U.S. v. Franklin
Decision Date | 09 September 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 01-3568.,01-3568. |
Citation | 302 F.3d 722 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry FRANKLIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jonathan L. Marks (argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Hammond, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Richard H. Parsons, Kent V. Anderson (argued), Office of the Fed. Pub. Def., Peoria, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BAUER, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
In April 2001, after a two-day trial, a jury found Jerry Franklin guilty of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing the district court determined that Franklin had three prior violent felony convictions, including a 1993 Mississippi conviction for escape from a county jail, which made Franklin eligible for an armed career criminal enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Over Franklin's objections the district court applied the statutory enhancement and corresponding guideline provision, see id.; U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, and sentenced him to 235 months' imprisonment. On appeal Franklin does not contest his conviction under § 922(g)(1) but instead challenges the district court's application of the statutory enhancement. He argues specifically that his prior escape conviction cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 924(e) because escape is not a "violent felony." We affirm.
Whether "escape" constitutes a violent felony for purposes of § 924(e) is an issue of first impression in this circuit, and a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See United States v. Collins, 150 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir.1998). Under § 924(e) any person who violates § 922(g) and who has three prior convictions for "violent" felonies or serious drug offenses faces a minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The statute defines "violent felony" as any felony that either "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" or "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). To determine whether a particular prior offense is a violent felony, sentencing courts take a categorical approach, looking to the statutory elements of the crime, rather than the particular facts underlying the conviction. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); United States v. Fife, 81 F.3d 62, 64 (7th Cir.1996).
Mississippi has several statutes that punish escape, see Miss.Code Ann. §§ 97-9-45, 97-9-47, 97-9-49, and neither the indictment nor the judgment of conviction explicitly references the particular escape statute Franklin violated. The government argues that the state court applied § 97-9-49 when sentencing Franklin. Under § 97-9-49 any person in custody on a felony charge who "escapes or attempts by force or violence to escape from any jail ... or from any [lawful] custody" faces up to five years' imprisonment in the state penitentiary. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-9-49. Franklin's indictment and prison sentence support the government's position because these documents reveal that Franklin had been confined in a county jail under a felony charge of aggravated assault before his escape, and that he received a sentence of five years' imprisonment upon his recapture. The other possible statutory provisions for escape contain additional elements not referenced in Franklin's indictment, see Miss.Code Ann. § 97-9-45 ( ); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-47 ( ), and because at argument Franklin effectively conceded that the government correctly identified the proper statute, we will proceed under the assumption that Franklin was sentenced under § 97-9-49.
Escape under § 97-9-49 consists of three elements: "(a) the knowing and voluntary departure of a person (b) from lawful custody and (c) with intent to evade due course of justice." Miller v. State, 492 So.2d 978, 981 (Miss.1986). Because no evidence of force or violence is required to sustain an escape conviction under this statutory provision, see id., it becomes necessary to consider whether escape nevertheless constitutes a "violent felony" by "involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In determining whether escape falls under this prong of the statute, "the benchmark should be the possibility of violent confrontation, not whether one can postulate a nonconfrontational hypothetical scenario." United States v. Davis, 16 F.3d 212, 217 (7th Cir.1994).
The four circuits that have addressed this issue, in the context of other states' escape statutes, have concluded that an escape always involves the potential for injury to others, and therefore constitutes a violent felony under § 924(e) even if the underlying facts of conviction establish in hindsight that the risk never actually materialized. See United States v. Abernathy, 277 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.2002) ( ); United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 1999) ( ); United States v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir.1999) ( ); United States v. Houston, 187 F.3d 593, 594-95 (6th Cir.1999) ( ); United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1998) ( ); United States v. Hairston, 71 F.3d 115, 118 (4th Cir.1995) ( ); see also United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 677 (5th Cir.1999) ( ). As the Tenth Circuit has recognized, an escapee's desire to avoid detection and recapture creates real and unpredictable risks of potential violence and injury:
A defendant who escapes from a jail is likely to possess a variety of supercharged emotions, and in evading those trying to recapture him, may feel threatened by police officers, ordinary citizens, or even fellow escapees. Consequently, violence could erupt at any time. Indeed, even in a case where a defendant escapes from a jail by stealth and injures no one in the process, there is still a serious potential risk that injury will result when officers...
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