U.S. v. Edwards
| Citation | 627 F.2d 460 |
| Decision Date | 18 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 79-2251,79-2252,s. 79-2251 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Vernon EDWARDS, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America v. Robert E. McCOY, Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Allan M. Palmer, Washington, D. C., with whom William E. Reukauf, Washington, D. C., was on brief, for appellants.
Benjamin B. Sendor, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles F. C. Ruff, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, Michael W. Farrell, H. Lowell Brown and Roger M. Adelman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellee.
Before TAMM, MacKINNON and MIKVA, Circuit Judges.
Opinion PER CURIAM.
The only issue on appeal is whether or not the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976), has been violated by the action of the trial court. For reasons set forth below, we find there has been no violation and the convictions are affirmed.
The appellants and two others were arraigned on various narcotics charges on April 17, 1979. The trial was set for June 20, 1979, 64 days from the day of arraignment. The date was set in order to comply with the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act that the trial begin no more than 80 days from the date of arraignment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(g). That trial date was postponed on three separate occasions. As a result of these continuances, the trial, in fact, began 125 days after the arraignment.
In passing the Speedy Trial Act, Congress recognized the need to provide flexibility to permit a trial court to coordinate the schedules of multiple defendants and their counsels. Two of the exclusions to the 80-day rule specifically provided within the Act are especially relevant to that situation. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8), for example, a court shall exclude:
(a)ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Also, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), a court shall exclude:
(a) reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.
The exclusion under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) is crucial in a case involving multiple defendants because it provides that an exclusion applicable to one defendant applies to all codefendants.
All three of the continuances granted by the trial court clearly fall within one or the other of the quoted exceptions. Indeed, appellants do not really contend that the second and third continuances had any defects. Their argument is based wholly on the first continuance in the case. That first continuance, from June 20 to July 23, was granted by the trial court after it was informed that counsel for one of the subsequently acquitted codefendants was ill and that the prosecutor had a conflicting trial schedule. The court noted these two reasons for the continuance during a later status call, held on July 25. The gist of appellants' argument is that this continuance was granted sua sponte by the court and no contemporaneous record was made of the reasons for it. We think neither of these arguments render the exclusionary language inoperative.
Section 3161(h)(8)(A) clearly empowers the judge to grant a continuance "on his own motion" if he finds that the "ends of justice" so require. The section further provides that any delay resulting from such a continuance shall be excluded from the computation of trial delays so long as the...
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