U.S. v. Escobar Noble
Decision Date | 30 June 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 80-1099,80-1099 |
Citation | 653 F.2d 34 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Thomas ESCOBAR NOBLE, Defendant, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Jose C. Aponte, Jr., Santurce, P.R., on brief for defendant, appellant.
Raymond L. Acosta, U. S. Atty., and Justo Arenas, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Juan, P.R., on brief for appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, BOWNES and BREYER, Circuit Judges.
Thomas Escobar Noble pleaded guilty in the district court to having conspired to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 500 pounds of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He was sentenced to a prison term of one year and one day, and a special parole term of two years. On appeal, Escobar argues that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting a plea agreement that would have allowed him to plead guilty to the lesser crime of possession of marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). He also contends that the prison term imposed by the district court was too harsh, and that the special parole term was not authorized by the statute. Except as to the last issue, we affirm the district court.
Noting that one of the three central figures in the conspiracy had been sentenced to fifteen months in prison, the government expressed its concern "that with all due respect to the Court, (it would be) almost a mischarge of justice if a relatively minor character was to serve two to three years ...." For his part, Escobar's attorney reemphasized his client's minimal role in the conspiracy and asserted that, if convicted of a felony, rather than a misdemeanor, Escobar would lose his present job and be unable to pursue a legal career upon completing his final year of law school.
The district judge refused to allow dismissal of the felony charge, indicating he did not wish his hands to be tied, and referred to another case where he felt he had received misinformation about the defendant's degree of involvement.
Escobar now argues that the rejection of his plea agreement was an abuse of discretion.
Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2), a district court may, as a matter of discretion, accept, reject or defer a decision upon a proposed plea agreement. See In re Arvedon, 523 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1971). See also Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e). The issue Escobar raises is whether a district court abuses this discretion by rejecting a plea agreement in order to leave open the possibility of imposing a higher sentence than would have been permitted under the plea agreement.
We think the answer must be "No" in these circumstances. This is not a case where acceptance of the plea agreement is both reasonable and necessary to secure a legitimate and important prosecutorial interest. See United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C.Cir.1973)(plea bargain enabled prosecutor to obtain critical testimony needed to convict an accomplice, and without seriously weakening sanctions that would be imposed on defendant). Nor is this a case involving some other independent consideration so compelling as to necessitate acceptance of the plea. As the prosecutor admitted to the court, he was prepared to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Escobar was guilty of the felony with which he had been charged. Compare United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Association, 228 F.Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y.1964) ( ). In addition, there is no suggestion that the prosecutor hoped to use information obtained from Escobar to help convict other defendants. Compare United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2168, 48 L.Ed.2d 795 (1976). The only justification offered for the proposed plea agreement was that the possible sentence under a felony conviction "would not be just" for a defendant who "in this case played the least role," had no prior record and wished to pursue a legal career. The court, however, was free to impose a light sentence indeed it could have suspended all imprisonment on the felony, just as on the proposed misdemeanor. In fact, the sentence it finally did impose was, for all practical purposes, little different from what it could have imposed under a misdemeanor charge. To be sure, the collateral consequences of a felony conviction are harsher than for a misdemeanor, but unfortunately for defendant the crime he committed was in point of fact a felony. 1 It is the particular function of the court, not the prosecutor, to say the last word about the justice of a sentence. See Koski v. Samaha, 648 F.2d 790 at 796-797 (1st Cir. 1981). We do not consider the case before us as comparable to a refusal of a prosecutor's request to withdraw an indictment. In the latter instance, the prosecutor is exercising a power traditionally associated with prosecutors, to determine what charges to press against a particular individual. Id. There is no reason for the judge to interfere unless the public interest is threatened. Plea bargains, however, go to the traditionally judicial...
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