U.S. v. Erdman

Decision Date08 January 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-1382ND,91-1382ND
Citation953 F.2d 387
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ronald R. ERDMAN, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Alan J. Sheppard, Fargo, N.D., for appellant.

Norman G. Anderson, Fargo, N.D., for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Ronald Erdman appeals from his conviction for harboring or concealing a fugitive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988). Erdman argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He also argues that the trial court 1 erred in its definition of "harboring or concealing," in its handling of a jury request for transcripts of parts of the trial testimony, and in its admission of purely speculative evidence. We affirm the conviction. Because we find Erdman's other claims meritless, we discuss only the sufficiency of the evidence claim.

I.

On September 14, 1989, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Merlyn Yagow in connection with a bankruptcy fraud indictment. The same day, FBI agent Kenneth M. Aldridge attempted to locate Yagow by contacting Yagow's brother, Morris. Aldridge informed Morris of the warrant, but Morris said he did not know where Yagow was. Subsequently, agent Aldridge regularly contacted Yagow's family and friends in his attempt to locate Yagow. Agent Aldridge testified that whenever he contacted anyone, he told them about the warrant and usually showed them a copy.

At about the same time the warrant was issued, Yagow left his home near Gwinner, North Dakota, where he lived with his wife and child. He went to Clay County, Minnesota, near Barnesville, where he met Erdman, whom he had known since 1986, at the home of a mutual friend. Shortly after Yagow's arrival in Barnesville, Erdman painted Yagow's green van a maroon color. In early October, Erdman helped Yagow find work hauling sugar beets, and then helped Yagow do the actual hauling. Between January and March 1990, Craig Baker, a Clay County (Minnesota) Deputy Sheriff, repeatedly saw Yagow's van parked at a trailer house he believed belonged to Erdman. 2 On March 1, 1990, Deputy Baker took a picture of the van parked at the trailer.

On March 16, 1990, agent Aldridge and Erdman met in Fargo. Both admit that they discussed the whereabouts of Yagow. Agent Aldridge testified that he told Erdman about the arrest warrant, that Erdman already knew about the warrant, that Erdman told him that the warrant was not valid because it was not signed by a judge, and that Erdman said he did not know what kind of vehicle Yagow was driving. Erdman denied that agent Aldridge told him about the warrant, and claimed that he did not know about the warrant until July 1990. He also testified that he could not remember if agent Aldridge asked him what kind of vehicle Yagow was driving.

On May 2, 1990, Yagow opened a checking account at Union State Bank, Fargo, in the name of First Dakota Trust. The next day he attempted to cash a check drawn on his account, but the bank refused because the check he had deposited to open the account had not cleared yet. On May 8, Erdman attempted to cash a check drawn on Yagow's account. Again the bank refused to cash the check. There was conflicting testimony about Erdman's attempts to cash checks on this account. A teller at the bank's drive-up window testified that Erdman unsuccessfully attempted to cash three different checks on that account during May, two made payable to Erdman and one made payable to cash. Erdman testified that he twice attempted to cash only one $550 check that he had received in the mail. He also testified that he did not know who sent the check to him, but assumed it was someone who owed him money.

On July 9, 1990, agent Aldridge learned that Yagow was at the Peavey Elevator near Valley City. He called Barnes County Deputy Sheriff Larry Mundahl in Valley City and asked him to arrest Yagow, who would be in a red truck. When Deputy Mundahl and another deputy sheriff arrived at AgraBasics Company, a seed company located right next to the elevator, they saw a red truck, also arriving, with two people inside. The deputies could not see who was driving the truck. The passenger, Yagow, jumped out of the truck and ran. After a chase, the deputies caught and arrested Yagow.

There was conflicting testimony about whether Erdman arrived at AgraBasics before Yagow or whether he was the person who arrived in the truck with Yagow. Ronald Gienger, a seed plant manager for AgraBasics, testified that he saw Erdman remove his jacket from the truck shortly after the arrest. Agent Aldridge testified that two AgraBasics employees identified Erdman as the person who was at the elevator with Yagow. Yagow testified at his federal bond hearing before a United States magistrate judge that Erdman was the person who was in the truck with him when he arrived at AgraBasics that day. At Erdman's trial, however, Yagow denied that Erdman was with him and explained that he had misunderstood the question at the earlier hearing. Erdman and Gerald Stuhr both testified that Stuhr, not Yagow, had taken Erdman to AgraBasics. Gienger stated that Erdman was already inside the AgraBasics building and followed everyone outside when they went out to see why a sheriff's deputy had just chased someone past their building.

Erdman claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury finding that he is guilty of harboring or concealing a fugitive. We disagree, and affirm the jury verdict.

II.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict. United States v. Mallen, 843 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Newton, 756 F.2d 53, 54 (8th Cir.1985). A conviction may be based on circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Mallen, 843 F.2d at 1099. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt. Newton, 756 F.2d at 54. The jury's verdict must be upheld if there is an interpretation of the evidence that would allow a reasonable-minded jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Rodriguez, 812 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir.1987).

In order to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988), 3 the government had to establish that (1) Erdman knew that a federal warrant had been issued for Yagow's arrest; (2) Erdman harbored or concealed Yagow; and (3) Erdman intended to prevent Yagow's discovery and arrest. United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir.1984). We will discuss each element in turn.

A. Knowledge

Knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone; it frequently cannot be proven in any other way. Mallen, 843 F.2d at 1099; Udey, 748 F.2d at 1236. An issue, like knowledge, that turns in large part on the credibility of the witnesses is peculiarly within the province of the factfinder. See United States v. Long, 952 F.2d 1520, 1525 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir.1984).

The jury had to decide when Erdman learned that there was a warrant for Yagow's arrest. The jury's resolution of this issue was key to Erdman's conviction because any action he took that aided Yagow in avoiding arrest could be "harboring or concealing" only if Erdman knew about the warrant at the time he acted. Erdman testified at trial that he did not know about the warrant until after he was arrested in July 1990. He stated that agent Aldridge did not tell him about the warrant during their meeting on March 16, 1990. Agent Aldridge, on the other hand, testified that he always informed anyone from whom he was seeking information about Yagow's whereabouts of the warrant. He stated that he discussed the warrant with Erdman at their March meeting. He further stated that Erdman already knew about the warrant, and that Erdman told agent Aldridge that the warrant was not valid because it was not signed by a judge. Agent Aldridge explained to Erdman that the warrant was valid because it had been approved by a...

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