U.S. v. Edgar, No. 02-6195.
Decision Date | 30 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-6195. |
Citation | 348 F.3d 867 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenn Dwayne EDGAR, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Susan M. Otto, Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellant.
F. Michael Ringer, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert G. McCampbell, United States Attorney, and Sue Tuck Richmond, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge.
On February 11, 2002, Defendant-Appellant Glen Dwayne Edgar pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Pursuant to his plea agreement, Mr. Edgar waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Despite this agreement, Mr. Edgar filed a timely notice of appeal. Because we find that Mr. Edgar validly waived his right to direct appeal, we DISMISS.
On December 12, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Edgar on two counts of distributing methamphetamine (Counts I and II), one count of manufacturing methamphetamine (Count III), and one count of possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count IV). Mr. Edgar entered into a plea agreement with the government on February 11, 2002. This agreement waived his right to appeal directly and to challenge collaterally his "guilty plea and any other aspect of his conviction" and his "sentence as imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined," except in two limited circumstances not relevant here. In exchange for the plea, the government agreed to drop Counts I and II. The district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Edgar to a 120-month prison term on Count III and a 60-month prison term on Count IV. This appeal followed. We take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On appeal, Mr. Edgar contends that we should not enforce his waiver of appellate rights because (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the waiver was not knowing or voluntary.
On the first point, Mr. Edgar argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which tainted the plea agreement, because he received essentially the same sentence under the plea agreement that he would have received if convicted at trial on all four counts. To support this claim, he alleges that he received little to no benefit from the plea agreement, yet gave up valuable appellate rights.
Although it is well established that we will not enforce a waiver that is the product of ineffective assistance of counsel, see United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir.2001), we dismiss Mr. Edgar's direct appeal of this issue without reaching the merits of his claim. With rare exception, a defendant must raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a collateral proceeding, not on direct appeal. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir.1995) (en banc) (). Indeed, we have followed this practice even when the issues on direct appeal are sufficiently developed for us to pass judgment, reasoning that we benefit from the views of the district court regarding such claims. Id. Accordingly, we refuse to consider Mr. Edgar's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
We turn next to Mr. Edgar's second argument. Despite evidence that he fully understood his plea agreement, Mr. Edgar argues that the district court's failure to discuss the appellate waiver during the plea colloquy establishes that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a district court to "inform [a] defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands... the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence" before accepting a plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(N). The commentary to Rule 11 notes that the Advisory Committee drafted the rule, in large part, to ensure that appellate waivers are knowing and voluntary. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(N), advisory committee notes to 1999 amendments ("Given the increased use of [waiver] provisions, the Committee believed it was important to insure that ... the waiver was voluntarily and knowingly made by the defendant.");1 see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 1049 n. 6, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) ().
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) — enacted as Rule 11(c)(6) — became effective December 1, 1999. Prior to its enactment, district courts were under no obligation to discuss appellate waivers, and we only considered the absence of such a discussion to the extent that it illuminated whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir.1998). Nevertheless, prior to the enactment of Rule 11(b)(1)(N), we employed an error analysis when a district court failed to give other warnings that were then required by Rule 11. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 7 F.3d 1533, 1535-36 (10th Cir.1993) ( ). In light of the clear text of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and the Supreme Court's decision in Vonn, we see no reason why we should treat Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors any differently. Vonn, 122 S.Ct. at 1054 ( ). Thus, we conduct an error review when a district court fails to discuss the provisions of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) at the colloquy. Even under error review, however, the knowing and voluntary nature of a waiver remains important to the extent that it informs our error analysis.2
Following this guidance, we conclude that it is always error for a district court to fail to discuss an appellate waiver provision during a Rule 11 colloquy, although not always reversible error. This conclusion comports with the decisions of several other circuits. See, e.g., Teeter, 257 F.3d at 24 ( ); United States v. Siu Kuen Ma, 290 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir.2002) (same); Reyes, 300 F.3d at 559-60 (same).3
In deciding whether this omission constitutes reversible error, we must determine whether to review it under the harmless error or plain error standard. The Supreme Court has instructed that when a defendant fails to raise a Rule 11 error to the district court — as is true of Mr. Edgar — we review any alleged error under the plain error standard of Fed. R.Crim.P. Rule 52(b). See Vonn, 122 S.Ct. at 1046 ().
"To notice plain error under Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b), the error must (1) be an actual error that was forfeited; (2) be plain or obvious; and (3) affect substantial rights, in other words, in most cases the error must be prejudicial, i.e., it must have affected the outcome...." United States v. Haney, 318 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir.2003) (en banc). "If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
Under plain error analysis, we must first determine if actual error exists. Haney, 318 F.3d at 1166. As we discussed above, the district court erred by failing to discuss Mr. Edgar's waiver of appellate rights before accepting his plea.
Next, we must decide whether the error was plain. Id. Error "is `plain' if it is obvious or clear, i.e., if it is contrary to well-settled law." United States v. Duran, 133 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir.1998). Generally, we do not consider an error to be "plain" in the absence of "Supreme Court or controlling circuit authority, [where] other circuit authority is divided." Haney, 318 F.3d at 1167. This general rule, however, is most persuasive "where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue[.]" United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003).
Applying these considerations to the current case, we find that the district court's failure to discuss the appellate waiver provision was obvious. The congressional mandate embodied in Rule 11(b)(1)(N) is clear: "the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands ... the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence." Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 11(b)(1)(N) (emphasis added). Therefore, we find that the district court committed an error, which was plain, by failing to discuss Mr. Edgar's waiver of appellate rights.
Third, we must determine whether the error affected substantial rights. See Duran, 133 F.3d at 1332. "An error affects substantial rights where the error was prejudicial, that is, if it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." See United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir.2003) (internal...
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