U.S. v. Garcia, 91-5684
Decision Date | 28 May 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-5684,91-5684 |
Citation | 962 F.2d 479 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John R. Carter, Asst. Federal Public Defender and Lucien B. Campbell, Federal Public Defender, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Richard L. Durbin, Jr., LeRoy Morgan Jahn, Asst. U.S. Attys. and Ronald F. Ederer, U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before SNEED, 1 REAVLEY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
Carlos Garcia appeals only his sentence, contending that the two prior convictions relied on for his career offender enhancement constitute only one conviction, pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. We AFFIRM.
In April 1991, Garcia pleaded guilty to distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In issue at sentencing was the application of the career offender enhancement based on two prior state convictions for distribution of heroin. 2 Although the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) did not recommend enhancement, the government urged it. 3 Garcia asserted, as in his earlier objection, that the prior convictions were "related", as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, and therefore counted for only one prior conviction for career offender purposes, based on his contentions, taken from the commentary to § 4A1.2, that the state convictions were part of a common scheme or plan and that they had been consolidated for sentencing. The district court found to the contrary and sentenced Garcia, as a career offender, to 168 months' imprisonment. 4
The guidelines provide for enhanced punishment for "career offenders". One of the criteria for such status is that "the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 5 Section 4B1.2(3) defines "two prior felony convictions" and provides that, in determining whether prior convictions are to be counted separately, § 4A1.1(a)-(c) controls. Section 4A1.1, which concerns computing the defendant's criminal history category, speaks of "prior sentences". Section 4A1.2 defines a "prior sentence" and provides that U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
The official commentary to § 4A1.2 states that "prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (1) occurred on the same occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were consolidated for trial or sentencing." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n. 3). This court looks to that commentary on this question. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Perpia, 932 F.2d 364, 365 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Ainsworth, 932 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 327, 116 L.Ed.2d 267 (1991), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 346, 116 L.Ed.2d 286 (1991); United States v. Metcalf, 898 F.2d 43, 46 n. 6 (5th Cir.1990). Garcia maintains that his two prior state convictions for delivery of heroin are related; that they resulted from offenses that (1) were part of a common scheme or plan and (2) were consolidated for trial and sentencing; and that, therefore, the district court erred in finding that they were not related and in applying the career offender enhancement.
This court will uphold a sentence unless it was imposed in violation of law; imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; or outside the range of the applicable sentencing guideline and is unreasonable. United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 136-37 (5th Cir.1989) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) and (e)), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 1957, 109 L.Ed.2d 319 (1990). Application of the guidelines is a question of law subject to de novo review. E.g., Castro-Perpia, 932 F.2d at 365. However, factual findings by the district court are reviewed for clear error. E.g., Metcalf, 898 F.2d at 44.
The initial query is the standard of review for a district court finding on whether prior convictions are related. Although the question is in large part one of fact, this court, without expressly ruling, has viewed this issue as an application of the guidelines, subject to de novo review. This much is certain; it has not applied the clearly erroneous standard. See Castro-Perpia, 932 F.2d at 366 (); Ainsworth, 932 F.2d at 361 (); United States v. Paulk, 917 F.2d 879, 884 (5th Cir.1990) ( ); Metcalf, 898 F.2d at 46 (); United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir.1989) (). Accordingly, we apply that de novo standard here, even though a strong--indeed compelling--argument can be made that the clearly erroneous standard of review is appropriate for whether prior convictions are related. The circuits are split on this question; 6 and this court, in an appropriate case, should consider giving this issue en banc consideration. 7
Garcia's first basis for contending that the two state convictions were "related" is that they were part of a "common scheme or plan". In 1989, he pleaded guilty to two separate indictments for delivery of heroin: the first delivery was to one undercover officer for $25.00; the second, to another undercover officer for $19.00. The two sales occurred within a nine-day period and in the same vicinity. In the first, Garcia had to go elsewhere to retrieve the heroin; in the second, he had it with him.
Although the guidelines do not define "common scheme or plan", Garcia contends that the term is to be used for § 4A1.2 purposes as it is used for the relevant conduct guideline, § 1B1.3(a)(2). 8 We have interpreted the relevant conduct language broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 264, 116 L.Ed.2d 217 (1991), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 887, 116 L.Ed.2d 791 (1992). Garcia maintains that we should do the same for "common scheme or plan" in determining whether convictions were related; and that, because the heroin deliveries involved almost identical conduct and occurred within the same area and within days of each other, they were part of a common scheme or plan.
Even if we were to adopt Garcia's analysis and broadly construe the language of § 4A1.2, an issue we need not reach, the facts underlying the two state convictions do not establish a common scheme or plan. Although the facts surrounding the cases may be similar, " '[s]imilar crimes are not necessarily related crimes.' " United States v. Mau, 958 F.2d 234, 236 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Lowe, 930 F.2d 645, 647 (8th Cir.1991)). "[A] relatedness finding requires more than mere similarity of crimes." United States v. Brown, 962 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir.1992). Garcia's "argument ... would lead to the illogical result that a defendant who is repeatedly convicted of the same offense on different occasions could never be considered a career offender under the guidelines." Mau, 958 F.2d at 236.
Garcia executed two distinct, separate deliveries of heroin. Although the crimes may have been temporally and geographically alike, they were not part of a common scheme or plan that would preclude imposition of career offender status.
Alternatively, Garcia asserts that the two cases are "related" because they were "consolidated for trial and sentencing": the two indictments had consecutive numbers and were filed on the same day; the same attorney was appointed to represent Garcia in both cases and submitted one statement for both representations; the clerk scheduled the two cases in the same court for the same date and time; the plea agreements for the two cases refer to each other; and the ten year sentences for each conviction run concurrently. 9
Garcia notes the consecutive indictment numbers, the scheduling of the cases for the same day and time, the plea agreements which refer to each other, and the concurrent sentences to support his position. The government emphasizes the separate indictments and docket numbers, the separate plea agreements and sentences, the lack of an order of consolidation, and the simultaneous resolution of a pending motion to revoke parole for a 1985 heroin possession case, as discussed in note 9, supra.
This court has already "rejected the proposition that cases must be considered consolidated 'simply because two convictions have concurrent sentences.' " Ainsworth, 932 F.2d at 361 (quoting Flores, 875 F.2d at 1114). Likewise, "[w]e also rejected the notion that 'sentencing on two distinct cases on the same day necessitates a finding that they are consolidated.' " Id. (quoting Metcalf, 898 F.2d at 46). Although Garcia contends that his case presents a unique combination of these factors, especially a close factual relationship between the convictions, this precedent obviously weakens his argument.
Garcia maintains, in any event, that consolidation in Texas can occur two ways: formally, through the operation of Chapter 3 of the Texas Penal Code; or informally, through the acquiescence or consent of a defendant. According to Garcia, an order of consolidation is not necessary for either procedure.
Under Chapter 3 of the Texas Penal Code, formal consolidation may occur when the state moves to consolidate two or more offenses "arising out of the same...
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