U.S. v. Equihua-Juarez, EQUIHUA-JUAREZ

• Decision Date: 15 July 1988
• Docket Number: EQUIHUA-JUAREZ,No. 87-5205,87-5205
• Citation: 851 F.2d 1222
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfredo, aka Jorge Perez-Magana, Martin Ramirez-Estrada, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1222

851 F.2d 1222

102 A.L.R.Fed. 729

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfredo EQUIHUA-JUAREZ, aka Jorge Perez-Magana, Martin

Ramirez-Estrada, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87-5205.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 7, 1988.

Decided July 15, 1988.

Verna J. Wefald, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Laura J. Birkmeyer, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before PREGERSON and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges, and MUECKE, ^* District Judge.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Alfredo Equihua-Juarez appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for making a false material statement to a United States Border Patrol agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001. ¹ Equihua-Juarez made the false statement when he gave a false name, i.e., "Martin Ramirez-Estrada," in response to a question asked by Border Patrol Agent Spruance during a postarrest interview. Equihua-Juarez contends that his false statement falls within the "exculpatory no" exception to section 1001. Specifically, Equihua-Juarez argues that stating his true name would have potentially incriminated him because Border Patrol Agency files on "Alfredo Equihua-Juarez" would have revealed prior convictions for illegal entry.

Because proof of such a prior conviction is an element of felony illegal entry, had Equihua-Juarez given his true name, he would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence leading to his prosecution and conviction for felony illegal entry. We reverse the Sec. 1001 conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On January 28, 1987, Equihua-Juarez was arrested by United States Border Patrol Agents Spruance and Steiner for having entered the United States illegally. Equihua-Juarez was taken to a Border Patrol station for processing. Before Equihua-Juarez was questioned, he was advised of his Miranda rights. After Equihua-Juarez stated that he understood his rights, Agent Spruance asked him for certain biographical information including his name, his place and date of birth and his parents' names. Equihua-Juarez falsely stated that his name was "Martin Ramirez-Estrada." Agent Spruance entered this biographical information on a "Record of Deportable Alien," a form that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) requires Border Patrol agents to prepare for every suspected illegal alien held in detention. ² A further records' check based on fingerprint analysis revealed that Equihua-Juarez had previously been convicted of illegal entry On February 13, 1987, Equihua-Juarez was indicted. The indictment charged violations of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325 (felony illegal entry) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (false material statement). ⁴ On May 11, 1987, Equihua-Juarez filed a motion to dismiss the Sec. 1001 charge. He asserted that his statement of a false name to Agent Spruance fell within the "exculpatory no" exception to section 1001. The district court denied the motion.

                under the name of "Alfredo Soto-Torres."    Immigration files listed the name of "Alfredo Equihua-Juarez" as one of the aliases for this same individual. 3
                

A jury trial began on May 12, 1987. At the close of the government's case and again after the defense rested, Equihua-Juarez made motions for acquittal on the Sec. 1001 charge based on the "exculpatory no" exception. The court denied both motions. On May 13, 1987, the jury returned guilty verdicts. Judgment of conviction was entered and Equihua-Juarez was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for violating Sec. 1325 and one year's imprisonment for violating Sec. 1001, the sentences to be served consecutively.

DISCUSSION

The application of the "exculpatory no" exception to liability under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 is a legal question reviewed de novo. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).

Section 1001 prohibits knowingly and willfully making a false statement that is material to any matter within the jurisdiction of a federal government department or agency. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001. Section 1001, however, was not intended to apply to all false statements made to government agencies. See United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir.1972). The "exculpatory no" doctrine provides an exception to Sec. 1001. If certain requirements are met, a person may not be prosecuted under Sec. 1001 for making a false exculpatory response to government investigators. See United States v. Olsowy, 836 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1299, 99 L.Ed.2d 509 (1988), Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 544-46. See also United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 913, 105 S.Ct. 3540, 87 L.Ed.2d 663 (1985); United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir.1978); Bedore, 455 F.2d at 1111. In Medina de Perez, combining elements drawn from Bedore and Rose, we discussed five factors that should be satisfied to apply the "exculpatory no" doctrine:

(1) the false statement must be unrelated to a claim to a privilege or a claim against the government;

(2) the declarant must be responding to inquiries initiated by a federal agency or department;

(3) the false statement must not impair the basic functions entrusted by law to the agency;

(4) the government's inquiries must not constitute a routine exercise of administrative responsibility; and

(5) a truthful answer would have incriminated the declarant.

Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 544 and n. 5. ⁵

Equihua-Juarez falsely stated his name in response to a question asked by Border Patrol Agent Spruance. This false statement clearly meets the first two requirements of the "exculpatory no" exception. First, Equihua-Juarez did not give a false name to gain the privilege of entry into the United States. He was already present in the United States when questioned by Agent Spruance and admitted that he had entered the country illegally. Second, Equihua-Juarez gave his false statement in response to an inquiry initiated by Agent Spruance. The dispute in this appeal focuses on the final three factors of the "exculpatory no" doctrine.

A. False Statement Does Not Impair Agency's Basic Function

Initially, Equihua-Juarez contends that by giving a false name to Agent Spruance, he did not impair the basic functions entrusted by law to the Border Patrol Agency because trained Border Patrol agents anticipate that apprehended aliens will give false names and thus rely on other means to check on an arrestee's identity.

In Medina de Perez, we concluded that "[i]n a post-arrest criminal investigative setting, a competent government investigator will anticipate that the defendant will make exculpatory statements." We further noted that "[a] defendant who meets this expectation cannot possibly pervert the investigator's police function" because "a thorough agent would continue vigorous investigation of all leads until satisfied that he has obtained the truth." 799 F.2d at 546.

Here, Agent Spruance admitted at Equihua-Juarez's trial that he does not automatically believe the names given by apprehended aliens because they frequently give false names, and the Border Patrol relies on numerous other means to identify apprehended aliens including files indexed by family name and files of photographs and fingerprints. Equihua-Juarez could not have impaired the function of the Border Patrol because determining the correct identity of aliens is one of the agency's primary responsibilities, and Border Patrol agents are aware that apprehended aliens often give aliases. Equihua-Juarez's false statement of identity did not pervert the agency's function. See Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 546. ⁶

B. Inquiries Not Routine Exercise of Administrative Responsibility

Equihua-Juarez next contends that when Border Patrol Agent Spruance asked his name and other biographical questions during a post-arrest interview, the agent was not discharging a routine administrative responsibility but was acting as a police investigator conducting an interrogation. The government contends that Agent Spruance's solicitation of Equihua-Juarez's name was for INS administrative record-keeping purposes, and that the district court correctly found that Agent Spruance's biographical questions did not constitute interrogation. ⁷

In Medina de Perez, this court held that the "exculpatory no" exception applies when the inquiring government agent acts as a police investigator and not when the agent's questions constitute a routine exercise of administrative responsibility. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 544-45. The court noted that Although the line between "administration" and "investigation" cannot be sharply drawn, the argument has been made that this statute was intended to apply only to federal government "administration" and not intended to compel citizens to answer truthfully every question put to them in the course of a federal police or federal criminal investigation.

Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 545 (quoting United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir.1974)). In Medina de Perez, the defendant made false statements regarding her possession of a camper truck that had been searched at the border and found to contain marijuana. The defendant made the statements, charged as violations of Sec. 1001, to a United States Customs agent and a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent when they questioned her after she had been arrested and advised of her Miranda rights. The court held that "during the post-arrest interrogation, [the DEA agent] was acting as a police investigator and not as a program administrator, and therefore his inquiries could not constitute a 'routine exercise of administrative responsibility.' " Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at...