U.S. v. Geiser
Citation | 527 F.3d 288 |
Decision Date | 10 June 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 06-4406.,06-4406. |
Parties | UNITED STATES Of America v. Anton GEISER, Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Valerie M. Antonette, Samuel J. Reich, Jay K. Reisinger, Reich, Alexander, Reisinger & Farrell, Adrian N. Roe (Argued), Watkins, Dulac & Roe, Pittsburgh, PA, Attorneys for Appellant.
Christina Giffin (Argued), Stephen J. Paskey, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
In this case, we must decide whether Anton Geiser, who served as an armed Nazi concentration camp guard, "personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of ... [a] group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin" and is thus ineligible for a visa under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub.L. No. 83-203 at § 14(a), 67 Stat. 400, 406 ("RRA"). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Geiser "personally advocated or assisted in ... persecution" and is ineligible for an RRA visa. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's order granting the Government's motion for summary judgment and revoking Geiser's United States citizenship.
Anton Geiser, an ethnic German, was born in 1924 in a part of what was then Yugoslavia and is now Croatia. After German forces invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, Geiser was drafted into the Waffen Schutzstaffel ("SS"). The SS was the elite guard of the Nazi party, and the "Waffen" SS was the "Armed" SS. Certain units of the Waffen SS, the "Death's Head" battalions, were responsible for guarding concentration camps.
Geiser was chosen for a Death's Head battalion and sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Oranienberg, Germany. Geiser received training in how to guard prisoners and was told that if a prisoner tried to escape, he should shoot the prisoner with his rifle or sidearm. He guarded the perimeter of the camp and escorted prisoners to and from labor sites. He also served at Buchenwald concentration camp near Weimar, Germany, as well as Arolsen, a subcamp of Buchenwald. Geiser admits that Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald were places of persecution.
When Allied forces approached, Geiser and his fellow guards fled. They obtained civilian clothing and buried their SS uniforms in the woods. After the war, Geiser worked in Germany and Austria. In 1956, he applied for a United States visa under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and the RRA. Geiser entered the United States in 1956 and was naturalized in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, Pennsylvania, in 1962.
On April 9, 2004, the United States filed a complaint to revoke Geiser's citizenship in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged that Geiser's service as an SS concentration camp guard rendered him ineligible for a visa under the RRA, which provides: "No visa shall be issued under this Act to any person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin." RRA § 14(a). Geiser and the Government filed cross motions for summary judgment.
The District Court rejected Geiser's argument that the term "persecution" in the RRA is ambiguous. Therefore, the Court concluded that Chevron deference, as outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), did not apply. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment and ordered Geiser's citizenship to be revoked.
Geiser filed this timely appeal. He argues that the term "persecution" is ambiguous, and he asks us to reverse and remand for consideration of the second step of the Chevron analysis.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have previously explained our standard of review for an appeal from a grant of summary judgment:
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir.2007) (citations omitted).
"[T]he Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ..., 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), requires revocation of United States citizenship that was illegally procured." Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 493, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). The legality of a naturalization "ultimately turns on" an alien's eligibility under the Act under which he was issued a visa. United States v. Szehinskyj (Szehinskyj I), 277 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir.2002). Therefore, in order to determine whether Geiser's citizenship was illegally procured, we must examine whether he met the RRA's requirements.
The RRA was one of a series of post-World War II immigration statutes. "In 1948, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act ..., [or DPA,] to enable European refugees driven from their homelands by the war to emigrate to the United States without regard to traditional immigration quotas." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495, 101 S.Ct. 737. "Section 13 of the [DPA] ... states ...: `No visas shall be issued under the provisions of this Act, as amended ... to any person ... who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion or national origin.'" Szehinskyj I, 277 F.3d at 334. In 1953, Congress passed the RRA as a successor statute to the DPA. United States v. Friedrich, 402 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2005). The RRA provides: "No visa shall be issued under this Act to any person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin." RRA § 14(a).
The RRA did not displace the then-existing immigration requirements under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). The RRA states: "No person shall be issued a visa ... under [the RRA] unless ... the applicant has established his eligibility for a visa and his admissibility into the United States under this Act and under the immigration laws and regulations." RRA § 11(c).
Geiser's appeal rests on his assertion that RRA § 14(a) is ambiguous because it uses the term "persecution." Geiser argues that because of the ambiguity, the District Court should not have stopped with its Chevron step one analysis, but should have proceeded to inquire at Chevron step two whether the State Department's interpretation of the RRA is reasonable.
We have explained Chevron analysis as follows:
Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 223-24 (3d Cir.2004) (parallel citations omitted).
Thus, at step one, the question is "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," id. at 224— whether serving as a concentration camp guard constitutes "personally advocat[ing] or assist[ing] in ... persecution." RRA § 14(a). At step one, we consider the text and structure of the statute in question. See Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 120 (3d Cir.2005). The parties dispute whether further analysis is required at Chevron step one. Geiser states that according to our case law, a court should refer to legislative history to confirm its step one statutory analysis. To support this proposition, he cites Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388 n. 3 (3d Cir.2005). The Government contends that if the statutory text is unambiguous, it is inappropriate and unnecessary to inquire into the legislative history at step one.
The Government is correct that legislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one. A closer look at Santiago and subsequent cases confirms this point. In Santiago, we stated:
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