U.S.A. v. Dhinsa

Decision Date01 August 2000
Docket NumberDocket No. 99-1682
Citation243 F.3d 635
Parties(2nd Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. GURMEET SINGH DHINSA, Defendant-Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Korman, C.J., entered on November 5, 1999, following a jury trial convicting defendant-appellant Gurmeet Singh Dhinsa of, inter alia, racketeering and racketeering conspiracy and numerous related offenses including murder, conspiracy to commit murder, threatening to commit murder, kidnapping, mail fraud and firearms violations and principally sentencing him to multiple terms of life imprisonment for the racketeering, murder and kidnapping convictions. On appeal, Dhinsa raises numerous challenges to various evidentiary rulings made by the district court during the trial and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a number of his convictions. Dhinsa also challenges the Grand Jury's amendment of the indictment following the close of the government's case-in-chief.

Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part. Judge Calabresi concurs in a separate opinion. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, Cambridge, MA (Victoria B. Eiger, Nathan Z. Dershowitz, Dershowitz, Eiger & Adelson, New York City, of counsel), for Appellant.

BENTON J. CAMPBELL, RONALD WHITE, Assistant United States Attorneys, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY (Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney, Peter A. Norling, David C. James, Assistant United States Attorneys, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for Appellee.

Before: MESKILL, CALABRESI and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

MESKILL, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises out of the prosecution of appellant Gurmeet Singh Dhinsa (Dhinsa)1 in connection with his role as leader of the Singh Enterprise, a racketeering organization centered around a chain of gasoline stations owned and operated by Dhinsa throughout the New York City area. At trial, in which the government sought the death penalty, the government presented voluminous evidence, including nearly 100 witnesses and hundreds of exhibits. In total, the trial spanned nearly four months from jury selection to the penalty phase. The jury convicted Dhinsa of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), (d) (counts 1 and 2);2 three counts of conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(5) (counts 3, 7 and 14); two counts of murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(1) (counts 4 and 8); two counts of obstruction of justice murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1512(a)(1)(C) (counts 5 and 9); one count of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (count 10); one count of threatening to commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(4) (count 11); one count of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (count 15); one count of mail fraud conspiracy and six counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§371 and 1341 (counts 16 through 22); one count of conspiracy to commit interstate kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1201(c) (count 23); and one count of interstate kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1) (count 24). In all, the jury found Dhinsa guilty of twenty-one of the twenty-nine counts charged in the superseding indictment. After the jury decided against imposition of the death penalty, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Korman, C.J., sentenced Dhinsa to multiple terms of life imprisonment for the racketeering, murder and kidnapping convictions.

On appeal, Dhinsa raises the following challenges to his convictions: (1) the district court erred by admitting the hearsay statements of two murder victims pursuant to United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982), and its progeny, and Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); (2) there was insufficient evidence to establish that Dhinsa acted "for the purpose of... maintaining or increasing [his] position" as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a); (3) the district court erred by admitting the testimony of Julie Uberoi, the girlfriend of Satinderjit Singh, one of the murder victims; (4) following Dhinsa's motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 and at the sua sponte suggestion of the district court, the indictment was improperly amended by the Grand Jury to include charges of interstate kidnapping in place of kidnapping in aid of racketeering; (5) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's convictions for interstate kidnapping; (6) a new trial is warranted on the racketeering counts because Dhinsa's convictions on a number of the predicate crimes are invalid; (7) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for coercion in the first degree, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law §135.65; (8) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the felon-in-possession of a firearm charge; and (9) the district court erred by admitting the evidence obtained from the search of Dhinsa's car following his July 7, 1997 arrest.

In a prior decision, we reversed the district court's orders granting Dhinsa's motion to suppress evidence obtained: (1) in connection with a stop and subsequent search of Dhinsa's car on July 1, 1997; and (2) during an inventory search of Dhinsa's car following his arrest on July 7, 1997. See United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-27 (2d Cir. 1999). We did not consider the merits of Dhinsa's claims regarding the legality of the July 7, 1997 search, but instead ruled that the fruits of that search be admitted based on the district court's prior findings of fact and legal conclusions. See id. at 727-28. To the extent relevant, those facts are reproduced below.

BACKGROUND

Because Dhinsa appeals his convictions following a jury trial, "our statement of the facts views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting any inferences that the jury might have drawn in its favor." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 107 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 (1999); see also United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1994) (denial of a motion to suppress evidence).

I. The Singh Enterprise

Dhinsa was the self-professed leader of the "Singh Enterprise," a vast racketeering organization built around a chain of fifty-one gasoline stations that Dhinsa owned and operated throughout the New York City metropolitan area under the name "Citygas." The enterprise was funded by a pump-rigging scheme that overcharged Citygas customers through the use of an elaborate electronic device located beneath the gasoline pumps at the various Citygas stations. Operated via remote control, the rigging mechanism overcharged each customer by about six to seven percent on each purchase. During the enterprise's ten year existence, the pump-rigging scheme generated tens of millions of dollars, which were used, inter alia, to bribe public officials, purchase weapons and carry out crimes of violence aimed at protecting the enterprise's operations and its profits.

As the leader of the Singh Enterprise, Dhinsa maintained an "inner management circle" consisting of his cousin Gulzar Singh (Gulzar), his brother Gogi Singh (Gogi) and Citygas employee Babu Singh (Babu). Gulzar and Gogi supervised and trained the Citygas employees on the pump-rigging scheme, and, along with Babu, collected proceeds from the various Citygas stations and assisted Dhinsa in carrying out his violent criminal activities. Equally vital to the enterprise's operations were Antonio and Otilio Galvan, the designers of the pump-rigging mechanism and Marvin Dodson (Dodson), Walter "Jazz" Samuels (Samuels) and Evans Alonzo Powell (Powell), the group of hitmen employed by Dhinsa in connection with the murders of former Citygas employees Manmohan Singh (Manmohan) and Satinderjit Singh (Satinderjit).

Manmohan and Satinderjit were both murdered on Dhinsa's orders. Prior to his death, Manmohan made numerous inquiries, and confronted various members of the Singh Enterprise, about the July 1995 disappearance of his brother Kulwant, a Citygas employee.3 Dhinsa ordered Satinderjit murdered after learning that he was cooperating with police regarding, inter alia, Kulwant's disappearance, Manmohan's murder, and the enterprise's pump-rigging scheme. Dhinsa also employed Dodson, Samuels and Powell in an unsuccessful plot to kill Sarvjeet Singh (Sarvjeet), who witnessed a murder allegedly committed by Dhinsa's brother Gogi in 1991.

In an effort to conceal his pump-rigging scheme from the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) (the city agency responsible for oversight of gasoline stations), Dhinsa regularly bribed DCA inspector Lawrence Woods(Woods), who tipped off Dhinsa about DCA enforcement activities targeting the Citygas stations and provided him with special DCA inspection seals and stickers. The Singh Enterprise's ten year existence ended following the arrests of Dhinsa and other key members of the Singh Enterprise.

II. Crimes Charged at Trial
A. The Murders of Manmohan and Satinderjit and the Plot to Kill Sarvjeet

Dhinsa was convicted for his role in the murders of Manmohan and Satinderjit and the plot to kill Sarvjeet. Each was targeted by Dhinsa because of his active or potential cooperation with the police. Although their stories differ, they share a common theme -- each posed a threat to the continued operation of the Singh Enterprise and the millions of dollars of profits generated each year by the enterprise's criminal activities.

The events leading up to Manmohan's murder began with the disappearance of his...

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