U.S. v. Ford, Criminal No. 05-10326-JLT.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 05-10326-JLT. |
| Citation | 440 F.Supp.2d 16 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Tyson FORD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Albert F. Cullen, Jr., South Boston, MA, for Tyson Ford.
Jack W. Pirozzolo, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for United States of America.
Defendant Tyson J. Ford is charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm.1 Defendant has moved to suppress the firearm seized by Officers Daran Edwards and Daniel Griffin of the Boston Police Department and to suppress certain statements that Defendant made to the officers. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
On September 8, 2005, Boston Police Department ("BPD") Officers Daran Edwards ("Edwards") and Daniel Griffin ("Griffin") were on routine patrol in the Dorchester section of Boston, Massachusetts. Both officers were in uniform and driving a marked Boston police cruiser.2 Around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon, the officers drove towards the intersection of Harvard Street and Gleason Street in Dorchester. The BPD has deemed this neighborhood a "hot spot" for criminal activity. The neighborhood has a high rate of firearm arrests, violent crime arrests, drug arrests, gang activity, and "shots fired" incidents. Officers Edwards and Griffin regularly patrolled this area and were familiar with most of the residents of the neighborhood.
As Officers Edwards and Griffin approached the Harvard-Gleason area, they observed Defendant walking alone down Harvard Street towards Gleason Street. Neither Officer Edwards or Officer Griffin recognized Defendant. Defendant, looking over his shoulder, observed the officers' police cruiser traveling in his direction. Defendant immediately looked down, sped up, and then quickly changed his direction, turning off of Harvard Street and on to Gleason Street. The officers, still in their marked cruiser, followed Defendant on to Gleason Street and pulled the cruiser to the curb alongside Defendant in order to conduct a Field Intelligence and Observation Report ("FIO").3 The officers did not physically block Defendant's path.
Officer Griffin leaned out of the cruiser's passenger side window and asked Defendant "[c]an I speak to you for a minute?" Defendant stopped walking, took his identification out of his front pocket, and voluntarily handed his identification to Officer Griffin. Defendant then told the officers that he had no outstanding warrants and that he was not on probation. Officer Edwards took Defendant's identification and initiated a search of the BPD computer database to determine whether Defendant had any outstanding warrants. While Officer Edwards waited for the results of the search, Officer Griffin continued to ask Defendant various routine questions, such as "[w]here do you live?" and "[w]here are you headed?" During this brief interaction, the officers observed Defendant's rapid breath, stuttered words, and trembling hands. Although Defendant answered all of Officer Griffin's questions, the officers described Defendant as Annoyed, hostile, and, on the basis of the above mentioned observations, extremely nervous. Officer Griffin then asked Defendant "[d]o you have anything on you we need to know about?" Defendant replied "no."
Officer Griffin then exited the cruiser to complete the FIO. Officer Edwards also exited, walked around the back of the car and approached Defendant from the same side as Officer Griffin. Defendant, at this point, began shaking more severely and raised his hands above his head, asking "[c]ome on man, what's this all about?" Officer Griffin again asked Defendant whether he had any weapons on him. Defendant answered "[y]eah, I got a gun in my pocket, but it don't fire." Officers Edwards and Griffin then placed Defendant in handcuffs and Officer Griffin frisked him. Officer Griffin discovered and seized a Grendel, Inc., P-12.380 semiautomatic handgun from the pocket of Defendant's pants. The officers then arrested Defendant. The firearm was not loaded and subsequent testing confirmed that the firearm was in fact inoperable.4
The entire encounter between the officers and Defendant lasted approximately two to three minutes. Neither officer physically touched Defendant before placing him in handcuffs, neither officer drew his weapon, and neither officer told Defendant that he was not free to leave. The officers, furthermore, never activated the police cruiser's siren or its flashing blue lights.
On August 18, 2005, the BPD posted a message on the BPD internal intranet "weblog" bulletin stating that Defendant may be in possession of a .380 caliber handgun. All Boston Police Officers had access to this bulletin through computers in the Boston Police Stations. Officer Edwards saw this bulletin at some point before his September 8, 2005 encounter with Defendant. Officer Edwards testified, however, that he did not remember the bulletin at any time before or during the encounter with Defendant.
The issues presented by Defendant's motion are two-fold. The first issue is whether Officers Griffin and Edwards seized Defendant before he made the incriminating statement and before they seized the firearm. The second issue depends upon the resolution of the first — that is, whether the officers, if they did seize Defendant, had sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.5
The Fourth Amendment protects all people against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 The Fourth Amendment, however, is not implicated every time a police officer encounters a citizen in a public place.7 In fact, "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.'"8 "`Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.'"9
The hallmark of a Fourth Amendment seizure is coercion.10 A police-citizen encounter rises to the level of a seizure when the interaction is compelled by physical restraint or a nonphysical show of authority, rather than by the citizen's voluntary compliance.11 A certain degree of compulsion is inherent when a law enforcement officer confronts someone with questions.12 Courts, therefore, apply an objective standard to determine whether an encounter was sufficiently coerced to rise to the level of a seizure.13 That standard is that "[n]o seizure occurs when officers approach a citizen to ask a question unless it was objectively reasonable for that person to believe that he was compelled to stay and answer the question."14 Stated another way, a seizure occurs only when the totality of the circumstances illustrates that a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the conversation and leave the encounter.15
The United States Supreme Court has designated several factors to guide a court's evaluation of whether a seizure occurred in a given situation.16 Factors that might elevate a police encounter from a voluntary conversation to a seizure include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of the officers' weapons, any physical touching of the defendant, and the use of language or tone of voice that indicates that compliance with the officers' request is not discretionary.17 These factors are not exclusive, however, and no single factor is dispositive.18 Courts, instead, will examine all of the facts surrounding a particular situation to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.19
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has considered facts similar to the present case in two cases which serve as useful guides in the resolution of the instant motion.20 In United States v. Young, two Boston Police officers on patrol in a marked cruiser observed three men, who were standing together, quickly disperse upon seeing the police cruiser.21 The officers noted that the defendant matched the description of a suspect in a robbery that occurred in the area.22 The officers followed the defendant, pulled their cruiser to the curb alongside him, and stated "Boston Police, you got a minute?"23 The defendant replied "[s]ure" and stepped towards the cruiser.24 The First Circuit held that the officers did not seize the defendant and that the encounter, up to that point, did not trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment.25 The court explained that "in the absence of an officer's exertion of physical force or an individual's submission to a show of authority, no seizure occurs."26
In United States v. Smith, two Boston Police officers were on patrol in a marked Boston police cruiser when they noticed the defendant, Smith, sitting on a small wall behind a telephone pole.27 A chain link fence stood directly behind the defendant.28 Both officers regularly patrolled this area and were familiar with the local residents.29 Neither officer recognized the defendant.30 One of the officers leaned outside of the cruiser's passenger side window and asked the defendant whether he lived at the house behind him.31 The defendant stated that he did not live there.32 After a few more questions, the officers exited their cruiser and approached the defendant to complete a FIO.33 The officers stood on either side of the telephone pole that was directly in front of the defendant.34 The officers asked the defendant for his identification, which the defendant produced.35 Then, as one of the officers started back to the cruiser to run the defendant's name through the police database, the defendant stated that he had an outstanding warrant.36 After a brief scuffle, the officers then arrested the defendant and found a firearm in his possession.37
The issue in Smith, as in the instant case, was whether the defendant was seized...
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