U.S. v. Edick

• Citation: 603 F.2d 772
• Decision Date: 31 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-1893,78-1893
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald EDICK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 772

603 F.2d 772

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald EDICK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-1893.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Aug. 31, 1979.

Thomas M. Schneiger, Portland, Or., on brief; Stuart I. Teicher, Portland, Or., argued, for defendant-appellant.

Sidney I. Lezak, U. S. Atty., Henry C. Lorenzen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., on brief; Jack C. Wong, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., argued, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before VAN DUSEN, ^* WRIGHT and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges.

ON PETITION FOR CLARIFICATION OR REHEARING

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

The court's opinion of May 22, 1979, reported at 597 F.2d 672, is withdrawn. The government's petition for rehearing or clarification and the defendant-appellant's petition for rehearing are granted. The following disposition replaces the court's earlier opinion.

Edick appeals the district court's order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence following his conviction for violating the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and (i). He contends that the consecutive sentences imposed were illegal because they arose from a single transaction which violated two closely related provisions of the Act. He also asserts that the initial sentence was invalid as a "split sentence" contrary to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3651.

We agree that the consecutive sentences were illegal. The sentences are vacated, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

Edick was convicted on a two-count indictment of possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and of possession of the same firearm not identified by serial number, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i). On September 29, 1975, Edick was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of three years on Count One and five years on Count Two. The latter sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for a five-year period, commencing upon his release from custody on the sentence imposed under Count One. Upon Edick's motion for modification of sentence, the sentence imposed under Count One was reduced to "time served as of June 15, 1976."

A hearing was held on April 7, 1978, on Edick's motion to correct illegal sentence and on an Order to Show Cause seeking the revocation of Edick's probation under Count Two. The motion was denied. He was found to be in violation of the conditions of his probation; therefore the district court revoked his probation and imposed a new sentence of three years imprisonment on Count Two.

The question is whether consecutive sentences may be imposed on the multiple counts where the firearms violations arose from a single transaction.

ILLEGALITY OF SENTENCE

Relying on United States v. Clements, 471 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972), Edick contends that the district court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing consecutive sentences on the two counts of the indictment. He argues that under Clements the two counts must merge for sentencing purposes because they arose from the same transaction.

The government argues that Clements does not prohibit consecutive sentences per se but only those sentences that exceed the ten-year statutory maximum allowed for a single count. There is language in the opinion to support each contention. However, our consideration of Clements and subsequent cases persuades us that the broader interpretation proposed by Edick is the better view.

Clements had been convicted for a single act that violated subsections (c), (d), and (f) In Clements we held that the imposition of consecutive maximum sentences for multiple offenses arising from the same transaction pyramids punishment when such multiple punishment is not authorized by Congress. The sentences were vacated and the cause remanded to the district court "for resentencing to a term not to exceed the maximum punishment that can be imposed for a single count of the indictment upon which Clements has been convicted." 471 F.2d at 1258.

of 26 U.S.C. § 5861. Under 26 U.S.C. § 5871 ten years imprisonment is the maximum that may be imposed for "any" violation of the National Firearms Act. The district court in Clements had imposed sentences of ten years imprisonment On each count, to be served consecutively.

The Clements doctrine has been discussed and approved in numerous subsequent cases both within this circuit and in others. E. g., United States v. Kaplan, 588 F.2d 71, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 557 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kalama, 549 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110, 97 S.Ct. 1147, 51 L.Ed.2d 564 (1977); Rollins v. United States, 543 F.2d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ackerson, 502 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1974), Vacated on other grounds, 419 U.S. 1099, 95 S.Ct. 769, 42 L.Ed.2d 796 (1975); United States v. Tankersley, 492 F.2d 962, 969 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Jones, 487 F.2d 676, 679 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973). Most of these opinions have involved cases where the total of the sentences imposed exceeded the statutory maximum. Only the Fifth Circuit has addressed the precise issue raised by Edick.

In Rollins v. United States, 543 F.2d 574, the Fifth Circuit, citing Clements, vacated a ten-year sentence imposed upon revocation of probation as to one count and remanded for resentencing to a term that would not exceed the ten-year statutory maximum when coupled with the three years already served on a different count arising from the same violation of the National Firearms Act.

This application of Clements agrees with the government's argument that only sentences exceeding the ten-year maximum are prohibited. Accord, United States v. Kaplan, 588 F.2d at 75 (in remanding for correction of two consecutive maximum sentences the court noted that separate sentences were permitted so long as the total sentence did not exceed the maximum sentence allowed for one violation).

Notwithstanding these cases, the language in the Clements opinion and in subsequent opinions by this court convinces us that the law of this circuit forbids the imposition of consecutive sentences for different counts arising from a single transaction violating different provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 5861, regardless of whether the aggregate of the sentences exceeds the statutory maximum.

In Clements we stated repeatedly that Congress did not intend to impose cumulative or pyramided punishments for a single violation of the Act. 471 F.2d at 1255-58. ¹ In United States v. Kalama, 549 F.2d 594, we did not mention the number of years of the consecutive sentences that had been imposed but, citing Clements concluded that "(t)he imposition of consecutive sentences for possession (Count I) and making (Count IV) the same firearm . . ., constitute (sic) an unlawful pyramiding of punishments." 549 F.2d at 597. In United States To maintain consistency within this circuit and to follow the policy of resolving doubts of congressional intent in favor of less severe punishment, See Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957), we hold that the consecutive sentences imposed upon Edick were illegal because the offenses violating the National Firearms Act arose from a single transaction.

v. Jones, 487 F.2d at 679, we characterized the Clements holding as "only that the imposition of cumulative sentences was not authorized by the statute."

SPLIT SENTENCING

Edick contends that the district court had the statutory authority to impose one of three alternative sentences: (1) imprisonment for a term not to exceed ten years or a fine not greater than $10,000, under 26 U.S.C. § 5871; (2) probation for not more than five years, under 18 U.S.C. § 3651; or (3) a split sentence of not more than six months in confinement and five years on probation, under 18 U.S.C. § 3651.

Edick asserts that the counts should have been merged for sentencing and that therefore the sentence imposed was in effect a split one of three years imprisonment and five years probation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3651. ²

He argues that the three-year sentence on the first count was valid, but that the five-year sentence on the second count was void when imposed. ³ He cites Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964), for the proposition that the void portion of the sentence must be stricken, and contends that, because he has satisfied the three-year sentence, he must be released.

We need not decide whether Kennedy dictates the result urged by Edick when an illegal split sentence has been imposed, because we believe that he mischaracterizes the error that occurred below. If the district court had imposed one sentence of three years in prison and five years probation, it would clearly have violated the guidelines for split sentencing. But the problem here was not that there was One sentence unauthorized by statute. It was the consecutive nature of two separate sentences which effected an illegal cumulation of punishment under Clements.

CORRECTION OF ILLEGAL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

Correctly characterizing the nature of the error does not resolve the question of how to correct the imposition of illegal consecutive sentences. The government asks that we adopt the approach taken by the Third Circuit in United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544 (3rd Cir. 1971).

Corson was convicted on multiple counts of violating the Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113. He received consecutive sentences of 10 years on count I, five years on count II, and five years on count III. Because his consecutive sentences were illegal under Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957), the district court granted Corson's Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 35 motion and vacated the sentences on counts II and III.

The Third Circuit held that the correct remedy for the illegal sentences was not to...