U.S. v. Freeman

• Decision Date: 04 December 1986
• Docket Number: 86-7002,Nos. 85-7615,s. 85-7615
• Parties: , 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 154 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwayne FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1574

804 F.2d 1574

55 USLW 2370, 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 154

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwayne FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 85-7615, 86-7002.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 4, 1986.

Margaret L. Givhan, Montgomery, Ala. (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.

John C. Bell, U.S. Atty., Kent B. Brunson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before HILL and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and THOMAS ^*, Senior District Judge.

HILL, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Dwayne Freeman challenges his conviction of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(b), (d) (1982). At trial, the facts surrounding the robbery and the defendant's guilt were never at issue. Freeman merely contests the trial court's determination that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. Freeman bases his appeal upon two grounds. First, he challenges the constitutionality of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, Sec. 402, 98 Stat. 1837, 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 20 (Supp.1986); Fed.R.Evid. 704(b)). Second, Freeman asserts that as a matter of law, he has established his insanity by clear and convincing evidence. We reject both of the defendant's arguments.

The Insanity Defense Reform Act produced three principal changes to the insanity defense in federal courts. First, the definition of insanity was restricted so that a valid defense only exists where the defendant was "unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts" at the time of the offense. The amendment thus eliminated the volitional prong of the defense; prior to the act, a defendant could assert a valid defense if he were unable to appreciate the nature of his act or unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830 (11th Cir.1983). The second change produced by the Act resulted in a shifting of the burden of proof from the government to the defendant. Prior to the Act, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895). Under the current act, the defendant must prove his insanity by clear and convincing evidence to escape criminal liability. The third change prohibits experts for either the government or defendant from testifying as to the ultimate issue of the accused's sanity. The act changes Federal Rules of Evidence 704 so as to provide:

No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.

Fed.R.Evid. 704(b).

The defendant's principal contention concerning the constitutionality of the act pertains to the burden of proof being placed upon the defendant. The nineteenth century decision of Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895), established that the prosecution must prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt in federal cases. The Supreme Court, however, has pointed out that Davis is not a constitutional ruling, but an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over prosecutions in federal court. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).

In Leland, the Supreme Court held that a state could constitutionally require a defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsequent to Leland, the Supreme Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), held that a juvenile cannot be confined to a correctional facility where a delinquency adjudication is based upon a preponderance of the evidence: "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." The apparent inconsistency between Leland and Winship led one commentator to question the continuing validity of Leland. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law Sec. 8, at 48 (1972). Such an analysis would be further supported by the Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), which held that a homicide defendant could not be required to prove heat of passion by a fair preponderance of the evidence in order to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly reaffirmed the Leland holding. See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 97 S.Ct. 226, 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976) (request to overrule Leland dismissed for want of substantial federal question); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3051 n. 17, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (citing Leland with approval); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 122 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1568 n. 23, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (citing Leland with approval); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2325, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (citing Leland with approval); Williams v. Wainwright, 712 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir.1983) (indicating that a state may make insanity an affirmative defense to be proved by defendant).

At oral argument, Freeman attempted to distinguish Leland by urging this court to adopt stricter constitutional standards for federal courts than that required for state courts under Leland. The only suggestion we can find indicating that federal courts may discover stricter constitutional requirements for federal criminal trials than state criminal trials is United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 835 n. 5 (2d Cir.1983). To the extent that Mitchell goes beyond observing that the Bill of Rights were only partially incorporated by the fourteenth amendment, we disagree with it. No logical basis exists to distinguish between a state legislature's constitutional power to require a defendant to prove insanity and the United States Congress' power to require a defendant to prove insanity. The United States Constitution does not draw meaningless distinctions. Therefore, Leland compels a holding that the aspect of the Insanity Reform Act of 1984 requiring a defendant to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence is constitutional.

Additionally, we hold that the Act's restriction against opinion testimony as to the ultimate issue of insanity does not restrict the defendant in the preparation of his defense in violation of the fifth amendment. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 merely reserves for the jury the authority to determine the sanity of the accused under the statutory standards. The defendant is not prohibited from...