U.S. v. Fairchild
| Decision Date | 12 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | 98-2330,No. 98-2311,98-2311 |
| Citation | 189 F.3d 769 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 1999) United States of America, Appellee, v. Timothy R. Fairchild, Appellant. United States of America, Appellee, v. Jeffrey Paul Gruber, also known as No Mind, also known as The King, also known as Boss, Appellant. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before LOKEN, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
After a trial in district court,1 a jury found Jeffrey Paul Gruber guilty of various drug trafficking offenses, a firearm violation, money laundering, racketeering, and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. The district court sentenced Gruber to life in prison on the racketeering and criminal enterprise counts, and to lesser concurrent terms of imprisonment on the other counts of conviction. Gruber received a provisional sentence of life in prison on the drug conspiracy conviction. Timothy R. Fairchild, Gruber's codefendant, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Fairchild to 135 months in prison. Gruber appeals both his convictions and his sentences. Fairchild appeals aspects of his sentence. We affirm the judgments of the district court but remand Gruber's drug conspiracy conviction and sentence for vacation to avoid double jeopardy.
Facts and Background.
About 20 years ago, Gruber formally affiliated with a motorcycle club known as the Sons of Silence. Sons of Silence members pledge oaths of loyalty, secrecy, and commitment to their common bonds of brotherhood. Their brotherhood, however, as this case demonstrates, enforces its oaths through violence and other nefarious activity.
Gruber rose to prominence in the Sons of Silence, became a national vice-president, and was the de facto leader of the organization's Cedar Falls/Waterloo, Iowa chapter. In the 1980's, Gruber utilized his position within the Sons of Silence to engage in an illegal drug trafficking enterprise. The drug trafficking activity consisted of numerous interstate transactions involving large amounts of money and methamphetamine. David Fairchild (who is no relation to defendant Timothy R. Fairchild) also was a high ranking member of the Sons of Silence and became the defendant Jeffrey Gruber's partner in the interstate drug trade. David Fairchild was convicted after a jury trial in 1995 of numerous drug, money laundering, and racketeering offenses and received a 300-month sentence. His convictions were affirmed by this court. See United States v. Fairchild, 122 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1086 (1998). After his conviction, David Fairchild began to cooperate with the government and testified against defendant Jeffrey Gruber when Gruber was later apprehended. David Fairchild testified that his involvement with Gruber began in 1986 with the transporting of money and drugs between Kentucky and Iowa for Gruber's brother, Ron. David Fairchild was told by Ron Gruber that the methamphetamine he was transporting (in three to six pound quantities per trip) belonged to the defendant Jeff Gruber. Later, after the two Gruber brothers had a falling out, David Fairchild began dealing directly with and transporting drugs and money directly for the defendant Jeff Gruber between Iowa and Colorado. After David Fairchild's house was searched by law enforcement authorities in 1992, he and the defendant Jeff Gruber began using another gang member to do the drug transportation work. Other former Sons of Silence members, including a national officer, testified that they often received distributable quantities of methamphetamine from Jeffrey Gruber, which they in turn sold to other members. Throughout the 1980's and early 1990's, the defendant Gruber and other Sons of Silence members regularly and routinely shipped illegal drugs and money in and between at least four states.
Gruber and the other members of his drug trafficking cadre spent the proceeds of their illegal operation on real property, vehicles, and motorcycles. Gruber, for example, purchased a Harley-Davidson motorcycle for $15,123.80 in cash, a Ford Bronco for $7,000 in cash, and a house in Cedar Falls for $13,500 in cash.
Gruber commanded the loyalty of his drug associates through threats and actual violence. On one occasion, Gruber "earnotched" an associate by taking a knife and cutting out part of the associate's ear for disciplinary reasons. On another occasion, Gruber beat an associate almost to the point of death. An eyewitness described the beating as so savage that the associate required extensive hospitalization and reconstructive surgery. On other occasions, Gruber attacked and beat his associates with baseball bats.
Knives and bats were not the only weapons in Gruber's arsenal. Firearms played a prominent role in the Cedar Falls/Waterloo chapter events. (See Jeff Gruber Trial Tr. at 134-35, 212-13, 394.) More importantly, Gruber employed firearms as a method of ensuring the secrecy of his illicit drug operation. Gruber more than once threatened to murder his associates with a firearm if they betrayed him to law enforcement. On another occasion, he severely pistol-whipped an associate. A search of Gruber's residence revealed 50 rounds of .22 caliber maximags. A search of another Sons of Silence drug trafficker's cabin yielded 32 firearms, all of which were owned by Gruber.
A grand jury indicted Gruber and 13 of his associates in November 1994. Most, but not all of the associates, were immediately arrested. Gruber was not found and became a fugitive; he was seen (but not apprehended) in 1995 in Costa Rica and was finally arrested in Tacoma, Washington in July 1996. In the meantime, David Fairchild and twelve others had either gone to trial or pleaded guilty and been convicted. A second superceding indictment was returned by the grand jury in September 1997, and was the indictment Gruber was tried upon in February 1998. The jury found Gruber guilty of all the charges made against him after an eight-day trial. On appeal, Gruber alleges that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a wiretap, the government erroneously charged him as an enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the government violated his due process rights by compensating the witnesses who testified against him, the district court erred when it determined the type and quantity of methamphetamine for sentencing purposes, and the district court erred when it imposed a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm during the course of a drug conspiracy. Timothy Fairchild argues that the district court erred by double-counting his criminal history and denying his motion for a downward departure.
Gruber's Challenges
The government electronically monitored the telephone of Gerald VanBrocklin. VanBrocklin was a member of the Cedar Falls/Waterloo Sons of Silence chapter and an associate of Gruber's. The wiretap of VanBrocklin's telephone line intercepted Gruber's conversations with VanBrocklin regarding the Sons of Silence methamphetamine operation. The district court had ordered the wiretapping of VanBrocklin's telephone and authorized the interception of VanBrocklin's and Gruber's conversations after the government presented the district court with an application and a supporting affidavit. Following his arrest, Gruber filed a motion to suppress the. District of Iowa. Although Chief Judge Melloy presided over most aspects of this case, Judge Bennett decided the pretrial suppression issues intercepted information. The district court 2 denied his motion. See United States v. Gruber, 994 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Iowa 1998). On appeal, Gruber contends that the wiretap orders were invalid because they failed to specify the person whose communications might be intercepted and they did not conform to the minimization requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2518(5). Gruber also argues that the wiretap application was not supported by probable cause. We review the facts underlying a district court's decision to deny a suppression motion for clear error. See United States v. Searcy, 181 F.3d 975, 978-80 (8th Cir.1999). We review de novo a district court's legal conclusions regarding a suppression motion. See id.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520, generally prohibits the government from conducting wiretap investigations without first obtaining an approval order from a judicial officer. Obtaining such an order requires the government to present the court with facts sufficient to establish probable cause that a wiretap will yield information concerning the commission of a particular offense by an identified individual. See 18 U.S.C. 2518(3)(a), (b). Once the district court determines that probable cause exists, it may issue an order authorizing the wiretap. The wiretap order must specify: (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications will be intercepted; (b) the location of the facilities where authority to intercept communications is permitted; (c) a description of the types of communications that are expected to be intercepted and the offense to which they relate; (d) the name of the person authorizing the application and the name of the government agency authorized to intercept the communications; and (e) the period of time for which the wiretap is authorized. See 18 U.S.C. 2518(4)(a)-(e). The statute also mandates that every order contain a provision requiring the government to minimize the interception of communications unrelated to the illegal activity specified in the application. See 18 U.S.C. 2518(5). Wiretap orders are valid for no more than...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Harvey, No. S1-4:02 CR 482 JCH DDN (E.D. Mo. 2003)
...of communications unrelated to the illegal activity specified in the application. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); United States v. Fairchild, 189 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1999). Wiretap orders are valid for no more than thirty-day intervals, but may be renewed upon an application with the court for......
-
Cunningham v. Offshore Specialty Fabrications
...from the organizational entity." St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 447 (5th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Fairchild, 189 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir.1999)). Here, the "persons" are each of the Service Defendants. As explained by the Plaintiff, all of the Manning Defenda......
-
Honken v. United States
...in a continuing criminal enterprise. See United States v. Jefferson, 215 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.2000) ; United States v. Fairchild, 189 F.3d 769, 781 (8th Cir.1999) ; Jelinek, 57 F.3d at 660 ; United States v. Holt, 969 F.2d 685, 687 (8th Cir.1992) ; Possick, 849 F.2d at 341 ; Maull, 806 F.......
-
In re Mastercard Intern. Inc., Internet Gamb., CIV. A. MDL1321.
...reasoned that Indeed, "`[a] collective entity is something more than the members of which it is comprised.'" United States v. Fairchild, 189 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 (8th Cir.1989)). "Although a defendant may not be b......