U.S. v. Deloney

• Decision Date: 25 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-3451.,07-3451.
• Citation: 578 F.3d 690
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwight D. DELONEY, Defendant-Appellant.

578 F.3d 690

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwight D. DELONEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-3451.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 15, 2009.

Decided August 25, 2009.

Thomas S. Ratcliffe (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Hammond, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Claudia Traficante (argued), Portage, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

In 2007, Dwight D. Deloney pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to deliver crack cocaine and was sentenced to 87 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Deloney claims that the sentence was unreasonable; he argues that the district court failed to give meaningful consideration to the statutory sentencing factors and, moreover, should have sentenced him according to the then-impending amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, which later reduced the penalties for most crack cocaine offenses. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 17, 2007, Deloney was indicted on three counts of distributing crack cocaine and one count of possessing with intent to distribute at least five grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He later pleaded guilty to the possession charge; the government dismissed the remaining counts. A presentence investigation report (PSR) concluded that Deloney distributed a total of 11.9 grams of crack cocaine during three controlled buys and that another 30.4 grams of crack cocaine were found in his bedroom during the execution of a federal search warrant.

Deloney had no major offenses in his criminal history and was credited with a three-point reduction to his base offense level for accepting responsibility for his actions; however, the PSR also recommended that the district court enhance Deloney's base offense level by two points for possessing a rifle in connection with his drug offenses. Deloney objected to the enhancement. In sum, the PSR concluded that Deloney's total offense level was 29, yielding a Guidelines sentencing range of 87-108 months.

At his sentencing hearing, Deloney asked for a below-Guidelines sentence based on his lack of serious criminal history; his education, work experience, and family support; and his voluntarily enrollment in a drug treatment program. He also urged the court to consider impending changes to the Sentencing Guidelines which would reduce the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. Although the amendment had been adopted by the Sentencing Commission, it had not yet gone into effect.

The district court also heard evidence and argument on the gun enhancement. After determining that Deloney presented only incredible testimony disputing the government's evidence that a rifle was found in his bedroom closet during a lawful search of his home, the court gave Deloney the opportunity to withdraw his objection; Deloney did so. The district court rejected Deloney's request for a non-Guidelines sentence and sentenced him to 87 months' imprisonment. Deloney filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Deloney claims that the district court failed to give meaningful consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors before sentencing him to a term of imprisonment at the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range. He also argues that the district court should have factored in the impending amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that would have made Deloney eligible for a two-level reduction in base offense level. We consider each argument in turn.

We review sentences for reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir.2008). A sentence that falls within the properly-calculated Guidelines range, as Deloney's sentence does, is presumed reasonable. Id. The district court must consider and balance the wide range of factors enumerated in section § 3553(a). United States v. Blue, 453 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir.2006). We owe deference to the district court's resolution of those factors, but may intervene if the court has "altogether ignored a relevant consideration" or "unreasonably discounted a factor so weighty as to compel a sentence outside of the Guidelines range." Id. However, a district court is not obligated to "address each § 3553(a) factor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating its conclusion for each factor; rather, the court must simply give an adequate statement of reasons, consistent with § 3553(a) for believing the sentence it selects is appropriate." Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d at 728.

According to Deloney, the district court merely went through the motions in imposing his sentence, glossing over the substantial amount of evidence that weighed in his favor including lack of serious criminal history, strong family ties, college education, completion of a drug treatment program, and "extreme remorse" for his crime.

However, having reviewed the record and the district court's reasons for sentencing Deloney as it did, we are satisfied that Deloney's sentence is a reasonable one. In sentencing Deloney at the bottom of the 87-108 month advisory Guideline range, the district court sufficiently analyzed the factors and explained the reasons for his sentence. For instance, the court noted that it considered Deloney's offense to be "very serious," acknowledged its duty to impose a sentence that served as a sufficient deterrent, and made reference to...