U.S. v. Garzon

Citation688 F.2d 607
Decision Date20 September 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-1421,81-1421
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Miguel GARZON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

John D. Vandevelde, Talcott, Vandevelde & Woehrle, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

R. Brian Ball, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., argued for plaintiff-appellee; Mark E. Beck, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before SCHROEDER, CANBY, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

NORRIS, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Miguel Garzon appeals from a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He claims prejudicial error from a "conscious avoidance" jury instruction. We agree and reverse.

I

The evidence at trial may be summarized as follows. In March of 1981, appellant's co-defendant, Moreno, met Weaver, who, unknown to Moreno, was a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant. Moreno and Weaver discussed the possibility of future drug deals. On March 25, 1981, Moreno told Weaver that he had located a seller of drugs. Late that night, Moreno took Weaver to a location in Inglewood, California where appellant and his father had adjacent homes on the same lot: appellant lived in the home in the front; the father lived in the home in the rear. According to Weaver's testimony at trial, Moreno, the father, and appellant negotiated to sell four kilograms of cocaine. The discussions took place first at the front home, where the father showed Weaver a small amount of cocaine, and then at the rear home, where the father showed Weaver all four kilos of cocaine. Weaver testified that appellant was present during both displays.

Weaver then left, ostensibly to find purchase money. Instead, Weaver met with DEA agents to make arrangements for the bust.

The next afternoon, Weaver returned to the Garzons' homes with two DEA undercover agents. The father met the three at the front gate and walked them to the rear home. On the way, the father asked appellant to join them in the rear home. Once the six had assembled at the rear home, the father left for a moment and returned with a package that contained cocaine.

One of the DEA agents testified that he and appellant discussed terms of the deal, with appellant limiting the sale to one pound of cocaine.

The father set the package down on the kitchen counter. Either at the father's request, or on his own, appellant then picked up the package, opened it, and showed it to the DEA agents.

Finally, Weaver, the father, and one of the DEA agents left the rear home to retrieve the money. The father was arrested outside. Appellant was arrested inside the rear home with $1100 cash in his pocket. A subsequent search revealed a scale in the rear home, and a scale in the front home.

Appellant's defense at trial was that he had no knowledge of any cocaine deal. Appellant denied involvement at the meeting the night before-a denial corroborated by testimony of his wife, brother, and father. 1 Appellant testified that he joined the group during the next afternoon because his father requested his presence and he was loyal to his father. Appellant denied having had any discussion with the DEA agent about terms of the deal. Appellant admitted only to carrying the package across the room and opening it up to show to the agents. 2

Thus, the jury had to choose between the government's story, which portrayed appellant as a willful, knowing participant in all phases of the deal, and appellant's own story, which portrayed him as innocently present at a short meeting where he opened up a paper bag containing cocaine to show the DEA agents, but without knowledge that cocaine was involved.

II

Over appellant's objection, the trial judge granted the government's request that a "conscious avoidance" instruction be read to the jury. According to this instruction, the jury could have found that appellant had the requisite knowledge if he was aware of the high probability that a drug deal was taking place and deliberately avoided learning the truth. 3 See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).

We explained in United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1977), that the "conscious avoidance" instruction "should not be given in every case where a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, but only in those comparatively rare cases where, in addition, there are facts that point in the direction of deliberate ignorance." Id. at 1325. The instruction should be given rarely because of the risk that the jury will convict on a standard of negligence: that the defendant should have known his conduct was illegal. Thus, even if the circumstances are highly suspicious, the instruction is improper unless the defendant acted deliberately to avoid learning the truth.

Occasionally, failure to inquire will constitute deliberate ignorance. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Any reasonable person would have inquired extensively into the nature of the proposed venture before he invested...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • U.S. v. Heredia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 2 d1 Abril d1 2007
    ...F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1982). Three other federal circuits have followed suit. See United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1149 (11th Cir.2003); Unit......
  • U.S. v. Aguilar
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 2 d4 Setembro d4 1993
    ...definition creates the risk that the jury will convict the defendant for what he should have known, he argues. See United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir.1977). Because there was no evidence of "deliberate ......
  • U.S. v. Heredia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 2 d1 Abril d1 2007
    ...F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1982). Three other federal circuits have followed suit. See United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1149 (11th Cir.2003); Unit......
  • U.S. v. de Francisco-Lopez
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 17 d3 Julho d3 1991
    ...v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1222, 108 S.Ct. 2880, 101 L.Ed.2d 915 (1988); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir.1977). We emphasize that the deliberate ignorance instr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT