U.S. v. Gabrion, 02-1386.

Citation517 F.3d 839
Decision Date14 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. 02-1461.,No. 02-1570.,No. 02-1386.,02-1386.,02-1461.,02-1570.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin Charles GABRION, II, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

ARGUED: Judy C. Clarke, Federal Defenders of San Diego, San Diego, California, Margaret S. O'Donnell, McNally & O'Donnell, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant. Joan E. Meyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Judy C. Clarke, Federal Defenders of San Diego, San Diego, California, Margaret S. O'Donnell, Kevin M. McNally, McNally & O'Donnell, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant. Joan E. Meyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: MERRITT, BATCHELDER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. MOORE, J. (pp. 857-76), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. MERRITT, J. (pp. 876-87), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal from a federal criminal conviction, we are confronted with the precursory issue of whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution for murder — the federal statute for which predicates subject matter jurisdiction on the murder's having been committed on certain federal property — when the property in question is within the national forest. The dispositive question is whether certain national forest land falls within the federal government's territorial jurisdiction. Because, in this case, it does, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this criminal prosecution.

I.

On June 3, 1999, the United States Attorney, acting on the finding of the federal grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, charged Marvin Gabrion with committing first degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), at a location within the federal government's special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 7(3), which is a capital felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b).1 The text of the indictment reads, in its entirety:

Between on or about June 3, 1997, and on or about July 5, 1997, in the County of Newaygo, in the Southern Division of the Western District of Michigan, Marvin Charles Gabrion II did, after deliberation, premeditation and malice aforethought, willfully kill Rachel Timmerman within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States by drowning her in Oxford Lake, which lies within the Manistee National Forest.

18 U.S.C. § 1111

18 U.S.C. § 7

Indictment, Case No. 1:99-CR-76 (W.D. Mich. June 3, 1999).2 The first statute cited in the indictment, the federal murder statute, provides in pertinent part:

(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing . . . is murder in the first degree.

. . .

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, [w]hoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life[.]

18 U.S.C. § 1111. Congress has defined the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" to include "[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).

Following a six-day trial, a jury convicted Gabrion as charged and the district court sentenced him to death. See United States v. Gabrion, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60578 at *1, 2006 WL 2473978 at *1 (W.D.Mich. Aug.25, 2006) ("Defendant Marvin Gabrion was convicted of first degree murder within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and 18 U.S.C. § 7. The Court imposed a sentence of death pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3594 in accordance with the jury's recommendation." (footnote omitted)). Gabrion appealed the conviction and his court-appointed appellate counsel asserted 23 claims of error.3 Gabrion himself, in a pro se supplemental brief, asserted at least three additional claims.

Upon reviewing the briefs, the panel was intrigued by a "curious issue of jurisdiction" that had not been addressed by the district court, but had nonetheless been raised on appeal, although only in footnotes to the appellate briefs. Specifically, Gabrion's counsel had noted:

The government never presented any evidence proving that in 1938 when the Manistee National Forest was created and then in 1939 when the particular land surrounding the southern portion of Oxford Lake was sold to the federal government that the government gave proper notice of its acceptance of jurisdiction. Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943) (`Since the government had not accepted jurisdiction [of Camp Claiborne, Louisiana in the manner required by the Act of October 9, 1940] the federal court had no jurisdiction' over rape prosecution). Gabrion filed several pro se motions relevant to the jurisdiction question. In one, he raised the question of whether the federal government, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 255, had ever properly accepted jurisdiction in 1939 of the land surrounding Oxford Lake that became part of the Manistee National Forest. Gabrion tried to argue his pro se motions at the jurisdiction evidentiary hearing, but the court would not let him speak.

Appellant's Final Br. at 24, fn. 20 (Dec. 12, 2005) (brackets in original; record citations omitted). The government reciprocated with a footnote in its own brief, in which it noted:

Defendant now argues that the federal government never formally accepted jurisdiction over the southern portion of Oxford Lake pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 255. See Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943). Defendant did not litigate this issue in the trial court and his own expert conceded federal ownership of the southern portion of Oxford Lake at hearing. In any event, 40 U.S.C. § 255 was enacted in 1940. For lands acquired prior to 1940, federal jurisdiction is presumed. United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842, 91 S.Ct. 86, 27 L.Ed.2d 78 (1970); Markham v. United States, 215 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 939, 75 S.Ct. 360, 99 L.Ed. 735 (1955); see also SRA Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 563 n. 7, 66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851 (1946). The southern portion of Oxford Lake was acquired for the Manistee National Forest in 1939.

Appellee's Final Br. at 72, fn. 10 (Dec. 5, 2005) (record citations omitted).

Thus, on our own initiative and prior to argument, we ordered the parties to "further brief what appears to be a subject matter jurisdiction issue raised for the first time in this case only in footnote 20 on page 24 of defendant's opening brief and discussed briefly in the government's brief at footnote 10 at page 71." Order (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006). We explained that this "issue arises from 40 U.S.C. § 255[,] which says that the government must first give notice that it is asserting law enforcement jurisdiction before it displaces the State's jurisdiction," and expressed our concern that the Supreme Court, in Adams, 319 U.S. at 315, 63 S.Ct. 1122, "seems to have regarded such notice as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. We also issued to the parties six specific questions,4 the answers to which, we hoped, would assist us in resolving this heretofore unaddressed jurisdictional issue.

Rather than responding with supplemental briefing, however, the parties filed a "Joint Motion to Remand for Hearing on Subject Matter Jurisdiction," in which they explained:

The exercise of federal prosecutorial power over lands in national forests is dependent upon the date and method of land acquisition, and the relevant state statute, if any, authorizing that acquisition. After preliminary research, the parties jointly ask for a remand to further develop the record. This issue was never litigated in the district court so that, beyond establishing the bare minimum of the date the land was acquired, the record on appeal does not contain details related to the method of acquisition, how the land was acquired and held by the Forest Service, or the title history of the particular tract. Moreover, expert testimony may be necessary to explain various issues related to land acquisition by the federal government in the early 20th century and better inform the Court as to the respective arguments of both parties. In addition, although this Court reviews jurisdictional issues de novo, it will allow the district court to hear testimony and better inform the Court with further development of the record and its own legal analysis of the issue.

Upon consideration of this request, we granted the parties' motion and instructed the district court on remand to "hold such further proceedings as it determines are appropriate to fully develop the record on subject matter jurisdiction." Order (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2006).

On remand, the district court accepted additional briefing and held an evidentiary hearing to expand the record. At that hearing, Gabrion introduced 24 exhibits and the testimony of three witnesses, the government introduced nine additional exhibits, and the parties entered a stipulation:

It is stipulated and agreed between the parties that the United States does not possess records of notice filings pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 255 for the Manistee National Forest. In the absence of records reflecting [that] such notice has been given, [ ] it must be conclusively presumed at this time that no jurisdiction was accepted for those post February 1, 1940 parcels.

Confronted with this accumulation of evidence and the parties' revised arguments, the district court explained: "The parties'...

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