U.S. v. Ellison, 82-1602

• Decision Date: 20 May 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82-1602,82-1602
• Citation: 684 F.2d 664
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner, v. Honorable James O. ELLISON, Respondent, v. Robert B. SUTTON, BPM, Ltd., and Scurry Oil Company, Amici Curiae.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 664

684 F.2d 664

UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner, v. Honorable James O. ELLISON, Respondent, v. Robert B. SUTTON, BPM, Ltd., and Scurry Oil Company, Amici Curiae.

No. 82-1602.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

May 20, 1982.

Victor D. Stone, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Frank Keating, U. S. Atty., N. D. Oklahoma, Tulsa, Okl., James L. Swartz, Asst. U. S. Atty., Anchorage, Alaska, and William J. Hardy, Jr., Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with him on the briefs), for petitioner.

W. Rodney DeVilliers, Sr., Oklahoma City, Okl. (Mitchell Lansden, Baton Rouge, La., James R. Eagleton and Marc F. Conley, Tulsa, Okl., with him on the briefs), for Robert B. Sutton, BPM, Ltd., and Scurry Oil Co., amici curiae.

Before McWILLIAMS, DOYLE and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

By petition for mandamus the government attacks the action of the trial court in entering a judgment of acquittal on 15 counts of a 17-count indictment and asks that the action of the district court be stayed. A notice of appeal was filed with the district court on May 17, but the appeal has not been docketed in the court of appeals. Accordingly we give no consideration to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (appeal by the United States). Action on the mandamus petition is proper under our supervisory power to prevent a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice. See United States v. Weinstein, 2 Cir., 452 F.2d 704, 712-713; United States v. Dooling, 2 Cir., 406 F.2d 192, 198-199; and In Re United States, 1 Cir., 286 F.2d 556, 563, 564, reversed on other grounds sub nom.; Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629.

The petition was filed with the clerk on May 17. Because of the urgency for action we ordered a response and heard oral argument on the afternoon of May 19.

The government charges a fraud scheme by which approximately 240 million barrels of crude oil were falsely certified under the government's Mandatory Price Regulations. Counts 1, 2, and 3 charge violations of the anti-racketeering statutes. Counts 4 through 15 charge violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Count 16 charges obstruction of justice and Count 17 conspiracy to obstruct justice. The jury impanelled to try the case has not been discharged.

After an extensive trial at which the government had produced many witnesses and many documents, the defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal under F.R.Crim.P. Rule 29(a). In his verbal statement the trial judge seemed to rely on prosecutorial misconduct. That misconduct is not a ground for action under Rule 29(a). In his later written memorandum the Judge said as to the first three counts:

"The evidence fails to show the receipt of income by defendant Sutton, as an individual (and this is crucial, since he alone not the corporate defendants is charged with these offenses), and it fails to show his personal involvement in the entities as charged, or in the transfer of funds as alleged. It is true as the Government points out, that there is some evidence that goes to this point, that is, concerning Sutton's interest and involvement as charged in the first three counts." (Emphasis Supplied)

With regard to Counts 4 through 15, the court said:

"The scheme as alleged is a scheme to defraud the United States, through the circumvention of those regulations pertaining to the certification of crude oil under the EPAA, and through the impairment and obstruction of the Entitlement Program. The Court has searched the record, and has found no proof of any impact on the entitlements program, or the cost of petroleum products that is directly tied to the frauds alleged. To be sure, there is evidence as to the general impact on the Government's program of price control of the practice of unlawfully changing the tier certification of crude oil. That, however, falls short of showing that these defendants in these trades, by their 'juggling' of tiers, had an impact as alleged." (Emphasis supplied)

The government says that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. We do not know because the voluminous record is not before us. As to the first three counts the Court says that there "is some evidence that goes to this point." The Court says that the evidence "does fall short." We have no way of knowing whether the statement is correct.

As to the remaining 12 counts, the Court recognizes a "juggling" of tiers, and says that this shows only a suspicion which does not suffice to let the case go to the jury. Again we do not know. The government says that it is sufficient.

We reject the defense double jeopardy claim. This is not a case of successive trials. See U. S. v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128, 101 S.Ct. 426, 432, 66 L.Ed.2d 328. The original jury has not been discharged. The status of the trial is that the government has rested its case.

In United States v. White, 10 Cir., 673 F.2d 299, we reversed the same trial judge's grant of a judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict of conviction. In that case we had before us the record. Here we do not. We are impressed with the qualifications which the judge placed on his rulings and with the government's assertion that the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury.

In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, the Court said:

"Where the court, before the jury returns a verdict, enters a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 29, appeal will be barred only when 'it is plain that the District Court ... evaluated the Government's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.' " Quoting from United States v. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. 564 at 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349 at 1355, 51 L.Ed.2d 642.

On the record the "it is plain" question cannot be answered affirmatively. The qualifications which the Court puts in its memorandum opinion disturb us and we do not have the record. We believe that a prompt conclusion of the trial on all 17 counts "would significantly advance the public interest." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 101, 98...