under Rule 29. Be that as it may, we simply cannot approve dismissal of an indictment on the basis of predictions as to what the trial evidence will be. The charges set forth in the two dismissed counts substantially track the language of the statute; the indictment is sufficient on its face. Indeed, the defendant did not, and does not now, challenge the dismissed counts as facially insufficient. The case must therefore be remanded to the district court for trial on all counts.

In addition to the procedural error discussed above, it is our view that the district judge mis-applied the substantive law, as clarified in the Zwick case, supra. On this issue, we labor under the same handicap as the district court, namely, the fact that there has not yet been a trial, hence no actual assessment of the government's evidence can be made. In the interest of providing guidance to the district court for the future conduct of the trial, however, we consider it appropriate to register our firm conclusion that, if the government's evidence is to the same effect as the parties and the district court have thus far assumed it will be, it would suffice to permit a jury to convict the defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. S666.

The statute criminalizes bribery committed by "an agent... of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof... in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such... government[,] or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more...," but only if

the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.

18 U.S.C. S666.

It is undisputed that the defendant was, at all relevant times, the Supervisor of Detectives in the Hammonton New Jersey Police Department, and was thus an agent of a local government or agency. It is also undisputed that the town of Hammonton was the recipient of federal funds, amounting to at least $25,000 per year for a three-year period. A literal reading of the statute would suggest that, if the defendant solicited or accepted bribes to influence or reward him in the performance of his police duties, he would be subject to punishment under the...