U.S. v. Francis, 89-2747
| Decision Date | 12 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-2747,89-2747 |
| Citation | 916 F.2d 464 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Willie R. FRANCIS, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
John E. Turner, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Matt J. Whitworth, Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Willie R. Francis appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 and the distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). We affirm both the conviction and the sentence in all respects.
As part of an ongoing investigation of the Francis family, on February 8, 1989, Detective Ransburg of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department went to purchase drugs at a residence in Kansas City. At the residence, Detective Ransburg purchased five packages of crack cocaine. Detective Ransburg testified that the person in control of the drugs at the residence was the appellant, Willie Francis. He also saw the appellant's sister, Tammy Francis, at the residence.
During February and March, detectives from the Kansas City Police Department made four separate cocaine purchases from members of the appellant's family. Except for Detective Ransburg, no other detective investigating the Francis family claims to have seen the appellant participating in drug sales. On March 7, 1989, the Kansas City Police Department searched the home of the appellant's parents. The police seized cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, food stamps, weapons, and cash from the residence. After the search of the house, Willie Francis was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine.
The appellant raises six points of error on appeal. First, he claims that the District Court 1 erred in allowing Detective Starbuck to testify about his observation of Detective Ransburg's identification of the appellant. Detective Starbuck testified that Detective Ransburg "immediately initialed" appellant's photograph in a photo array. Tr. 295. Detective Starbuck also testified that "[t]here was no hesitation or seemed to be no doubt in Detective Ransburg's mind of who he identified...." Tr. 307.
The appellant claims that this testimony was hearsay and improperly bolstered the testimony of Detective Ransburg, the only witness directly linking him to the conspiracy. We disagree. Detective Starbuck's testimony was not hearsay. Detective Starbuck merely testified concerning the speed of Detective Ransburg's identification and the reason he believed there was no need to conduct a live line-up for identification of the appellant. In neither instance was Detective Starbuck's testimony hearsay.
The appellant's second claim is that the District Court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor claimed during cross-examination that Mr. Francis had not attended the high school he listed on a job application. The prosecutor based his disbelief on the fact that he, the prosecutor, had attended the same high school during the same period and did not remember Mr. Francis. While the attorney's comments were improper, we believe the District Court correctly refused to grant a mistrial. The District Court instructed the jury to disregard the attorney's comments. Moreover, after an examination of the high school's records, the parties entered into a joint stipulation that Mr. Francis had attended the high school the prosecutor claimed he had not attended. Thus, the prosecutor's comments bolstered Mr. Francis's credibility as a witness, rather than detracted from it. Therefore, we cannot agree with the appellant that the prosecutor's statements were grounds for a mistrial.
As his third point of error, the appellant claims that the District Court erred in admitting photographs of food stamps and guns seized at his parents' house into evidence. Appellant argues that the prejudicial impact of the photographs outweighed their probative value. We disagree. Not only does the District Court have great discretion in the admission of evidence, but this Circuit has acknowledged that weapons are tools of the drug-distribution trade. See, e.g., United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Aldridge
...timely withdraw and can never negate liability as to the conspiracy charge." Salazar, 751 F.3d at 331 (citing United States v. Francis, 916 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir. 1990)). Because the conspiracy crimes charged in Counts 1 and 13 do not require proof of overt acts, proof of withdrawal would ......
-
U.S. v. Grimmett, 97-4255
...to a conspiracy charge under a statute like 21 U.S.C. § 846 that does not require proof of an overt act, see United States v. Francis, 916 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir.1982), but those cases do not deal with a statute of limitations bar......
-
U.S. v. Clark
...v. Umentum, 547 F.2d 987, 990 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 1677, 52 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); United States v. Francis, 916 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1348 n. 6 (11th ......
-
United States v. Salazar
...act, a defendant can never timely withdraw and can never negate liability as to the conspiracy charge. See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 916 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir.1990). Salazar relies extensively on United States v. Schorovsky, 202 F.3d 727 (5th Cir.2000). The defendant challenged her ......