U.S. v. Fields, 87-3240
| Decision Date | 11 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-3240,87-3240 |
| Citation | 838 F.2d 1571 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Boyd Patrick FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Robert Merkle, U.S. Atty., Kathleen O'Malley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., for U.S.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before VANCE and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and O'KELLEY *, District Judge.
This appeal presents the question of how far one may go in obtaining false statements in anticipation of a judicial proceeding before one may be held to have "endeavored" to obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. Finding that our circuit law does not require that the false statements be used in a judicial proceeding or be delivered to an officer of the court, we affirm the convictions.
A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging the appellant, Boyd Patrick Fields, and Lee Warren Wilhite with federal firearms violations. The indictment charged Fields and Wilhite with one count of possessing and causing the possession of a sawed-off shotgun (26 U.S.C. Secs. 5861(d), 5871, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2) and one count of transferring and causing the transfer of a sawed-off shotgun (26 U.S.C. Secs. 5861(e), 5871, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2).
Later, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the same two counts plus a third count which charged only Fields with obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the charges against Wilhite. Fields's trials for the firearms violations and for the obstruction of justice charge were separate. Because of entrapment, the district court found Fields not guilty of the firearms violations, but found him guilty of the obstruction of justice charge.
At Fields's trial for obstruction of justice, Wilhite testified that following their arrest, Fields asked him to take full responsibility for the firearms violations and to exculpate Fields from any criminal liability for the firearms violations. Wilhite testified that Fields was concerned about the effect a felony conviction might have on Fields's probationary status in an unconnected state criminal case. Wilhite agreed to do so. Fields then convinced Wilhite to go to the offices of Fields's father, a lawyer, and to knowingly give a false sworn statement in which Wilhite denied that Fields had participated in the sale of the sawed-off shotgun. At trial, Wilhite specified seven false answers he gave in response to questions put to him by Fields's father. One exchange at trial is illustrative, and begins with Wilhite's reading of a question put to him by Fields's father:
[WILHITE (reading from sworn statement) ]: 'Did Boyd Patrick Fields, did you see him know anything about or participate in either the possession or the alteration of [the shotgun]?'
[PROSECUTOR]: What answer did you give?
[WILHITE (reading) ]: 'No, sir.'
Near the time Wilhite made the false sworn statement to Fields's father lawyer the government notified the lawyers for Fields and Wilhite that the informant who purchased the sawed-off shotgun had been wearing a recording device. Once Fields's lawyer learned of the informant's recording, he provided Wilhite's lawyer with a copy of Wilhite's false sworn statement. Wilhite's lawyer advised Wilhite that the statement could be used against him by Fields and the prosecutor. After advising the United States Attorney's Office of the statement, and after some negotiation, Wilhite's lawyer advised him to cooperate fully with a law enforcement investigation regarding the taking of the statement. Pursuant to this cooperation, law enforcement agents monitored a telephone call from Wilhite to Fields during which Fields admitted knowing the statement was false.
The grand jury charged Fields with violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503 (1986). That statute punishes one who "corruptly ... endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice...." **
The primary issue on appeal is whether sufficient evidence supports the district court's conclusion that Fields endeavored to obstruct justice.
To resolve the primary issue in this case, we must interpret our holdings in United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir.1984) and United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460 (11th Cir.1985). Specifically, the issue is: does one "endeavor to obstruct justice" by obtaining or giving a false statement with the intent that it be used in a judicial proceeding when the statement is never used in a judicial proceeding and never given or caused to be given to a prosecutor or other officer of the court? The government, citing Silverman, answers in the affirmative. Fields, citing Brand and attempting to distinguish Silverman, answers in the negative.
To determine what evidence is relevant to this inquiry, we must first identify the statutory meaning of the word "endeavor." In 1984, this court defined "endeavor" as used in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, stating "all the government has to establish is that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the success of his scheme would [obstruct the due administration of justice]." United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir.1984) (citations omitted). The district court apparently relied upon the Silverman definition in concluding that Fields endeavored to obstruct justice. The district court said:
The Court finds that Fields did endeavor to obstruct justice and further finds that Fields should have foreseen that the due administration of justice would have been obstructed if his plan for using Wilhite's false statement was successful, and that the obstruction of the administration of justice was a natural and probable consequence, even if the statement was not successfully used to aid Fields' defense. [Emphasis added.]
Reduced to its simplest terms, Fields's contention is that Silverman is distinguishable. In Silverman, a criminal defense attorney told his client that if the client paid the attorney $25,000, the money would be used to pay "powerful and dangerous people" who could assure that if the client pleaded guilty, he would receive a sentence of probation rather than imprisonment. Silverman, at 1390-91.
Fields argues that when a lawyer such as Silverman tells his client that the client will receive probation upon payment of a $25,000 bribe, but will receive thirteen years imprisonment if no payment is made, then it is foreseeable to the lawyer that the natural and probable consequence of his statements will be to obstruct justice. The client, Fields argues, is likely to plead guilty and then to commit perjury during the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 inquiry into whether the plea was being made in the absence of any promises apart from those contained in the plea agreement. Even if the client discloses his lawyer's behavior and obtains a new lawyer, the client's faith in the judicial system may be so shaken as to prevent the client from making a sensible judgment about whether to plead guilty. Silverman, 745 F.2d at 1394-95. According to Fields, "endeavor" means that the obstruction of justice effect must be more than merely foreseeable; it also requires that the obstruction be the natural and probable consequence of a defendant's act.
The Silverman case, Fields argues, clearly met this standard because whatever course of action Silverman's client took would inevitably result in an obstruction of justice. Although proof of an inevitable obstruction of justice is not required, the Silverman opinion takes pains to demonstrate the level of probability which must be demonstrated in order to prove that a given act constitutes an endeavor to obstruct justice.
Fields further argues that although Fields and Wilhite have been characterized as friends, Fields was in a far less influential position than was the lawyer in the Silverman case. For example, it is not certain that had Wilhite gone to trial on the firearms violation he would have continued to exculpate Fields. Had Wilhite gone to trial and told the truth about Fields's participation in the sale of the shotgun, it is not clear that Fields would have attempted to impeach Wilhite with the prior sworn statement because Fields had a valid entrapment defense. In fact, Fields argues, the entrapment defense won him an acquittal on the firearms charges. The probability that his act would result in an obstruction of justice was much lower than the probability demonstrated in Silverman. Fields also argues that it is important that he did not cause Wilhite's false sworn statement to be delivered to the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) or to be produced in court.
We reject Fields's attempt to...
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