U.S. v. Edwards, 82-8704

• Decision Date: 03 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-8704,82-8704
• Citation: 716 F.2d 822
• Parties: 14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 395 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. McArthur EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant. Non-Argument Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 822

716 F.2d 822

14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 395

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. McArthur EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 82-8704

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 3, 1983.

Jay Strongwater (court-appointed), Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

Gerrilyn G. Brill, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before FAY, VANCE and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant McArthur Edwards was convicted on fourteen counts of executing a scheme and artiface to defraud and to obtain money by false representations and use of the United States mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341. Edwards and coindictee Rogers Lowe were employed by Fulton County, Georgia, from July, 1980, through February, 1981. Travelers Insurance Company was then the carrier of Fulton County's group medical insurance plan. During the seven months in question, Edwards and Lowe submitted a number of fictitious insurance claim forms in the name of Fulton County, which Travelers honored.

Edwards and Lowe were indicted, and a public defender, Mary Donovan, was appointed to represent Edwards; Lowe pleaded guilty to three counts, and the remaining charges against him were dismissed. Due to various disagreements between Edwards and Donovan over trial strategy, Edwards filed a pro se motion requesting that Donovan withdraw from his case and seeking permission to conduct his own defense. Donovan also filed a motion requesting permission for Edwards to represent himself. The motions were granted, and, although the court requested Donovan to act as standby counsel at trial, Edwards was allowed to conduct his own defense. During Lowe's testimony as a prosecution witness his guilty plea was divulged. A jury convicted Edwards on all fourteen counts, and the court sentenced him to a prison term of twenty-one years.

Appellant raises four issues on appeal: whether the district court (1) erred in allowing him to represent himself at trial; (2) erred in admitting evidence of coindictee Lowe's guilty plea; (3) failed to dispose of all pretrial motions; and (4) relied upon misinformation or otherwise abused its discretion in setting appellant's sentence. Concluding that each of these contentions is without merit, we affirm.

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to conduct his own defense when he "knowingly and intelligently" chooses to do so. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Because assertion of the right of self-representation constitutes a waiver of the right to counsel, as well as a relinquishment of the important benefits associated with that right, the trial judge must conduct a hearing to ensure that the accused understands the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 949 (11th Cir.1983). The trial judge must determine that the defendant "knows what he is doing and [that] his choice is made with open eyes." Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942).

The record in this case shows that the trial judge questioned Edwards extensively on his decision to proceed pro se. The court inquired into Edwards' educational background, which included three years of college. In response to the court's query into his prior courtroom experience, Edwards replied that he had done some reading of the law during his prior prison term and that he had a "pretty fair knowledge of the law, how it works." The court emphasized that Edwards would be subject to the same rules and regulations as experienced trial lawyers, including the often technical Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The judge also cautioned Edwards that the court could not help him in his defense in any way. Despite the court's detailed lecture on the pitfalls of self-representation, Edwards insisted on going forward pro se, but agreed to have Donovan act as standby counsel. Following a discussion of pretrial motions, the court again requested Edwards to reconsider his decision, but he declined and announced he was ready to proceed. The trial judge once again raised the issue of Edwards' self-representation after voir dire, this time inquiring whether he understood that the maximum penalty could be imposed for all fourteen counts of the indictment. Edwards responded that he had read and understood the indictment, and reaffirmed his desire to proceed pro se. Relying on Edwards' responses to the court's numerous inquiries, the trial judge concluded, and we agree, that Edwards made a knowing and intelligent decision to relinquish his right to counsel.

Appellant next asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of coindictee Lowe's guilty plea. Prior to Lowe's testimony, the Government notified the court and Edwards of its intent to introduce Lowe's guilty plea in anticipation of Edwards' possible cross-examination. After reviewing the governing legal authorities, the court ruled that the prosecution may introduce evidence of a coindictee's guilty plea on direct examination to enhance the witness' credibility if a proper cautionary instruction is given to the jury. Following an objection by Edwards and his assertion that he did not intend to go into Lowe's guilty plea on cross-examination, the Government indicated that it would not introduce the plea on direct, but would reserve the right to do so on redirect.

On direct examination, Lowe testified that...