U.S. v. English

Decision Date23 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-3218NI.,02-3218NI.
CitationU.S. v. English, 329 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2003)
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William ENGLISH, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Christopher A. Clausen, argued, Marshalltown, IA, for appellant.

Peter E. Deegan, argued, Asst. U.S. Atty., Cedar Rapids, IA (Teresa K. Baumann, Special Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

William English was convicted on his plea of guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)and924(a)(2).At sentencing, the District Court assessed a two-level increase because the Ruger pistol Mr. English was charged with possessing was stolen, and another two-level increase because the defendant possessed between three and seven firearms.U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(4), (b)(1)(A).There was no objection to these enhancements.There was an objection, however, to another enhancement imposed by the sentencing court — four levels for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).A sentence of 110 months (9 years and two months) in prison was imposed.Mr. English appeals, claiming that it was error to assess the four-level enhancement under (b)(5).

The facts relevant to this appeal are brief and simple.Iowa police searched the defendant's home under a warrant and found a Ruger pistol in one of his tool boxes.The defendant was a felon, so it was illegal for him to possess the pistol.The police had been led to the defendant by information from one James Hiller.Mr. Hiller had told the police that the defendant had sold him six firearms.All of these guns were recovered by the police, and all of them had been stolen from their original owners.

The Guideline at issue, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), provides, in pertinent part:

If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense... increase by 4 levels.

The "other felony offense," according to the government, was the sale of the guns, the deal between Messrs. English and Hiller.The defendant objected on the ground that this offense was "trafficking," and therefore excluded from subsection (b)(5) by Application Note 18.This Note, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 18, provides in pertinent part as follows:

As used in subsection[](b)(5) ... "another felony offense" ... refer[s] to offenses other than explosives or firearms possession or trafficking offenses.

According to the position taken by the government in the District Court, the word "trafficking" in this Note is limited to trafficking in drugs, and does not include trafficking in firearms.The District Court accepted this argument.

Before this Court, the government concedes that the position it took below was erroneous, and we agree.The relevant phrase in Note 18 is "explosives or firearms possession or trafficking offenses.""Explosives" and "firearms" are nouns used as adjectives to modify the phrase "possession ... offenses."To read these modifiers as not also applying to "trafficking offenses" is strained and unnatural.Whatever else "trafficking" may mean, it has to refer, as the word is used in Note 18, at least to trafficking in explosives and firearms, where that trafficking constitutes a criminal offense, as it does here under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).Accordingly, we cannot uphold the (b)(5) four-level enhancement on the ground adopted by the District Court.

The government argues that the enhancement was nevertheless proper, and it is true, as the government asserts, that we can affirm the District Court's judgment on grounds supported by the record, even if those grounds were rejected by the trial court, as they were here.SeeTaylor v. United States,204 F.3d 828, 829(8th Cir.2000).

The government's other argument is that Mr. English committed a felony under Iowa law by possessing stolen property with a value over $1000; his possession of a firearm (the Ruger) in connection with that felony (possessing stolen property) would warrant an enhancement of his underlying sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm.(It was stipulated that the guns defendant possessed were worth about $1,600.)

The question upon which this appeal turns, then, is whether Mr. English's additional felony, possession of stolen property, is considered firearms possession within the meaning of Application Note 18, which, as we have already explained, excludes offenses for explosives or firearms possession or trafficking from being used as additional felonies to justify a four-level enhancement under (b)(5).SeeUnited States v. Kenney,283 F.3d 934, 937(8th Cir.2002).If it is, then the Guidelines expressly prohibit Mr. English's possession-of-stolen-property violation from being used as the additional felony that warrants an additional four-level enhancement.This Court has not directly addressed what constitutes a firearms-possession offense for purposes of this comment to the Sentencing Guidelines.Essentially, there are two meanings the comment could have.The first would understand it to refer to offenses that have, as an element, possession of a firearm.The second would have the comment refer to offenses in which the underlying conduct involved firearms possession.We consider the former interpretation more compelling than the latter because it is more faithful to the plain language of the comment.

The most compelling justification for our conclusion is the text of the comment — it applies to "firearms possession ... offenses."U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 18;seePerrin v. United States,444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199(1979)("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.").However, Mr. English is accused of committing a theft offense.He is accused of having "exercise[d] control over stolen property, knowing such property to have been stolen, or having reasonable cause to believe that such property has been stolen...."Iowa Code § 714.1(4).There is nothing about the theft offense that necessarily has anything to do with firearms.It is true that, in a broad sense, Mr. English committed a firearms-possession offense, but this reasoning makes virtually any offense in which a gun is used a firearms-possession offense, and we have already rejected such a broad interpretation of the comment at issue in Kenney.

In that case, the defendant broke into a house to steal several guns, and the question was raised whether the Commission intended to allow "double counting."While addressing that question, a panel of this Court said, "Application Note...

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18 cases
  • U.S. v. Boumelhem
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • August 12, 2003
    ...As used in the application note, "firearms" is a noun used as an adjective to modify "trafficking offenses." See United States v. English, 329 F.3d 615, 617 (8th Cir.2003). "Traffic," as the root of has been defined in Webster's Third International Dictionary as "to engage in commercial act......
  • U.S. Emerson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • May 11, 2006
    ...even though 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (e) constitute different felonies under the Blockburger test. Similarly, in United States v. English, 329 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2003), a defendant's sentence for felony firearm possession had been enhanced because he had sold the guns associated with the poss......
  • U.S. v. Valenzuela
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • August 3, 2007
    ...trafficking or possession offenses, and those that are not? We adopt the test applied by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. English, 329 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2003): an offense is a firearms possession or trafficking offense if it "contains, as an element, the presence of a firearm." Id. a......
  • U.S. v. Lindquist
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 31, 2005
    ...States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414, 427-28 (6th Cir.2003) (involving the transportation of firearms); see also United States v. English, 329 F.3d 615, 616-617 (8th Cir.2003) (reversing imposition of § 2K2.1(b)(5) where the "other felony offense" was the sale of firearms). If an offense is ex......
  • Get Started for Free
1 books & journal articles
  • One Gun Too Many: Double-Counting the Same Offense in Iowa
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 105-5, July 2020
    • July 1, 2020
    ...clause in defendant has to commit, in every case, in order to commit the underlying offense.” Id. (quoting United States v. English, 329 F.3d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 2003)). A similar situation would arise in this Arkansas hypothetical, meaning there would be no distinguishing between the requir......